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Abstract  In this thesis I develop a novel perspective on human enhancement and its moral and philosophical implications. I begin by describing the scientific developments that have ignited a debate within bioethics on human enhancement and reviewing the ways in which the concept of enhancement has been analysed in the philosophical literature. I then describe some of the ethical arguments that have been proposed both for and against human enhancement.  Human enhancement technologies have the potential to benefit not only individuals, but also human groups – such as our communities and our species. In this thesis I show how these two potential uses of enhancement technologies often conflict. The use of cognitive enhancement technologies to make individuals smarter may reduce our collective ability to solve problems; the use of life extension technologies to increase the lifespan of individuals may reduce the long term persistence of the species; and the use of genetic enhancements to improve individual wellbeing may make society as a whole worse off.  In Chapter 1 I argue that the use of genetic enhancement technologies to benefit individuals could reduce valuable forms of genetic diversity and undermine the continued survival of the human species. In Chapter 2 I develop this idea further to show that the rational use of particular reproductive technologies by individuals could have a negative effect on society as a whole, including future generations. I argue this provides a plausible prima facie reason to restrict access to particular enhancement technologies. In Chapter 3 I discuss the use of reproductive technologies to screen against disability. I argue that in some cases the state will have good reason to prevent people from accessing disability screening technologies. This is because some disabilities contribute to valuable forms of human diversity which benefit our populations as a whole. In Chapter 4, I turn my attention to debates regarding cognitive enhancement. I argue that to date the focus of cognitive enhancement has been too narrow. Rather than considering enhancing just the cognitive attributes of individuals we should instead focus on enhancing our collective capacity to solve problems. I suggest this involves enhancing our ability to cooperate with each other as much as it involves changing aspects of our cognition. In my final chapter I discuss life extension technologies. I suggest that radically extending the lifespan of individuals may reduce the adaptability of our populations, and species as a whole, through both genetic and cultural mechanisms.  I conclude by arguing for the need to think of human enhancement as a collective enterprise. When individuals use enhancement technologies to alter their traits, they do so in the context of many others having access to the same technologies. In order to secure the greatest benefit for all we need to coordinate our enhancement decisions.     
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Introduction  A world in which we can radically alter our basic capabilities is looking increasingly feasible. As a result of advances in pharmacology, neuroscience and genetics, technologies are being developed which can make us smarter, stronger, kinder and allow us to live longer. The moral implications of these enhancement technologies have been at the centre of numerous debates within bioethics over the past two decades.   This introduction to the topic of human enhancement is in four parts. In Part 1 I look at the scientific and technological advances that have made human enhancement possible.  In Part 2, I analyse the concept of enhancement and develop several alternative ways of understanding human enhancement. In Part 3, I look at some of the ethical arguments that have been developed for and against human enhancement as a general project. In Part 4, I provide a context statement which summarises the five chapters that comprise the body of this thesis and explains their relevance to the enhancement debate.   
Part 1: The science and technology of human enhancement My discussion of the science and technology of human enhancement is divided into four sections. The first section focusses on a general class of enhancement technologies – reproductive genetic technologies. The next three sections focus on potential targets of enhancement technologies: life extension; cognitive enhancement; and moral enhancement.  
Reproductive genetic technologies 
Prenatal testing and selective abortion  In a seminal article in the journal Nature, Fuchs and Riis1 described a technique which enabled practitioners to determine whether embryos possessed specific genetic factors based on extractions of amniotic fluid. This technique formed the basis of the first ever prenatal test. By the mid-1970s prenatal tests were regularly used to test embryos for a range of conditions including Down Syndrome (trisomy 21) and muscular dystrophy. In addition to identifying chromosomal abnormalities, contemporary prenatal tests can detect the presence of single gene mutations associated with conditions such as cystic fibrosis, and also genetic predispositions to complex diseases such as breast and ovarian cancer.2  The invention of prenatal tests marked an important milestone in human reproduction. When used in combination with abortion, prenatal tests enable parents to avoid having children with particular genes and chromosomes. Women who do not wish to have a child with Down Syndrome can utilise prenatal tests to check for the extra chromosome associated with this condition, and abort the foetus if it is detected. Prenatal tests therefore mark the first reproductive technology which gives parents some control of the genetic makeup of their children.3  
1 F. Fuchs & P. Riis. Antenatal Sex Determination. Nature 1956; 177: 330-330. 
2 N. Petrucelli, et al. Hereditary breast and ovarian cancer due to mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2. Genet 
Med 2010; 12: 245-259. 
3 Of course, individuals have long had non-technological means of influencing the genetic makeup of their children through partner choice.   
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However parental testing with selective abortion only gives parents a very limited influence over their children’s genetic constitution. While it is an effective method of selecting against undesirable genetic diseases or predispositions, it has limited usefulness as a method to select for particular traits. When having a selective abortion a mother must initially make a decision to destroy a particular embryo with no guarantee she will be able to conceive another one in the future. Given the costs involved in both having an abortion, and attempting to conceive another child, this method is, and will likely continue to be, primarily used to select against serious diseases and disabilities.4    
In-vitro fertilisation (IVF) and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) The advent of IVF in the 1970s marked another important milestone in human reproduction. For the first time in history human embryos could be created entirely outside the body of the mother. This innovation was followed in the early 1990s by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, in which the embryos created in-vitro were tested for the presence or absence of particular genes.5  PGD was initially developed as an alternative to prenatal testing and selective abortion. It allowed parents to avoid having children with serious disabilities without the emotional and physical costs associated with abortion. However the potential for IVF and PGD to be used for non-medical purposes soon became apparent. Through IVF, multiple embryos can be created, all of which can be tested before implantation. It is thus technologically possible for parents to choose between embryos based on the presence of genes associated with non-medical traits such as height or intelligence. Choosing an embryo that is likely to be taller, for example, comes at little extra cost to the mother.   Many human traits have a strong genetic component, and could thus potentially be targeted though PGD. Geneticists have already identified genes associated with height,6 intelligence,7 and musical ability.8 As our knowledge of genetics increases, it will likely become possible to perform quite sophisticated genetic analyses on embryos before implantation. Hence IVF and PGD potentially provide parents with a mechanism to influence a great variety of traits in their children.  
Genetic engineering  In addition to being able to select between embryos based on their genetic makeup, parents may soon have the ability to directly modify embryos, using genetic engineering technologies. Genetic engineering technologies potentially allow new genes to be inserted into embryonic DNA; and existing genes to be modified or deleted. 
4 The major exception to this is sex – which is a significant non-disease trait that can easily be selected for through the use of prenatal tests and selective abortion. However there are more readily available technologies that enable sex selection, like ultrasonography. Imaging techniques like ultrasonography have been a much more significant driver of sex selection than prenatal tests in countries where social sex selection is common. For example see J. B. Nie. Non-medical sex-selective abortion in China: ethical and public policy issues in the context of 40 million missing females. Br Med Bull 2011; 98: 7-20. 5 A.A. Theodosiou & M.H. Johnson. The politics of human embryo research and the motivation to achieve PGD. Reprod. Biomed. Online 2011; 22: 457-471. 
6 S. I. Berndt, et al. Genome-wide meta-analysis identifies 11 new loci for anthropometric traits and provides insights into genetic architecture. Nat Genet 2013; 45: 501-512. 
7 S. Desrivieres, et al. Single nucleotide polymorphism in the neuroplastin locus associates with cortical thickness and intellectual ability in adolescents. Mol Psychiatry 2014; DOI: 10.1038/mp.2013.197 
8 J. Oikkonen, et al. A genome-wide linkage and association study of musical aptitude identifies loci containing genes related to inner ear development and neurocognitive functions. Mol Psychiatry 2014; DOI: 10.1038/mp.2014.8.   
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These technologies could potentially be used to create much more significant changes to the traits of children than is possible through IVF and PGD.  Genetic engineering technologies have been successfully used on other species to alter their physical, cognitive and social characteristics. For example, in 2007 Scientists at Case Western Reserve University used genetic engineering technologies to alter a gene called “PEPCK-A” in mice. The resulting transgenic mice could run for 6 kilometres without a break – 30 times longer than a normal mouse’s limit of 200 metres. They also had extended lifespans compared to their unaltered counterparts, and retained the ability to breed well into old age.9 In 1999, scientists engineered mice to overexpress the gene “NR2B”, which codes for a nerve cell receptor. This was shown to lead to dramatic improvements in memory, with transgenic mice being able to remember objects and experiences for many days longer than unaltered mice.10 The social characteristics of some animals have also been altered using genetic engineering technologies. Polygamous voles can be turned monogamous by modifying genes associated with the vassopressin V1a receptor.11  Recent advances in genetics have increased the probability of genetic engineering technologies being used on human embryos in the near future. The methods used to create transgenic animals, such as those described above, are not feasible for human use for safety and technical reasons.12 However the recently developed CRISPR genetic modification technique is safer and more precise than these older methods. The CRISPR technique uses customisable snippets of RNA to guide a DNA cutting mechanism, Cas9, to precise locations in the genome. It then triggers DNA repair mechanisms that can alter a gene by inserting an alternative DNA sequence from another template. It has already been used to make precise genetic modifications to primate embryos which have been subsequently expressed in adult organisms.13 In November 2013, the company Editas Medicine, announced that it had raised $43 million in venture capital and plans to use the funds to develop treatments for human diseases and illnesses that utilise the CRISPR method of genetic engineering.14 In the future then, it seems plausible that it will be technologically possible for parents to modify the DNA of embryos created through IVF. As genetic technologies continue to advance, it may also become possible for embryos conceived naturally to be modified via vectors delivered directly to the uterus. This will not only provide a novel way for parents to be able to treat and prevent disease, it could also allow parents to influence a wide range of non-medical characteristics of their children.  
Selective fertilisation and gamete modification Recent advances in genomics have given parents another way of influencing the genetic makeup of their children. Rather than selecting between embryos, or modifying existing embryos, parents may soon be able to differentially create embryos with 
9 P. Hakimi, et al. Overexpression of the cytosolic form of phosphoenolpyruvate carboxykinase (GTP) in skeletal muscle repatterns energy metabolism in the mouse. J Biol Chem 2007; 282: 32844-32855. 
10 Y. P. Tang, et al. Genetic enhancement of learning and memory in mice. Nature 1999; 401: 63-69. 
11 M. M. Lim, et al. Enhanced partner preference in a promiscuous species by manipulating the expression of a single gene. Nature 2004; 429: 754-757. 
12 H. Shen. First monkeys with customized mutations born. Nature 2014; DOI: 10.1038/nature.2014.14611 
13 Y. Niu, et al. Generation of gene-modified cynomolgus monkey via Cas9/RNA-mediated gene targeting in one-cell embryos. Cell 2014; 156: 836-843. 
14 H. Shen. CRISPR technology leaps from lab to industry. Nature 2013; DOI:10.1038/nature.2013.14299. 
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desirable genetic characteristics. This possibility first received wide spread attention when personal genomics Company ‘23andMe’ received a patent to a technology called ‘Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations’.15 This technology would allow individuals accessing assisted reproductive services to choose between sperm or egg donors based on the statistical likelihood of the resulting child having a certain phenotype. Using 23andMe’s technology a woman wanting a blue-eyed child could select sperm donors to maximise this probability. She would differentially create an embryo with desirable characteristics, rather than selecting between different embryos or modifying an existing one.  Similar techniques could provide an alternative to PGD for couples accessing IVF. Rather than performing genetic tests on embryos and then choosing which to implant based on the results of those genetic tests, testing could be done directly on gametes.  Particular sperm could then be combined with particular eggs based on the likelihood of the resulting embryos having certain genes.   Importantly these selective fertilisation techniques could be used in combination with the genetic modification technologies described above. The CRISPR technique could be used to modify the DNA of sperm; and modified sperm could then be combined with particular eggs to create embryos with specific genetic characteristics.   Life extension  Ageing has long been thought to be an unavoidable part of life. Although the past century has seen a rapid raise in human life expectancy (the number of years the average human can expect to live), human lifespan (the maximum amount of time a human can live) has remained more or less unchanged for the last 100,000 years at approximately 125.16 Until very recently the possibility of interventions that could significant alter human lifespan seemed unfeasible. However in the 1980s scientists started to develop ways to alter lifespan in other species of animals. In 1986, scientists showed that restricting the caloric intake of mice increased their lifespan by up to 65%.17 Since then caloric restriction has been shown to increase lifespan in a diverse range of species including yeast,18 fruit flies19 and dogs.20 Other interventions have also been developed which can increase lifespan in other animals. Altering the expression of certain genes increases lifespan in a range of species, sometimes by as much as 100%.21 Pharmacological interventions have also been developed that slow the progression of age-related decline in several species.22  
15 US patent: us 8,543,339. 
16 M. Tosato, et al. The aging process and potential interventions to extend life expectancy. Clin Interv Aging 2007; 2: 401-412. 
17 R. Weindruch. The Retardation of Aging by Caloric Restriction: Studies in Rodents and Primates. Toxicol 
Pathol 1996; 24: 742-745. 
18 S. J. Lin, et al. Calorie restriction extends yeast life span by lowering the level of NADH. Genes Dev 2004; 18: 12-16. 
19 K. J. Min, et al. Counting calories in Drosophila diet restriction. Exp Gerontol 2007; 42: 247-251. 
20 R. D. Kealy, et al. Effects of diet restriction on life span and age-related changes in dogs. J Am Vet Med 
Assoc 2002; 220: 1315-1320. 
21 H. R. Warner. Longevity genes: from primitive organisms to humans. Mech Ageing Dev 2005; 126: 235-242. 
22 V. Anisimov. Insulin/IGF-1 signaling pathway driving aging and cancer as a target for pharmacological intervention. Exp Gerontol 2003; 38: 1041-1049. 
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While to date most interventions which increase lifespan have only managed to slow the ageing process, some recent studies indicate that it is possible to manipulate the ageing process in more radical ways. In 2013, Gomes and co-authors were able to actually reverse age-related decline in older mice by increasing levels of the enzyme nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+).23 This suggests it is possible to actually stop and reverse, rather than just slow, the ageing process.   As humans are comparatively already quite long lived, extending human lifespan poses a much more significant challenge than extending the lifespan of short lived creatures like mice and worms. Caloric restriction, for example, does not seem to increase lifespan in humans and other primates.24 However it seems plausible that in the long-term, interventions that radically extend human lifespan will become technologically possible. Aubrey de Grey, a biomedical gerontologist and long-time advocate of human life extension, describes ageing as “a collection of cumulative changes to the molecular and cellular structure of the adult organism”.25 The changes are surprisingly few in number, being: cell loss (without replacement), oncogenic nuclear mutations, mitochondrial mutations, lysosomal aggregates, extracellular aggregates, cell senescence, extracellular protein-protein cross linking, immune system decline and endocrine decline.     If ageing only consists of these limited number of physical changes, then it is theoretically possible to stop and reverse ageing merely by preventing and reversing these changes. As our technologies become more and more advanced, the likelihood of humans gaining the ability to combat these physical changes increases. For example genetic engineering technologies could one day be used to prevent and reverse nuclear and mitochondrial mutations. Nanotechnologies could one day be used to remove lysosomal aggregates and extracellular aggregates from our cells. The futurist Raymond Kurzweil has predicted that medical nanobots will one day be developed which can be incorporated into our cells and repair all age related damage as it occurs.26  Corporate interest in human life extension is likely to lead to an increase in the funding that is available for life extension research. Google, one of the world’s largest companies, recently established a subsidiary called Calico, with the sole focus of investigating ways to combat human ageing.27 Similarly Craig Ventor, whose company Celera Genomics was the first to sequence the human genome, recently established Human Longevity Inc, a new company with a focus on enhancing human lifespan.28 The involvement of companies like this in life extension research will drive further scientific and technological developments. 
23 A. P. Gomes, et al. Declining NAD(+) induces a pseudohypoxic state disrupting nuclear-mitochondrial communication during aging. Cell 2013; 155: 1624-1638. 
24 A. Maxmen. Calorie restriction falters in the long run. Nature 2012; 488: 569-569. 
25 A. D. de Grey. An Engineer's Approach to the Development of Real Anti-Aging Medicine. Sci Aging 
Knowledge Environ 2003; 2003: 1vp-1. 
26 R. Kurzweil. The Singularity Is Near. New York: Penguin: 2005. p. 39.   
27 M. Liedtke. 2013. Google tackles immortality with launch of health company Calico. Sydney Morning 
Herald 19 September. Available at: www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/google-tackles-immortality-with-launch-of-health-company-calico-20130919-2u1fh.html [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 
28 C. Cookson. 2014. Can we extend healthy life? Financial Times March 14. Available at: 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/566821c0-aa4d-11e3-8497-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wI7LBe12 [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 
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In sum, it is possible that in the future we will have the ability to radically extend human lifespan. Ageing consists of a series of physical changes. Once technologies are available that slow, stop or reverse these changes, then a world where we can reverse, slow or stop human ageing seems plausible.  Cognitive enhancement Cognitive enhancements are already a ubiquitous feature of our society. Drugs like caffeine and sugar improve mental functioning, and are regularly used for their enhancing effects. Information processing devices such as computers are used to amplify our cognitive abilities. On an even more basic level, education and training not only impart specific bits of knowledge but also improve our core mental capacities.29  These “conventional” cognitive enhancements are widely used and uncontroversial. However recent developments have raised the possibility that individuals may soon have access to more radical types of cognitive enhancements.  Advances in pharmacology have led to the development of new classes of drugs which target cognitive performance. Modafinil, initially developed as a treatment for the symptoms associated with sleep apnoea, has been shown to improve performance in working memory tasks;30 and has also been associated with improved learning outcomes for individuals undergoing cognitive training.31 Methylphenidate, developed as a treatment for attention hyperactivity disorder, has also been shown to improve performance in a variety of memory tasks in healthy volunteers.32 These drugs are already widely used for cognitive enhancement purposes. Recent studies indicate that up to 20% of university students take drugs like Modafinil and Methylphenidate to improve their academic performance.33 Other aspects of cognition such as creativity have also been shown to be influenced through pharmacological interventions.34 Therefore, in the not so distant future, individuals may have access to a range of powerful drugs capable of enhancing many aspects of their cognition.   Another possible avenue for cognitive enhancement in the near term is transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS works by creating strong magnetic fields near the skull, which can increase or decrease the excitability of neurons in particular parts of the brain. This is primarily used in a clinical setting to treat depression. However it has also been shown to improve performance in a number of tasks. For example using TMS to stimulate the motor cortex helps individuals learn new motor tasks.35 Recently it has been demonstrated that TMS stimulation of the temporoparietal junction – which is involved in language processing – helps individuals learn and maintain a novel vocabulary.36 These studies show that TMS could be used to amplify the effect of 
29 A. Sandberg. Cognition Enhancement: Upgrading the Brain. In: Enhancing Human Capacites. J. Savulescu, et al., eds. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing; 2011. pp. 71-91. 
30 U. Muller, et al. Effects of modafinil on working memory processes in humans. Psychopharmacology 
(Berl) 2004; 177: 161-169. 
31 J. Gilleen, et al. Modafinil combined with cognitive training is associated with improved learning in healthy volunteers--a randomised controlled trial. Eur Neuropsychopharmacol 2014; 24: 529-539. 
32 A. M. Linssen, et al. Methylphenidate produces selective enhancement of declarative memory consolidation in healthy volunteers. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 2012; 221: 611-619. 
33 C. Housden, et al. Cognitive Enhancing Drugs: Neuroscience and Society. In Enhancing Human Capacities. J. Savulescu, et al., eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 2011. pp. 113-126.  
34 Sandberg, op. cit. note 29. 
35 M. A. Nitsche, et al. Facilitation of implicit motor learning by weak transcranial direct current stimulation of the primary motor cortex in the human. J Cogn Neurosci 2003; 15: 619-626. 
36 M. Meinzer, et al. Transcranial direct current stimulation over multiple days improves learning and maintenance of a novel vocabulary. Cortex 2014; 50: 137-147. 
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conventional enhancements such as education. It has been predicted that TMS technology could be incorporated into electronic devices like e-readers and iPads to enhance the learning experience derived from using them.  As stated above, the use of external information processing systems such as computers can dramatically boost our cognitive capacities. In the future, these devices may be able to be internalised and incorporated into our brains. Some brain-computer interfaces, like Cochlear implants, are already widely used. Recently the first ever retinal implant was also approved as a treatment for retinitis pigmentosa.37 However devices like this need not only be used to treat disease. Advanced cochlear implants could improve the hearing of people not suffering from any form of hearing impairment. Similarly, retinal implants could be used to improve people’s vision.  The digital elements of the cochlear and retinal implants could in principle be connected to any kind of software and hardware. This means that in the future much more radical types of computer-brain interfaces could be developed, which would allow individuals to interact with any number of digital applications.38  These types of devices could potentially enable quite radical enhancement of our cognitive capacities.   Moral enhancement The newest class of enhancement technologies to draw attention in bioethical circles is moral enhancement. Some interventions make people more or less prone to experience certain moral emotions such as empathy. This subsequently affects people’s moral decision making and their responses to moral dilemmas.  For example, taking beta blockers such as propanol can help reduce implicit racial bias,39 and influence people’s moral judgements.40 Administration of the hormone oxytocin has been shown to improve trust among participants in simple cooperation games.41 Oxytocin also appears to give individuals a more tribalistic psychology, making them biased toward members perceived to be in one’s in-group, and more willing to sacrifice those perceived to be in an out-group. Increasing serotonin levels makes individuals more likely to cooperate in prisoner dilemma games. All of this provides strong evidence that pharmacological interventions can influence our moral behaviour.  In the future, direct stimulation of the brain could be used to target our moral decision making. TMS has been shown to reduce some of the social symptoms associated with autism,42 and may be able to be used to enhance empathy in other individuals. A more novel way of stimulating the brain, called optogenetics, which uses light to stimulate particular neurons, has been used influence social behaviour in other species of animals.43 In addition to directly altering our moral behaviour, techniques like this 
37 J. Steenhuysen. 2013. FDA approves first retinal implant for rare eye disease. Reuters 14 February. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/14/us-secondsight-fda-eyeimplant-idUSBRE91D1AK20130214  [Accessed 16 October 2014] 38 Sandberg, op. cit. note 28. 39 S. Terbeck, et al. Propranolol reduces implicit negative racial bias. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 2012; 222: 419-424. 40 S. Terbeck, et al. Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement. Biol Psychol 2013; 92: 323-328. 41 M. Kosfeld, et al. Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature 2005; 435: 673-676. 42 L. Geddes. Empathy enhanced by magnetic stimulation of the brain. New Sci 2011; 211: 6-7. 
43 O. Yizhar, et al. Neocortical excitation/inhibition balance in information processing and social dysfunction. Nature 2011; 477: 171-178. 
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could be used to improve the effectiveness of traditional forms of moral enhancement such as moral education. Genetic engineering technologies could also one day be used as a mechanism to achieve moral enhancement. Recently specific genes have been found that make individuals more sensitive to unfairness, perhaps indicating that an individual’s sense of justice could be targeted through genetic modifications.44 Other genetic modifications may also improve people’s ability to act on moral principles they affirm. Good self-control and reasoning ability affect one’s ability to act morally, and could potentially be targeted by genetic interventions.     Therefore, although the science of moral enhancement is still in its infancy, it seems likely that interventions will one day be available that alter the moral behaviour of individuals.  
Part 2: Enhancement concepts All of the above technological advances are generally discussed under the banner of “human enhancement”. However it is not immediately clear what is meant by this term. “Enhancement” is used in a variety of ways among bioethicists. Some use the term to describe all interventions which increase or intensify certain capacities. Others use the term more narrowly to denote interventions that go beyond the purpose of medicine. Recently there has been a push to understand enhancement in a more normative sense, to denote interventions which are good for individuals. The lack of consensus regarding how best to understand “enhancement” has long been cited as a factor impeding the ethical debate about enhancement technologies. In 1998 Erik Parens reported that many bioethicists believed “the term enhancement is so freighted with erroneous assumptions and so ripe for abuse that we ought not even to use it”.45  More recently, Earp and co-authors stated 
 ‘enhancement debates’ in biomedical ethics have been needlessly encumbered by 
the existence of a hodge-podge of ill-defined, poorly articulated notions of 
enhancement—often only implicitly communicated – along with endless to-ing 
and fro-ing about the relationship between enhancement and the limits of 
medicine.46  In this section, I will discuss several different ways in which the term “enhancement” is used in the literature. I will first examine the functional sense of enhancement, which understands enhancement as a purely descriptive concept. I will then look at approaches which define enhancement as interventions which go beyond the purposes of medicine, or go beyond what is typical for our species. I will then look at more recent attempts to define enhancement that incorporate normative notions like “a good life” or “change for the better”.   
44 S. Zhong, et al. Dopamine D4 receptor gene associated with fairness preference in ultimatum game. PLoS 
One 2010; 5: e13765. 
45 E. Parens. Special Supplement: Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. The Hastings Center 
Report 1998; 28: 1-17. 
46 B. D. Earp, et al. When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics. Front Syst Neurosci 2014; 8: 12. 
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Functional approach to enhancement One way the term “enhance” can be used is to signify interventions which increase performance on some measure. We might say that caffeine enhances reaction speed, by which we just mean is that caffeine increases reaction speed. Similarly some people use “enhance” to refer to increases in some capacity. For example, if we say taking steroids enhances muscle growth, we just mean that steroids increase muscle growth. This sense of enhancement fits with the definition of enhance in the Oxford English Dictionary: “To raise in degree, heighten, intensify”. 47 In this spirit we can describe a “functional approach” to human enhancement (FA), which defines enhancements as interventions which increase some functioning or 
capacity.48 In their review piece on enhancement concepts, Earp and co-authors describe a similar approach to enhancement which they call the “functional-augmentative approach”: 
Interventions are considered enhancements insofar as they improve some 
capacity or function (such as cognition, vision, hearing, alertness) by increasing 
the ability of the function to do what it normally does.49 Under this approach, “enhancement” is a purely descriptive term, referring only to the direction of change achieved in a particular trait. Enhancements always increase particular traits. Hence height enhancements always makes people taller, memory enhancements always improve memory and so on. With this approach we must specify the trait that is being enhanced. More broadly we can say that something is a cognitive enhancement when it increases the functioning of at least one cognitive trait, and something is a physical enhancement when it increases at least one physical trait.  The functional approach to human enhancement is very broad and encompasses many common human practices like education and training. The narrower term “biomedical enhancements”, is used to designate biotechnologies which enhance our traits.    One advantage of understating enhancement in a functional sense is that the extension of the term is often clear. The claim that something is an enhancement just means that it increases some capacity, which can often be easily checked.50 Hence the class of technologies which are “memory enhancements“ or “height enhancements” is relatively easy to determine.   One criticism of the functional approach is that it does not align with how the term enhancement is ordinarily used. Many therapies work by increasing some capacity or function. For example respiratory medications improve respiratory function; anti-depressants improve psychological wellbeing, and cochlear implants improve hearing. On a functional approach, these interventions will be considered as enhancements. However these are normally considered as therapeutic interventions rather than as enhancements.   
47 W. Little. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1959. p. 612. 
48 This later point is to recognise that some enhancements may give people entirely new abilities, rather than just increasing existing functions.   
49 Earp et al, op. cit. note 46. 
50 Of course it is also the case that something can be an enhancement in one sense, but a diminishment in another sense. Alcohol for example may enhance confidence, but diminish balance.   
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Further, some interventions considered as enhancements do not fit within the functional definition. For example, consider the use of propranolol to reduce the emotional intensity of certain experiences, or the possibility of “anti-love” biotechnologies. Earp et al believe that:  
interventions of this kind raise many of the same patterns of ethical concern as 
the more conventional cases of functional enhancement typically encountered in 
the bioethics literature….. At the same time, however—given a functional-
augmentative framework—these cases might seem puzzling or out of place. They 
seem puzzling because they apparently involve the very opposite of enhancement, 
namely, diminishment: i.e., diminishment of wartime memories; diminishment of 
harmful love; diminishment of ill-directed lust, and so on.51 In addition some biotechnologies may not increase or diminish particular capacities but rather give individuals entirely new capacities. Imagine advanced biotechnologies which allowed individuals to navigate through the use of sonar, like some species of bats. These technologies would not be considered as enhancements under FA as they do not increase any existing functions. However many people would consider interventions like these as a type of enhancement.  Hence embracing the functional sense of enhancement would be revisionist, it would require us to change the way we ordinarily use the term. Rather than acting as an all-encompassing term that denotes all interventions that manipulate our traits outside a medical context, enhancements would be just one type of human modification technology. In addition to enhancements we must also recognise diminishments, interventions which decrease some functioning or capacity; as well as biotechnologies that give people entirely new capacities.  
The not-medicine approach to enhancement  As indicated above, an intuitive understanding of enhancements sees them as interventions which alter our capacities outside the context of treating disease. Drawing on Eric Juengst,52 Earp et al describe (but do not endorse) the “not-therapy” approach, which defines enhancement as “interventions designed to improve human 
form or functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health”.53 This approach draws a sharp distinction between enhancements and therapies. The use of respiratory medications to improve lung function is a therapy when used by someone suffering from lung disease, but it is an enhancement when used by a healthy individual. This view of enhancement is also reflected in the title of some of the most influential works on human enhancement including the President’s Council of Bioethics’ “Beyond Therapy”54 and Elliot’s and Kramer’s “Better Than Well”.55    
51 Earp et al, op. cit. note 46. 
52 E. T. Juengst. Can enhancement be distinguished from prevention in genetic medicine? J Med Philos 1997; 22: 125-142. 
53 Earp et al, op. cit. note 45. 
54 President’s Council on Bioethics. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. General Books; 2011. 
55 C. Elliott & P. D. Kramer. Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream. W. W. Norton; 2004. 
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Many theorists who use the not-therapy approach to enhancement treat the distinction between enhancements and therapies as morally significant. For example, when discussing genetic enhancement Anderson states that: 
On medical and ethical grounds we should draw a line excluding any form of 
enhancement engineering. We should not step over the line that delineates 
treatment from enhancement.56 This approach of enhancement assumes that we have an uncontentious and clear account of disease and health.57 However, what constitutes a disorder or disease is highly contested, and different scholars work with different concepts of disease. Hence depending on how one characterises disease, one can describe different variants of the not-medicine approach to enhancement.58      Constructivists about disease believe that conditions are classed as disease based only on societies’ norms and values. Different societies with different values will consider different states to be diseases. In support of this claim, constructivists point to cases like drapetomania,59 a “disease” described in 1851 which caused slaves to run away,60 and the fact that masturbation used to be considered a disease.61  This definition of disease can be used to develop what I will call the “constructivist approach” to enhancement (CA). Under CA enhancements are alterations to human 
capacities which are not performed in the context of treating disease – with diseases 
understood as states which are disvalued by society in a particular way .62,63 On CA there are no underlying biological differences between enhancements and therapies. What we happen to classify as enhancements or therapies is determined by the current values of society and will change over time, and be different in other societies. Something like this conception of enhancement is reflected in the work of James Canton: 
The future may hold different definitions of human enhancement affecting: 
culture, intelligence, memory, physical performance, even longevity. Different 
cultures will define human performance given their social and political values. It 
56 W. F. Anderson. Genetics and Human Malleability. Hastings Cent Rep 1990; 20: 20-22 
57 D. Resnik. The Moral Significance of the Therapy-Enhancement Distinction in Human Genetics. 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 365-377. 
58 J. Savulescu, et al. Well-Being and Enhancement. In: Enhancing Human Capacities. J. Savulescu, et al., eds. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing; 2011. pp. 3-18. 
59 Earp et al, op. cit. note 45.  
60 A. Samuel. Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race. DeBow's Review 1851; 11. 
61 D. Murphy. 2009. Concepts of Disease and Health. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=health-disease [Accessed 02 September 2014]. 
62 One criticism of the constructivist approach to disease is that it is difficult to provide a convincing account of the “particular” way in which disease states are disvalued, without appealing to objective facts about the body (see Murphy, ibid). It is clear that that not all states which are disvalued by society are considered as diseases. Being “impoverished” or “unpopular” are example of states that may be disvalued which would not be considered as diseases. Hence proponents of CA need to provide an account of the particular way in which diseased states are disvalued which does not appeal to facts about the body.  
63 This view of enhancement is similar to the “ideological approach” described by Savulescu, et al., op. cit. note 58. 
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is for our nation to define these values and chart the future of human 
performance.64  CA offers a purely normative account of enhancement. Which technologies are considered as enhancement is determined by values rather than empirical facts. However it is doubtful that the distinction between enhancements and therapies is morally significant on CA. For example, on CA the fact that we believe giving Ritalin to someone suffering from ADHD is a therapy, and giving it to a non-sufferer is an enhancement, merely reflects the fact that society doesn’t value the cognitive style associated with ADHD. However this fact, by itself, does not help determine whether the provision of Ritalin is morally permissible in either case. As the example of drapetomania shows, society’s values are often flawed.  Objectivists differ from constructivists in that they believe there is some type of underlying biological malfunction that characterises disease. Many objectivists believe that disease is just biological malfunction and disease status can be inferred solely on the basis of biological facts about the body. The most well-articulated approach to the not-medicine approach to enhancement has been derived from the objectivist account of disease developed by Christopher Boorse, which is known as the Biostatical theory (BST).65 The BST holds that a disease is something which “reduces one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency”. The normal function of a given trait within a species is described as its “statistically typical contribution(s)… to….individual survival and reproduction”.66 Hence, according to the BST we all have “species-typical” biological functions which support our survival and reproduction, and diseases are states in which these functions are compromised.67 We can determine whether an individual is suffering from a disease statistically, by comparing their functions to others in an appropriate reference class (normally others of the same species, sex and age). For example, if someone’s blood pressure is statistically significantly higher than others in her reference class, we can conclude she suffers from some form of cardiovascular disease.68     Swartz uses the account of disease provided by the BST to distinguish between therapies and enhancement:  
Philosophers and ethicists have defined “health” in myriad ways, but the approach 
that I would favor in this context ties health to normal functioning….. The function 
of a given trait in a species is the way that it typically contributes to survival and 
reproduction in individuals with that trait… Focusing on proper functioning in 
this way correctly classifies which interventions are treatments and which are 
enhancements. For instance, if the presence of some toxin (such as lead) in a 
child’s home would interfere with the normal development of his brain, then 
64 J. Canton. The Impact of Convergent Technologies and the Future of Business and the Economy. In: NBIC 
Convergence for Improving Human Performance. Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology 
and Cognitive Science. C. Roco and W. S. Bainbridge, eds. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2003. pp. 71-78. 
65 C. Boorse. Health as a theoretical concept. Philos Sci 1977; 44: 542-573. 
66 Ibid.  
67 It’s important to note that it is the disruption of functions that support survival and reproduction, rather than survival and reproduction itself which determines disease. For example, catching a cold often has no effect on your survival and reproduction, but it disrupts functions which support survival and reproduction, such as pulmonary function.  
68 This is assuming that high blood pressure impairs ones long term survival.  
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removing the toxin or counteracting its effects would certainly count as a medical 
intervention. And this remains true even if the result is raising the child’s IQ from 
140 to 160. In contrast, if there is no toxin, and the intervention instead raises the 
IQ from 140 to 160 by causing overgrowth of some part of the brain, this would 
count as enhancement.69 
 This builds on earlier work by Norman Daniels: 
Generally, this is taken to mean that the service involves treatment of a disease or 
disability, where disease and disability are seen as departures from species-typical 
normal functional organization or functioning. Characterizing medical need in 
this way implies a contrast between uses of medical services that treat disease (or 
disability) conditions and uses that merely enhance human performance or 
appearance. Enhancement does not meet a medical need even where the service 
may correct for a competitive disadvantage that does not result from prior 
choices. 70     
 Drawing on this work we can describe a different version of the not-medicine approach to enhancement, which uses a normal-functioning account of disease. The “normal functioning approach” (NFA) sees enhancements as: alterations to human capacities 
which are not performed in the context of treating disease – with diseases understood as 
deviations from normal functioning.71    NFA provides a purely descriptive account of enhancement. The normal functioning model draws on the BST which holds that a disease is abnormal functioning that disrupts survival and reproduction. Which technologies are considered as enhancements, and which are considered as therapies, is therefore determined purely by empirical facts. Given that enhancement under NFA is a purely descriptive concept, a separate argument is required to demonstrate that the distinction between therapy and enhancement is morally significance. Given that there is more to a good life, more to an individual’s well-being, than just surviving and reproducing, there may be good reasons to doubt that a distinction between therapies and enhancements on a normal functioning account will have moral significance. For example one of the criticisms of the BST is that it implies that homosexuality is a disease, because it leads to states which reduce fertility.72 However even if it were technically true that homosexuality is a disease according to the BST model, it seems an entirely different question whether therapies for homosexuality would be morally permissible. Relatedly, some studies indicate that a very high IQ is independently correlated with reduced fertility. Hence it could also be argued that a very high IQ is a disease according to the BST. However, it seems that even if it were true that having a high IQ reduced fertility, having a high IQ could still be a good thing, all things considered. In these cases “therapies” designed to treat high IQ would likely be bad for individuals. Hence not all treatments are morally permissible on a normal functioning account of disease.  
69 P. H. Schwartz. Defending the distinction between treatment and enhancement. Am J Bioeth 2005; 5: 17-19; discussion W14-19. 
70 N. Daniels. The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care. In: Justice and the 
Human Genome Project. F. Murphy, M. A. Lappé, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1994. pp. 110-132 
71 With normal functioning, in turn, understood as per the BST as a statistical concept.  
72 E. Kingma. What is it to be healthy? Analysis 2007; 67: 128-133. 
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 Similarly it is unlikely that all enhancements are morally impermissible under a normal functioning account. Take the example of vaccines, Eric Juengst states that:    
both normal immunization and the new "genetic immunizations" are hard cases 
for the Normal Function account. Susceptibility to infection by the polio virus is 
not a deviation from normal species typical functioning. Similarly, an individual's 
need for immunization does not require the loss of a functional efficiency or a 
disability. It simply reflects a human inability: the inability of the individual's 
immune system effectively to resist infection upon initial exposure to this virus.73  However despite the fact that vaccines may well be considered as an enhancement by NFA, it’s not clear this fact gives us any reason to doubt the clear moral desirability of vaccines.     In sum, while we can describe at least two different versions of the not-medicine approach to enhancement, neither provides a distinction between therapies and enhancements that carries the morally significance proponents of this approach sometimes assume it to have.   
Species-based approaches to enhancement Although Daniels’ normal functioning account of enhancement was originally formulated to be used to help distinguish therapies from enhancements, it can also form the basis of a different conception of enhancement that is independent of therapy. I will call this approach the Species-Typical Approach to enhancement (STA) which was formulated, though not endorsed, by Savulescu and Kahane. Under the STA an enhancement is any change in biology or psychology of a person which increases species-
typical functioning above some statistically defined level. 74 Unlike the NFA, which determines whether an intervention is an enhancement through reference to facts about an individual (whether or not they have a disease), the STA refers to facts about the species as a whole. If an intervention causes an individual’s capacities to rise above levels that are statistically typical of the species, it is considered an enhancement. To see the difference between the STA and Daniels’ original NFA consider the following case from Allan and Fost:75  
Johnny is a short eleven-year-old boy with documented growth-hormone 
deficiency resulting from a brain tumor. His parents are of average height. His 
predicted adult height without growth hormone (GH) treatment is approximately 
160 cm (5 feet 3 inches). 
 
Billy is a short eleven-year-old boy with normal GH secretion according to 
current testing methods. However, his parents are extremely short, and he has a 
predicted adult height of 160 cm (5 feet 3 inches).  
73 Juengst, op. cit. note 52.  
74 See Savulescu et al., op. cit. note 58.   
75 D. B. Allen & N. C. Fost. Growth hormone therapy for short stature: panacea or Pandora's box? J Pediatr 1990; 117: 16-21. 
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Let’s imagine that if both Johnny and Billy are given synthetic growth hormone, each would reach a height of 180cm. According to the NFA, giving growth hormone to Johnny is a therapy because his short stature is caused by a disease – a type of abnormal function. On the other hand, giving growth hormone to Billy is an enhancement – his short stature is caused by normal processes. However on the STA, neither counts as an enhancement as neither intervention causes Billy or Johnny to rise above species-typical levels. However if the intervention caused Billy and Johnny to grow much taller, say to 220cm, both would be considered to be enhancements. The central difficulty with the STA is that it is difficult to estimate what the species-typical values are for a particular trait. As Kingma states “the human species shows a wide variety of functioning; what is normal in one group can be abnormal in another”.76 This can lead to some problematic implications for any attempt to define enhancement in reference to the species. For example, the STA seems to imply that female athletes taking testosterone would generally not be enhancing themselves, as their testosterone levels stay below species typical levels. Conversely, young male athletes who take testosterone will be enhancing themselves on the STA, as the intervention takes them beyond species-typical levels. It seems counter-intuitive that these two acts should be classed differently.  The STA can be modified so that it controls for age and sex. Rather than comparing individuals to values that are typical for the species as a whole, we can use values that typical for their reference classes – stipulated as others of the same age and sex. Hence a 30 year old female athlete on supplements that causes her testosterone levels to exceed levels typical for 30 year old females would be taking an enhancement.  Using reference classes based just on sex and age has some interesting implications. Consider the case of age-related cognitive decline. If age-related cognitive decline is statistically normal for a given age group, then interventions which restore cognitive ability in the elderly may raise individuals above typical for their reference class, and thereby be considered as enhancements.  Furthermore, the building of reference classes based only on sex and age seems difficult to justify. For example ethnicity, place of residence, employment status, etc., all affect what values are typical for any given trait. Why not create reference classes based on these characteristics? What about all other factors that affect our traits? When we start to consider factors beyond species membership, we regress to a highly individuated notion of enhancement. However, if we do this we are creating a very different enhancement concept to what is originally outlined in the “species-typical” approach.   A different approach to enhancement, but one that still draws on the notion of species, is the “species-maximum approach” (SMA). According to SMA enhancements are “alternations to capacities which take people beyond what is naturally possible for the species”.77  This is a narrow concept of enhancement. Under SMA only quite extreme interventions are considered as enhancements. For example few, if any, people who take steroids achieve values in traits that are beyond what is possible to achieve naturally for Homo-
76 Kingma, op. cit. note 72. 
77 This is similar to how Nick Agar defines radical enhancement. See N. Agar. Humanity's End: Why We 
Should Reject Radical Enhancement. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2010. p. 1 
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sapiens. Hence, taking steroids is unlikely to be an enhancement on SMA in most cases. On the other hand, extensive genetic engineering that causes radical changes to our phenotype could well be considered as an enhancement as it may cause individuals to acquire values or properties that are not naturally possible for Homo-sapiens.    One problem with using this approach is that it is difficult to determine what species-maximum values are for a particular trait. For a species that currently consists of 8 billion individuals, how can we know what is even currently possible to achieve? For example, before Usain Bolt ran 100m in 9.58 seconds in 2009, many may have thought this was not possible, and that any athlete who used steroids so they could run this fast would be enhancing themselves. The fact that we generally don’t know what values for traits are in fact possible for the species means that SMA is hard to apply.  Relatedly, the notion of species-maximum levels is incoherent under some species concepts. According to one influential view, species are “ancestral descendant populations which maintains its identity from other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and historical fate”.78 On this view, species are seen as lineages composed of individuals who stand in certain ancestral relations to each other. If we think about species in this way, the notion of species-maximal values seems problematic. Homo-sapiens are defined as a lineage rather than an organism with particular characteristics. Our traits could radically change through evolutionary processes, without changing which species we belong to. Hence any properties we could acquire through the use of enhancement technologies would not take us across species possible values.   
Normative approaches to enhancement Recently there has been a push to understand enhancement in a more normative sense. For example John Harris states: 
In the context of interventions which impact on human functioning, an 
enhancement is clearly anything that makes a change, a difference for the 
better.79 Savulescu and Kahane, and then Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu, develop a more comprehensive normative account of enhancement called the welfarist conception of enhancement (WC). Under WC an enhancement is any change in the biology or 
psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a good life in a given set of 
circumstances.80   Savulescu and Kahane explain: 
On this view, any increase in IQ could count as enhancement – so long as it tends 
to increase a person’s well-being. But, contrary both to the species-functioning 
and functional approaches, in contexts where an increase in IQ is not beneficial to 
some person, such increase would not count as an enhancement, even if it raises 
78 E. Wiley. The Evolutionary Species Concept Reconsidered. Syst Biol 1978; 27: 17-26. 
79 J. Harris. Enhancing evolution : the ethical case for making better people. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2007. p. 36. 
80 Savulescu et al., op. cit. note 56.   
26 
 
                                                            
the person to (or well beyond) the level of normal functioning, that is, even if it 
were a functional enhancement.81 This is a very broad notion of enhancement. As treating disease improves wellbeing, nearly all therapies would be considered as enhancements under WC. Similarly other things that are not normally considered as enhancements improve people’s lives through changes to biology or psychology. Contraceptive pills, for example, generally improve the lives of women by increasing their reproductive liberty. On the WC, then, taking contraceptive pills is an enhancement.  WC was originally presented as an alternative to the not-medicine approach to enhancement.82 In its original formulation WC cannot incorporate a distinction between therapies and enhancements. This is because it focusses on “changes” to biology and psychology; all changes – therapies or not – are treated equally. However, a modified version of the welfarist approach to enhancement can be developed which incorporates an enhancement-therapy distinction.  One way to understand disease is as a thick concept, containing both normative and descriptive elements. On this view, when we characterise something as a disease, we are making the normative judgment that it reduces well-being, and in addition saying that it is caused by some type of abnormal biological function.83 Hence if someone has abnormal biological functioning which reduces their chances of living a good life, they are considered to be in a diseased state. 84  However not all abnormal biological functioning will be detrimental to one’s well-being. Many will be neutral, and some will be beneficial. If someone has abnormal biological functioning that increases their well-being, we can describe them as being in an advantaged or enhanced state. Hence we can distinguish the following states based on biological functioning:  1- Diseased state: abnormal biological functioning, which is detrimental to wellbeing 2- Normal functioning: no abnormal biological functioning, or abnormal biological functioning that does not affect well-being.   3- Enhanced state: abnormal biological functioning, which increases well-being.  This allows us to draw a distinction between therapies which move people from state 1 to 2, and enhancements that move people from state 1 or 2 to 3. Hence on this modified welfarist approach (MWA), enhancements are: alterations that give people abnormal 
biological functionings, which are associated with improvements in wellbeing.   Like the WC, MWA implies that every enhancement is good for you. However enhancements must also give individuals some type of abnormal biological functioning. As with many of the other enhancement concepts presented here, MWA has at least one counter-intuitive implication. Under MWA enhancement is a statistical concept. Enhancements make people statistically abnormal. This means it is impossible for 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Murphy, op. cit. note 61. 
84 We can then define abnormal biological functioning statistically – as per the BST, or in some other specified way. 
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every person in a population to be enhanced – if everyone took an “enhancement” it would not be associated with abnormality, and hence not actually an enhancement. Some biotechnologies, then, would be enhancements if taken only by some people, but not enhancements if taken by many.  
Summary  Above I have described seven different enhancement concepts. These are summarised in the table below, together with whether they understand enhancement as an objective or normative concept, and whether each concept implies that giving growth hormone to Johnny or Billy is an enhancement in the case from Allen and Fost. The case is repeated below.     
  
Enhancement Concept   Enhancements are -  Is giving 
Johnny or 
Billy GH an 
enhancement?   
Objective or 
normative 
concept?  
Functional Approach (FA)  Alterations that increase some type of  functioning.  
Both are enhancements   Objective 
Constructivist Approach (CA) Alterations that do not  treat disease – with diseases understood as states disvalued by society. 
Johnny but not Billy Normative 
Normal Functioning Approach (NFA)  Alterations that do not  treat disease – with diseases understood as deviations from normal functioning.  
Johnny but not Billy Objective 
Species-Typical Approach  (STA) Alterations that take people beyond “species-typical” values for particular traits.   
Neither are enhancements Objective 
Species-Maximal Approach (SMA)   Alterations that take people beyond “Species -maximum” values for particular traits.   
Neither are enhancements Objective 
Welfarist conception  (WC) Alterations that improve well-being. Both are enhancements  Normative Modified welfarist approach (MWA)  Alterations that give people abnormal biological functioning that improve wellbeing.  
Neither are enhancements  Both objective and normative components.  
The case of Johnny and Billy: Johnny is a short eleven-year-old boy with 
documented growth-hormone deficiency resulting from a brain tumour. His 
parents are of average height. His predicted adult height without growth 
hormone (GH) treatment is approximately 160 cm (5 feet 3 inches). 
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Billy is a short eleven-year-old boy with normal GH secretion according to 
current testing methods. However, his parents are extremely short, and he has a 
predicted adult height of 160 cm (5 feet 3 inches). 
 
Is giving Johnny or Billy growth hormone so that their height reaches 180cm an 
enhancement?   
   These are all coherent notions of enhancement (with the possible exception of SMA). In many ways our choice of enhancement concept is insignificant as long as we are clear about which one we are using. The same sorts of questions will get asked, but in different ways. For example, someone could ask “whether memory enhancements (understood as per FA) increase well-being?”, or “whether interventions that increase memory are enhancements (understood as per WC)?” In this case it seems not much rests on which particular enhancement concept we choose to employ.   However there are other ways in which our choice of enhancement concept can be important. For example, our choice of enhancement concept may make different sets of questions more salient and easier to respond to. In this context I believe the functional approach to enhancement is a better tool for current debates within practical ethics. It is the simplest conception of enhancement as it doesn’t rely on other complex concepts like disease, species or well-being. Interventions that increase or decrease certain traits are identified relatively easily. This is an advantage as it allows us to clearly categorise biotechnologies as, for example, memory enhancements, or height enhancements or muscle enhancements. Conversely it may be difficult to identify which technologies increase an individual’s chance of living a good life, or take individuals beyond what is typical for the species.  Another advantage of the functional approach is that it reorientates the enhancement debates in a helpful way. When characterising enhancements as interventions used outside the context of medicine, or that take people beyond species typical levels, it becomes an interesting question whether in general it is permissible or impermissible for individuals to use enhancements. It encourages us to think about enhancements in terms of permissibility.  However when enhancements are understood in the functional sense, asking whether their use is permissible or impermissible seems odd. It seems very dependent on which particular properties are being enhanced. Increasing some properties like compassion, seems fundamentally different to enhancing other properties like our capacity to feel pain. Hence, from a functional approach, the key questions become: what properties ought we enhance (or diminish)? what goals should we be pursuing through the use of biotechnologies that alter our traits; and what reasonable steps should states take to pursue these goals? A key theme running through this thesis is that we need to start thinking about enhancing “collective properties”. Rather than focussing on enhancing the cognitive capacities of individuals, we need to think about enhancing our collective ability to solve problems. Similarly, rather than just thinking about using biotechnologies to improve our own lives, we should think about pursuing other goals such as the long term persistence of the human species. I believe a functional approach to enhancement helps put these questions in context. This is because it helps facilitate discussion about 
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the goals of enhancement, rather than just its permissibility. It helps us think about the 
good of enhancement rather than just the right of enhancement.         
Part 3: The ethics of enhancement The moral implications of enhancement technologies have been at the centre of many debates within bioethics over the past two decades. Two distinct but related issues lie at the heart of these debates. The first involves the moral permissibility of individuals using enhancement technologies. If individuals have access to enhancement technologies, should they use them? If parents have access to reproductive genetic technologies, is it permissible, or even obligatory, for them to change the genetic makeup of their children?85 The second major issue associated with enhancement technologies concerns the obligations of states to provide or restrict them. Should enhancement technologies be freely available to people who want to use them? Should they be banned or restricted? These two issues are related. The same reasons that make the use of certain enhancement technologies morally impermissible might also mean there should be a legal prohibition against them (although this will not always be the case). Similarly the same reasons that make the use of certain enhancements permissible may also imply that the state should make them freely available.  In this section I will look at some of the major arguments for and against human enhancement – understood as a general project of altering our capacities with biotechnologies. I will argue there is nothing intrinsic about altering our capacities that has special normative significance. Rather, the value and disvalue of enhancement technologies derives from their instrumental influence on other morally relevant features such as well-being and justice. Different enhancements will raise different sets of opportunities and risks. The task for bioethicists is to identify the moral reasons for and against particular enhancements in particular contexts, and to balance these against each other. 
The argument from consistency and the importance of means  People already use all sorts of means to alter their physical and cognitive capacities. People do weight training to increase the size of their muscles, drink coffee to stay alert, and do brain training exercises to improve their memory. Similarly, pregnant women consume supplements to improve the expected cognitive functioning of their children. In general when people enhance themselves in these ways their behaviour is not thought to raise any significant moral concerns. Many biomedical enhancements aim at the same sorts of changes as these traditional methods. What reasons do we have to attach greater moral significance to them?  Appealing to the fact that biomedical enhancements are just new ways of achieving the same aims sought through training and education is sometimes called the argument from consistency.86 Erik Parens describes a simple account of the argument: 
85 For an argument that the use of enhancement technologies is obligatory, see J. Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 2001; 15: 413-426;J. Savulescu & G. Kahane. The moral obligation to create children with the best chance of the best life. Bioethics 2009; 23: 274-290. 
86 Savulescu, ibid; Parens, op. cit. note 45. 
30 
 
                                                            
We’ve always used means A to achieve end A; means B also aims to achieve end A; 
therefore means B is morally unproblematic. 87 In this form, the argument from consistency claims that as biomedical enhancements will achieve the same ends as other interventions which we approve of, they should not be subject to any further moral constraints. However, as Parens notes, when the argument is presented in this form it is clearly invalid. We can think of a wide range of cases in which the means used to achieve some end makes a moral difference to the achievement of that end. For example, imagine we have welfare equality as our end, and we could achieve this by either improving the situation of the worse off, or reducing the welfare of the better off. Both actions achieve welfare equality, but clearly the two methods are not morally equivalent.  Similarly, in some cases it looks as if the use of biotechnologies to achieve an end is inferior to using other means. Cognitive therapy and antidepressant drugs both increase well-being and could be used to treat depression. However, we may doubt whether this means the two interventions are equivalent. Whereas cognitive therapy seeks to increase wellbeing by enabling the patient to identify and resolve the root cause of their depression, anti-depressants seek to increase well-being directly through an effect on mood. However even if both interventions improve well-being, many would believe that cognitive therapy is more intrinsically valuable for the patient than antidepressants, because it allows the patient to play a more active role in their treatment.88  The above example points to a general concern that biomedical enhancements are a less valuable way of altering our traits than other means. These concerns are expressed in the following passage from Leon Kass: 
In most of our ordinary efforts at self-improvement, either by practice or training 
or study, we sense the relation between our doings and the resulting 
improvement, between the means used and the end sought. There is an 
experiential and intelligible connection between means and ends; we can see how 
confronting fearful things might eventually enable us to cope with our fears. We 
can see how curbing our appetites produces self-command. … In contrast, 
biomedical interventions act directly on the human body and bring about their 
effects on a subject who is not merely passive but who plays no role at all. He can 
at best feel their effects without understanding their meaning in human terms.89 Kass believes that the use of traditional methods to alter our capacities is more valuable than using biomedical means, because traditional methods allow us to see the relation between effort and reward. Traditional ways of improving our capacities can help us develop important character virtues, and hence are more valuable than using biomedical means to achieve the same end. 
87 Parens, ibid. 
88 C. Freedman. Aspirin for the Mind? Some Ethical Worries about Psychopharmacology. In: Enhancing 
Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. E. Parens, ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 1998. pp. 135-150.  
89 L. Kass. Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection. The New Atlantis 2003; 1: 9-28. 
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This seems to track an intuitive response to the development of enhancement technologies. Aren’t improvements in athletic performance more valuable when achieved through training and hard work, than when they are achieved through biomedical means? Aren’t improvements in scholastic performance more valuable when achieved through better teaching methods and increased effort on the part of the student than when achieved through the use of Ritalin and other drugs? If we were to begin to rely on biomedical enhancements we may be deprived of the value of experiences gained from changing our traits through hard work and persistence. Hence the mere fact that biomedical enhancements aim at the same ends as education and training does not show that they are somehow morally equivalent, and raise no special moral concerns.  However, the observation that using biomedical means to change our traits is sometimes less valuable than other methods does not show that biomedical enhancements have no value. Some end-states are independently valuable regardless of the means used to achieve them. We may believe that having a good memory is beneficial, in and of itself, even if it is true that it would be better for us to improve our memory through brain training rather than through taking drugs. When biomedical enhancements allow us to achieve independently valuable end-states, then it seems their use should be permissible even if other methods of achieving those end states would, overall, be more valuable. This point is powerfully made by Nick Bostrom:  
we do not generally feel ourselves obliged always to wring as much value as 
possible from the process of achieving a valuable end state: we may catch a bus to 
get somewhere even though we recognise that there is additional value to be 
gained from jogging instead, or we may employ a gardener to cultivate a garden 
even though we recognise that there is additional value to be gained from doing it 
ourselves. Since, in general, we are often content to achieve a valuable end state 
without using the most value-adding means, additional argument is required to 
support the claim that the practice of improving our capacities using drugs should 
be subject to different standards.90 Further, the use of biomedical means to achieve some end-states is not mutually exclusive with using more traditional means. Think again of cognitive therapy and antidepressants. It’s clear that these methods of treating depression are not mutually exclusive and in fact can help complement each other.91 Similarly, some cognitive enhancement drugs improve the outcomes associated with traditional educational means. Therefore it seems biomedical enhancements can sometimes be used to increase the value derived from more traditional enhancements.   In sum, the argument from consistency fails to show that we should embrace all biomedical enhancements which target the same traits as traditional means such as training and education. The means used to alter our capacities is an important consideration. However this observation does not show that biomedical enhancements are always going to be inferior to traditional means or that the use of enhancements should be seen as impermissible. Sometimes prudential reasons may make biomedical 
90 N. Bostrom & R. Roache. Ethical issues in human enhancement. In: New Waves in Applied Ethics, Ryberg J, Petersen T, Wolf C, eds. Basingstoke: Pal-grave Macmillan; 2007. pp. 120–152. 
91 B. Vitiello. Combined cognitive-behavioural therapy and pharmacotherapy for adolescent depression: Does it improve outcomes compared with monotherapy? CNS Drugs 2009; 23: 271-280. 
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enhancements preferable to traditional means. Further some biomedical enhancements can be used in combination with more traditional means – and may even enhance their value.  
Arguments from design  One suite of arguments against enhancement centres on concerns with interfering with the design of the human species. This argument is easily understood from certain religious perspectives. If “God created man in his own image”, then attempts to alter our capacities can be seen as attempts to redo divine work. To endorse biomedical enhancement is thus to “confuse our role with God's”.92  However even for those who do not believe that humans were designed by a benevolent God, there may be reasons to resist human enhancement for reasons of design. Take this passage from the President’s Council on Bioethics: 
The human body and mind, highly complex and delicately balanced as a result of 
eons of gradual and exacting evolution, are almost certainly at risk from any ill-
considered attempt at “improvement”… It is far from clear that our delicately 
integrated natural bodily powers will take kindly to such impositions, however 
desirable the sought-for change may seem to the intervener.93 Even if human bodies were not designed by a benevolent creator, they were still in some sense designed from millions of years of evolution. If all of our body systems are finely adapted through evolution, tinkering with them risks disrupting a fine balance. Making alterations to our bodies would be like a lay person making changes to the design of an aeroplane. The potential for improvement is small, and the potential for damage is high.94 This has been called the Master Engineers Argument (MEA).   Some flaws in MEA have been noted by Powell and Buchanan :  
organisms are remarkably unlike the work of a master engineer in two 
fundamental respects. First, unlike a master engineer, natural selection never gets 
the job done: organisms are not the end points of a transformative evolutionary 
process that has gradually climbed the ladder of adaptive perfection. Second, 
evolution does not “design” what it produces according to a plan that exists (even 
if only in rough outline) at the beginning of production.95 While we may have been designed by evolution, we have no guarantee that any particular aspect of this design is optimal. Consider the pharynx’s dual role in both ingestion and respiration which significantly increases the probability of choking to death, and the relatively small size of the female pelvis which dramatically increases risk during child birth.96 Indeed Charles Darwin often used examples of suboptimal design in organisms as evidence that we were designed through natural selection and 
92 M. Sandel. The Case Against Perfection. The Atlantic 2004: 1–11. 
93 President’s Council on Bioethics, op. cit. note 53. 
94 A. Sandberg, and N. Bostrom. The Wisdom of Nature: An Evolutionary Heuristic for Human Enhancement. In: Enhancement of Human Beings. N. Bostrom and J. Savulescu, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009. pp375 -416.  
95 R. Powell & A. Buchanan. Breaking evolution's chains: the prospect of deliberate genetic modification in humans. J Med Philos 2011; 36: 6-27. 
96 Ibid.  
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not by a God. Hence we should be sceptical of the claim that the human body is precisely engineered, and that any alterations to it are likely to be catastrophic. Furthermore it is clear that the conditions which humans live in today are very different from those we have lived in for the vast majority of our evolutionary past. Even if some of our traits were optimal in our evolutionary history, we have little reason to believe that they will continue to be optimal today. For example, perhaps being predisposed to anxiety benefited our early ancestors by keeping them on edge in a world full of risks. However we now live in a much safer world,97 and these same biases may be contributing to needless feelings of depression and anxiety. Hence for some traits, the environmental conditions in which they provided a selective advantage no longer exist. It seems we would have good reason to change these traits through enhancement technologies.  Even in stable evolutionary contexts, we should be sceptical of the Master Engineers Argument. Evolution favours traits that maximise survival and reproduction rather than maximise human good. Hence even if we accept the claim that our capacities have been finely adapted to our environment by evolution, this doesn’t mean they have been optimised to promote well-being, or other moral goods. There should be scope for us to change our design to allow us to improve our quality of life. Other concerns about enhancements that draw on issue of design are expressed by Michael Sandel. Sandel argues it is not so much the attempt to redesign our nature which is the problem with human enhancement, but rather the attitude we express when we enhance ourselves, and the dispositions it encourages. He states: 
The deeper danger is that they represent a kind of hyperagency—a Promethean 
aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes and 
satisfy our desires. The problem is not the drift to mechanism but the drive to 
mastery. And what the drive to mastery misses and may even destroy is an 
appreciation of the gifted character of human powers and achievements. 
It is more plausible to view genetic engineering as the ultimate expression of our 
resolve to see ourselves astride the world, the masters of our nature. But that 
promise of mastery is flawed. It threatens to banish our appreciation of life as a 
gift, and to leave us with nothing to affirm or behold outside our own will.98 For Sandel, enhancement is the expression of our desire to understand and control the world around us. The more we act on this desire, the more we fail to appreciate the mystery of life. It is only when we embrace the unknown, when we remain “open to the unbidden”, that we cultivate the virtues that allow us to appreciate the nature of human giftedness.  As Frances Kamm points out, it is possible to accept Sandel’s claims regarding the enhancement enterprise being an expression of a flawed desire and still believe that many enhancements are permissible. Perhaps the goods independently achieved by enhancements, such as increased well-being, will counterbalance the wrongness of the attitudes they express. For example we can imagine the case of someone using genetic 
97 See for example S. Pinker. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Penguin; 2011. 
98 Sandel, op. cit. note 92.  
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engineering technologies to treat a genetic disease. This seems to be an example of desiring mastery over nature and not being open to all things unbidden. However we might well conclude that, overall, the goodness of treating disease is more important than the wrongness of the attitudes that are expressed by this treatment.99 Sandel recognises the inherent goodness of treating disease, and wants to draw distinction between the use of biotechnologies to treat disease and their use in other contexts. He believes that: 
to appreciate children as gifts or blessings is not, of course, to be passive in the 
face of illness or disease. Medical intervention to cure or prevent illness or restore 
the injured to health does not desecrate nature but honors it. Healing sickness or 
injury does not override a child's natural capacities but permits them to 
flourish.100 However Sandel provides no account of why treating a sickness does not desecrate nature while enhancement does. We can think of some forms of enhancement which may enable individuals to better fulfil their true nature and permit them to flourish.  For example, some people think that poor self-control prevents them from becoming the kinds of people they want to be. Despite the fact they want to live healthy, productive lives, they keep succumbing to temptation. Enhancements which gave individuals like this more will-power, allowing them to resist temptation, seem as if they would help honour their true nature. A related argument Sandel develops against human enhancement focusses on its effect on human solidarity. Currently we recognise that we are not wholly responsible for our nature, and thereby not wholly responsible for our destiny. This knowledge is what Sandel believes cultivates sympathy for the less fortunate, and what binds us together as a community. Speaking specifically of genetic enhancements, Sandel states that:  
One of the blessings of seeing ourselves as creatures of nature, God, or fortune is 
that we are not wholly responsible for the way we are. The more we become 
masters of our genetic endowments, the greater the burden we bear for the 
talents we have and the way we perform….. 
Those at the bottom of society would be viewed not as disadvantaged, and thus 
worthy of a measure of compensation, but as simply unfit, and thus worthy of 
eugenic repair. The meritocracy, less chastened by chance, would become harder, 
less forgiving. As perfect genetic knowledge would end the simulacrum of 
solidarity in insurance markets, so perfect genetic control would erode the actual 
solidarity that arises when men and women reflect on the contingency of their 
talents and fortunes.101   In a world where people can alter their capacities at will, we may hold people responsible for their own misfortune. This in turn will lead us to feel less sympathy for individuals who are doing poorly. Rather than thinking “there, but for the grace of God go I” when seeing people struggling we would think of them as idiotic for not altering 
99 F. Kamm. What Is And Is Not Wrong With Enhancement? In: Human Enhancement. J. Savulescu & N. Bostrom, eds: Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010.pp 91-130.  
100 Sandel, op. cit. note 92.  
101 Ibid. 
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their traits in the right ways. This, according to Sandel, would erode the solidarity we feel with the less fortunate in our community.   Sandel’s argument here can be challenged on several levels. For one, it is unclear that in a world where enhancements are widely available we would in fact believe people are more responsible for their own fate. Luck will still play a significant role in people’s lives. Many, through no fault of their own, may be unable to afford enhancements which could invoke sympathy in others. Further, many enhancements will have different effects in different individuals. We may feel envy for people who through luck derive great benefits from enhancements, and sympathy for people whose enhancements have unintended consequences or no effect at all. Hence the claim that enhancements encourage the belief that people are responsible for their own fate needs further support.   Furthermore, even if enhancements did increase the sense that people were responsible for their misfortunes, it doesn’t follow that we would feel less sympathy and solidarity toward them. We can think of many cases in which we believe people are wholly responsible for their own misfortune, but yet we still sympathise with them. For example, we might feel sympathy for those who develop lung cancer; even if we believe that they are wholly responsible for the development of the disease. Given none of us are infallible –all of us make bad decisions – it seems likely that we will continue to sympathise with those whose misfortune stems from poor decisions, including poor decisions in relation to enhancement technologies.    On a different level, Sandel’s arguments do not seem to be an argument against all enhancement technologies. This is because sympathy and solidarity could themselves become targets for enhancement technologies. It’s plausible that our experience of complex emotions and dispositions could be targeted by biotechnologies which influence our emotional and cognitive states. Hence if solidarity is an important trait, one that we should be cultivating among members of our communities, then we could use biotechnologies to help do this. Sandel’s arguments therefore do not work against all enhancements. Further criticisms of enhancement that centre on issues of design come from Frances Fukuyama. Fukuyama speaks of the danger of using biotechnologies to change human nature. For Fukuyama,   
every member of the human species possesses a genetic endowment that allows 
him or her to become a whole human being, an endowment that distinguishes a 
human in essence from other types of creatures.102  He calls this endowment Factor X. Fukuyama believes Factor X is the core of our humanity, and helps ground human rights:     
In the political realm we are required to respect people equally on the basis of 
their possession of Factor X. You can cook, eat, torture, enslave, or render the 
carcass of any creature lacking Factor X, but if you do the same thing to a human 
being, you are guilty of a "crime against humanity." We accord beings with Factor 
102 F. Fukuyama. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New York: Picador; 2002. p. 171. 
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X not just human rights but, if they are adults, political rights as well-that is, the 
right to live in democratic political communities where their rights to speech, 
religion, association, and political participation are respected.  He also claims the use of enhancement technologies risks compromising this factor X: 
 
This essence, and the view that individuals therefore have inherent value, is at the 
heart of political liberalism. But modifying that essence is the core of the 
transhumanist project. If we start transforming ourselves into something 
superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what rights will 
they possess when compared to those left behind?103     On one level Fukuyama brings out the valid concern that there may be unintended consequences if we start to alter our capacities. For example, perhaps the reengineering of brains to make ourselves smarter would cause us to lose our sense of humour. Similarly in attempts to remake our moral character we could lose some of the morally relevant features that help ground our moral agency.104 This shows that if we do pursue enhancement technologies we need to be very cautious about which traits we alter, and consider what unintended consequences this could have.    However Fukuyama’s specific points regarding Factor X are unconvincing as a reason not to pursue human enhancement. This is made clear by John Harris:   
The essence of the problem with Fukuyama is that he gives no positive account of 
factor X which might persuade us either that it is worth preserving, or that if we 
lose it there will be hell to pay. Without this, Fukuyama is simply making a plea 
for precaution without any indication as to why precaution entails the 
preservation rather than the sacrifice of factor X. Indeed, if it could be shown that 
factor X could be enhanced, either to make it resistant to erosion or indeed in 
ways that boosted its essential X-ness, then presumably Fukuyama would have to 
endorse human enhancement.105  Imagine that we are able to identify and describe Factor X. If Factor X has a genetic basis, as Fukuyama indicates, then its expression depends on interactions with the environment. Therefore as our environment changes we could lose Factor X through natural processes. Biotechnologies could help preserve Factor X against these changes. Hence it is not clear how the existence of Factor X can constitute a reason not to engage in any form of enhancement.   
Arguments from justice  One of the most intuitive concerns about enhancement technologies is its effect on distributive justice.106 Enhancement technologies are likely to be expensive, and therefore only the rich may have access to them. This could widen the gap between rich and poor – adding biological advantages to already existing social ones. For example, Bill McKibbon states:   
103 Ibid, p. 9. 
104 J. Harris. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics 2011; 25: 102-111. 
105 Harris, op. cit. note 79, p. 23.  
106 For a discussion, see J. Savulescu. Enhancement and Fairness. In: Unnatural Selection: The Challenges of 
Engineering Tomorrow’s People. P. Healey and S. Rayner, eds. London: Earthscanpp; 2009. pp. 175 -206.  
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These would be mere consumer decisions -- but that also means that  
they would benefit the rich far more than the poor. They would take the  
gap in power, wealth, and education that currently divides both our  
society and the world at large, and write that division into our very  
biology.107 
 The dominant social class could become dominant biological class. The enhanced may then come to view the unenhanced as having a lower moral status. Such a prospect is raised by George Annas: 
’improved' posthumans would inevitably come to view the ‘naturals’ as inferior, as 
a subspecies of humans suitable for exploitation, slavery, or even extermination. 
Ultimately, it is this prospect of what can be termed ''genetic genocide'' that 
makes cloning combined with genetic engineering a potential weapon of mass 
destruction, and the biologist who would attempt it a potential bioterrorist.108 
 The claim that enhancement technologies’ would split society into the enhanced and unenhanced is highly speculative, and not something that would be considered a short term risk. If many different enhancement technologies become available, we would expect them to carry different costs and have different availabilities. It seems more likely that there will be a large spectrum in how individuals use enhancement technologies, rather than two distinct groupings (the users and non-users). This is something than can be monitored when enhancement technologies become available.    While enhancement technologies are unlikely to split us into new biological classes, it is likely that some enhancements would be expensive and unavailable to the poor. However this is no different to a range of other advantages the rich enjoy - like good education. Often the mere fact that an intervention would increase inequality does not provide a reason to ban or restrict it. For example, the fact that some medical treatments are expensive and will likely only be available to a very select few does not provide a reason not to develop these treatments.   Furthermore, some enhancements may actually help reduce the gap between rich and poor – by helping counteract natural inequalities. Many cognitive enhancement technologies, like Modafinil seem to have a sort of equalising effect on cognitive performance – having their strongest effect in those who perform poorly on a particular trait, and weakest effect in those who are the strongest. Enhancements with these sorts of effects may help reduce inequalities.   In sum, we cannot predict the effect enhancement technologies will have on distributive justice. While some enhancement technologies may increase the gap between rich and poor, others are likely to be readily available to all, some may benefit the worse off more than they benefit the best off. In this sense enhancements are no different to any other types of technological developments – like information technologies. The correct way to respond to technologies that raise these types of 
107 B. McKibben. 2003. Designer Genes. The Orion May/June 2003. Available at: www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/119 [Accessed 16 October 2014].  
108 G. Annas. Cell Division. Boston Globe 21 April 2005. Available at: www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=164[Accessed 16 October 2014].   
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concerns is not necessarily to ban or restrict the technologies, but rather to use political mechanisms to promote equality of access.  
Arguments from liberty The final category of arguments I will consider in relation to enhancement technologies are arguments from liberty. Many believe that individuals will have a right to use enhancement technologies which is derived from the basic political right to liberty. Some private companies will develop and want to sell a range of enhancement technologies, and some individuals will be willing to pay to access these technologies. To prevent access to enhancement technologies, the state is going to have to intervene to stop this otherwise free transaction. Restrictions on enhancement technologies can therefore been seen as a form of social coercion. Social coercion always requires a justification as suggested by John Harris109 who draws on the work of the political philosopher Joel Feinberg:  
Whenever a legislator is faced with a choice between imposing a legal duty on 
citizens or leaving them at liberty, other things being equal, he should leave 
individuals free to make their own choices. Liberty should be the norm; coercion 
always needs some special justification.110 Such an approach to the regulation of enhancement technologies has been particularly influential in discussions regarding reproductive genetic technologies. The movement known as liberal eugenics stresses the importance of parental autonomy regarding the use of reproductive technologies. One of the earliest descriptions of such an approach is found in Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”. Nozick advocates a “genetic supermarket”: 
 
Consider … the issue of genetic engineering. Many biologists tend to think the 
problem is one of design, of specifying the best types of persons so that biologists 
can proceed to produce them. Thus they worry over what sort(s) of person there is 
to be and who will control this process. They do not tend to think, perhaps because 
it diminishes the importance of their role, of a system in which they run a "genetic 
supermarket," meeting the individual specifications (within certain moral limits) 
of prospective parents … This supermarket system has the great virtue that it 
involves no centralized decision fixing the future of human type(s).111   The challenge posed by liberal eugenics is, therefore, for people who think others should be denied access to genetic, or other types of enhancements to show why their use would cause a harm of the appropriate type and magnitude to justify social coercion. This way of thinking provides a powerful case against any general prohibition against enhancement technologies. Rather, states need to look at the benefits and costs of each particular enhancement in context and determine whether the provision of each would cause harms that justify state interference.112  Under this approach to the regulation of enhancement technologies, questions regarding the appropriate grounds for state interference with individual liberty 
109 Harris, op. cit. note 79. 
110 J. Feinberg. Harm to Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1984. p. 9. 
111 R. Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books; 1974. p. 315. 
112 Similarly it is likely that in some case the reasons in favour of some enhancements will be so strong that they should be compulsory.  
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become paramount. Among proponents of liberal eugenics there is a wide disparity concerning the proper grounds for restricting access to enhancement technologies. Some believe that the state should only restrict access to technologies to prevent direct harm to individuals. Ronald Bailey suggests such a view when he argues “to the extent that new biotechnologies need regulation, agencies should be limited to deciding, as they have traditionally done, only questions about safety and efficacy”.113 John Harris accepts that the state could intervene for reasons beyond protection of the individual, but still advocates a high standard for state interference. He believes access to enhancement technologies should only be limited to prevent “real and present harms or dangers”.114  Other theorists are less restrictive in what they take the requirements for state intervention to be, endorsing restriction based on the public interest. For example Jonathon Glover writes: 
could leaving people free to choose genes for their children at the genetic 
supermarket have serious social costs? If so, we may need a regulated market, on 
a European model. On this system, there would be no state plan to change people's 
genes or to improve the gene pool, but there might be limitations on genetic 
choices thought to be against the public interest.115   Allen Buchannan and co-authors endorse a similar position when they say “society has a good, if not conclusive, reason to restrict the liberties of individuals if the exercise of those liberties undermines a public good.”116 Hence the acceptance of the liberal positions on enhancement technologies as default does not necessarily mean that all enhancement technologies should be freely available. Those that pose sufficiently grave risks to the public interest or risk harm to individuals can be restricted or banned. One important implication of this view is that states will need to have the capabilities in place to monitor the use and effects of enhancement technologies’, and place restrictions on that use if necessary. 
Part 4: Context statement – human enhancement and human 
diversity  To recap, in Part 2 of the Introduction I reviewed debates concerning how best to understand “human enhancement”. I have argued that not much is at stake in these debates. When we understand enhancement in an objective sense we need an accompanying normative account that explains which particular enhancements are good, bad, permissible or impermissible. While a normative understanding of enhancement can provide reasons to believe enhancements are good, this approach merely shifts the debate to one about which particular biotechnologies should be considered as enhancements. In neither case does our choice of enhancement concept make a significant difference to the ethical analysis of a particular capacity-altering biotechnology.  
113 R. Bailey. Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution. Amherst: Prometheus Books; 2005. p. 235.  
114 Harris, op. cit. note 79. p.79. 
115 J. Glover. Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press; 2006. p. 77. 
116 A. Buchanan, et al. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001. p. 183. 
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I then discussed the various normative arguments that have been put forward to suggest why enhancement biotechnologies might raise special concern. I argued that none of these arguments suggests there is anything intrinsic about altering our traits that has special moral significance. Rather than trying to assess enhancements as a general class of interventions, we should instead approach the ethics of enhancement technologies in a contextualised manner – looking at the costs and benefits associated with different technologies in particular contexts. The task for bioethicists is to identify the moral reasons for and against particular technologies and assess how strong these reasons are.  This is my goal in this thesis. In collaboration with co-authors, I have written five articles which analyse the costs and benefits of enhancement technologies in different contexts. I identify the reasons for and against particular uses of enhancement technologies, and discuss whether these reasons may be strong enough to justify further actions, such as state sponsored restrictions. These five separate manuscripts have been brought together in this “thesis by compilation”. Hence the next five chapters can be read as five different standalone pieces – each making a different set of claims. However, the forthcoming chapters can also be read as five interrelated pieces that support a general conclusion about human enhancement. This conclusion is that we need to considerer certain population-level properties, such as diversity and robustness when assessing the permissibility of particular enhancement technologies. When individuals alter their own genes, or the genes of their children, they also influence the human gene pool. Similarly when individuals alter their cognitive capacities they also influence the collective cognitive resources available to the population as a whole. These types of effects on collective properties provide reasons both for and against particular uses of enhancement technologies.  In Chapter 1 I take an in-depth look at how effects on genetic diversity can be relevant to debates on genetic engineering technologies. I argue that what is important is not genetic diversity per se, but rather the ability to balance the exploration of novel genes with the exploitation of successful genes. I show that one risk of allowing widespread access to genetic engineering technologies is that we could throw off this balance. The use of these technologies could lead to the over exploitation of particular genes, thereby reducing valuable forms of genetic diversity. This in turn could compromise important collective goods like the continued existence of the species.  I further develop the idea that the loss of certain types of genetic diversity could ground objections to enhancement technologies in Chapter 2. I show that reproductive genetic technologies that target genes involved in innate immunity and cognition could lead to “collective action problems”. If individuals use these technologies in ways that make themselves and their children better off, they could leave everyone worse off. This is because while some particular genes are good for specific individuals to possess, our populations as a whole benefit from diversity in these genes. In these cases what is good for each can be bad for all. Where the availability of enhancement technologies is likely to result in collective action problems, I suggest there is a plausible prima facie case that access to the technologies should be restricted.       In Chapter 3, I suggest that similar considerations may justify restrictions on one of the most accepted uses of reproductive genetic technologies – selection against disability. I argue that particular disabilities like Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia might 
41 
 
contribute to some valuable forms of diversity, which result in widespread social benefits. In these cases the state may be justified in restricting access to reproductive genetic technologies which target disability, as these actions would be preventing a type of harm.  Just as considerations of genetic diversity are important when considering forms of genetic enhancement, so too are considerations of cognitive diversity to debates on cognitive enhancement. This is my focus in Chapter 4. I suggest that if cognitive enhancement technologies are employed without efforts to enhance cognitive diversity and improve cooperation, they may be collectively self-defeating. We could improve the cognitive ability of each individual in a population but make society as a whole less able to solve complex problems. This provides an argument for a coordinated approach to cognitive enhancement, which also involves maintaining diversity and improving our ability to cooperate with each other.     In my final chapter, I argue that both cognitive diversity and genetic diversity are relevant when we consider the ethics of radical forms of human life extension. I argue that a regular generational turnover provides a source of genetic and cultural novelty that benefits our populations as a whole. If radical forms of human life extension were to dramatically slow the rate of generational turnover, this could cause our populations to become less able to adapt to challenges in our environment.    In sum, in addition to being standalone pieces, the next five chapters are interrelated arguments that show how human diversity matters to human enhancement. In light of this, the best way to understand the next five chapters is as five separate pillars – each able to stand on its own terms – but that together support a general approach to human enhancement that stresses the importance of human diversity. 
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Chapter 1: Enhancing the species: genetic 
engineering technologies and human 
persistence
 
Note:  This chapter is published as: C. Gyngell. Enhancing the Species: Genetic engineering technologies and human persistence. Philosophy & Technology 2012; 25 (4):495-512. Minor adjustments have been made to align the format, spelling and referencing to the rest of this thesis.   
Abstract: 
Many of the existing ethical analyses of genetic engineering technologies (GET) focus on 
how they can be used to enhance individuals – to improve individual wellbeing, health, 
and cognition. There is a gap in the current literature about the specific ways 
enhancement technologies could be used to improve our populations and species, viewed 
as a whole. In this paper I explore how GET may be used to enhance the species through 
improvements in the gene pool. I argue one aspect of the species that may be desirable to 
enhance is ‘persistence’, or long term viability. I then look at some of the ways in which 
GET could be used to improve human persistence, and argue that the use of GET to secure 
benefits for individuals may compromise persistence. This suggests conflicts between uses 
of GET to enhance individuals and uses to promote the persistence of the species may 
occur. As GET are further developed, the likelihood that these conflicts will actually arise, 
and how we should resolve them if they do, will need to be considered.  
Collective enhancement Scientific and technological advances are making a future where we can radically modify the human genome increasingly probable – allowing us not only to alter our physical and cognitive capacities but also change our evolutionary trajectory. Much of the existing ethical analysis concerning genetic engineering technologies (GET) has focused on how these technologies will be used to enhance individuals – to increase their chances of living good lives or to improve specific capacities such as cognition. However individuals are not the only possible targets of these new technologies. GET may also be used to benefit groups of individuals, such as our populations and our species. GET will not only allow individual enhancement, they may also make possible forms of collective enhancement. The purpose of this paper is to explore how we might use GET to approach one type of collective enhancement– the enhancement of the species through changes in the human gene pool.   
Enhancement concepts Before discussing whether we could enhance the species, it is important to specify what I mean by ‘enhance’. Functional definitions of enhancement define it in terms of increasing or augmenting a specific capacity or power.1 This conception of 
1 J. Savulescu, et al. Well-Being and Enhancement. In: Enhancing Human Capacities. J. Savulescu, et al., eds. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing; 2011. pp. 3-18. 
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enhancement is normally used in reference to the improvement of individual characteristics, such as health. However just as we can approach the enhancement of individual humans in a functional sense, we can also approach the enhancement of the human species in a functional sense. A broad functional definition of enhancement that could be applied to the species is ‘to raise in degree, heighten, augment’. Under this definition we would enhance the species by augmenting, or increasing, one of its properties.  In this paper I discuss how we could use GET to augment a specific property of the species –‘persistence’ or long term viability. In the future, GET may allow us to change the human gene pool in ways which increase ‘persistence’ and make the species more likely to survive in the long term. This may be achieved through changes to genes which affect our immunity, cognition, or moral capacities. GET could potentially be used to reduce our susceptibility to what Bostrom calls existential risks, i.e. threats to the existence of humanity.2 For instance, changing the frequency of certain genes in the gene pool could reduce our susceptibility to disease pandemics. Using GET to increase the persistence of the species can be seen as a functional enhancement – it increases a specific quality or property. This leaves open the question of whether increasing persistence is also morally desirable. However I introduce some arguments in favour of such a view below.    
Species concepts  Different ways of understanding human persistence can be derived from alternative conceptions of the term ‘species’. How best to define ‘species’ is widely debated. There are at least 26 different species concepts found in the scientific literature.3 Different definitions have different implications for how we define the group ‘homo sapiens’ and therefore how we would go about promoting its continued existence. I will consider two ways of understanding human persistence based on two commonly-used species concepts.  The Biological Species Concept (BSC) defines a species as a set of “populations which are actually or potentially interbreeding, and which are reproductively isolated from other such arrays under natural conditions".4 This definition of species sees the human species as a group of organisms which are capable of breeding with each other and which lack the ability to breed with other groups. Agar has taken the BSC to imply that if we used enhancement technologies to give human beings radically different characteristics, the resulting organism would probably not be considered as a member of the human species.5 This is because radically enhanced individuals will likely be reproductively isolated from unenhanced individuals in some way – if not through post-zygotic (physiological) mechanisms than through pre-zygotic (psychological) ones. Individuals with greatly improved cognitive capacities, for example, would likely have very different interests from unenhanced individuals and behave very differently. 
2 N. Bostrom. Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards. J Evol Technol 2002; 9: 1-30. 3 J. Wilkins. Species, Kinds, and Evolution. Reports of NCSE 2006; 26: 36-45. 4 E. Mayr. 1970. Populations, Species, and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5 N. Agar. Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2010. 
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This may make interbreeding between such groups unlikely – the enhanced are not likely to view the unenhanced as potential mates and vice versa.6   One way of understanding persistence, then, utilises the BSC to determine the conditions under which the species will be considered to have become extinct. The current human species will have perished if in the future no organisms exist who would be reproductively compatible with current members of the species. Under this conception of persistence, the use of GET to increase the persistence of the human species would involve using such technologies to ensure the continued existence of beings that we would potentially breed with. This could rule out the use of GET to make radical changes to our capacities if this would result in pre or post-zygotic reproductive isolation barriers between enhanced and unenhanced individuals.  A different way to understand human persistence can be derived from the Evolutionary Species Concept (ESC), which defines species as “a lineage of ancestral descendant populations which maintains its identity from other such lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and historical fate”.7 Under the ESC, the human species is comprised of individuals who occupy a particular lineage. As long as this particular lineage continues to exist and maintain evolutionary independence, the human species will continue to exist. It makes no difference if the organisms which occupy this lineage change radically over time, so that earlier members are very different to later members. Reproductive isolation can still be used to determine which current individuals should be considered as part of the same lineage, and hence the same species, but this test does not apply to individuals who are separated through time. On this view, using GET to increase persistence would amount to using GET to ensure the survival of our current evolutionary lineage,8 even if this involved making significant changes to our characteristics.    Hence the persistence of the species can be understood in at least two independent ways. In the next section I will refer to the persistence of the human species as understood through the above interpretation of the BSC as the persistence of the human biological species, and the persistence of the species as understood through the ESC as persistence of the human evolutionary species.   
The value of persistence It is intuitive that the continued existence of the species is in some way valuable and many authors endorse such a view.9 For example, Bostrom describes reducing our 
6 Ibid. 7 E. Wiley. The Evolutionary Species Concept Reconsidered. Syst Biol 1978; 27: 17-26. 8 Under the ESC a species may technically become extinct when they split into two separate lineages. Theoretically then, one way that the human species may become extinct is by splitting into distinct daughter species which then evolve separately. In this paper I do not consider this type of event as affecting human persistence under the ESC. This is because the central reason that I believe we have to value the persistence of the evolutionary species (the continued existence of persons) is likely to hold in cases of lineage splitting. When I talk about the persistence of the evolutionary species, I mean the persistence of our lineage even if it splits and takes a branching form.   9 Some theories imply there would be little or no value in human persistence. For example, Benatar argues for an asymmetrical theory of personal goods, according to which we harm people by causing the bad aspects of their lives, but we do not benefit them by causing the good aspects of their lives. (D. Benatar. 
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006.) It follows that it is wrong to create new humans and prolong the existence of the species. This theory has been criticised elsewhere (E. Harman. Critical Study - Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into 
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susceptibility to existential risks as a “global public good”, which implies that the persistence of the species is also a good.10 Sidgwick describes the extinction of mankind as the “greatest conceivable crime”,11 a view with which Parfit sympathises.12 In the following paragraphs I look at some positive arguments for why we should value the persistence of both the biological and the evolutionary human species.   Agar argues for a theory of goods based on ‘species relativism’, according to which ‘certain experiences and ways of existing properly valued by members of one species may lack value for the members of another species’.13 This theory can be taken to imply that we have reasons to value the persistence of the human biological species, but not the human evolutionary species. Some of the experiences we value today are unique to our current species and dependent on our current range of capacities. For example, our experience of listening to Bach’s music is likely to be in some ways dependent on our current level of cognitive ability. If we changed into organisms with radically different cognitive abilities we would have a different experience listening to Bach than we have now. Similarly the experiences we have when we fall in love, laugh with friends, or run a marathon, would all be very different if we had different cognitive and physical capabilities.  If we value a world in which people have experiences like we have now, this gives us a reason to perpetuate the existence of creatures that are capable of having these experiences. This not only provides us with a motivation not to become extinct, but also not to use enhancement technologies to radically change our characteristics.14  One criticism of the species relativist approach is that it implies that there is no objective basis for valuing the experiences we have now, compared to the experiences had by other animals. For example, species relativism implies that a chimpanzee would have no reason to value our experience of food over its experience of food, and the same is true of our other experiences such as love. Therefore, if our species were currently phenotypically identical to chimpanzees, and had the opportunity to use enhancement technologies to transform ourselves into humans, we would have no reason to do so. However this implication is questionable. Many claim that our experiences are not only subjectively better than those experiences had by chimpanzees, but that they are objectively better.15 Objective theories about values are unlikely to provide us with intrinsic reasons to value the persistence of the species. This is because they imply that we should favour any interventions which increase total value, even if these interventions make the species less likely to survive. However, objective theories about values may provide us with instrumental reasons to value persistence. Singer argues that what matters morally is not being a member of the species ‘Homo sapiens’ but rather some intrinsic 
Existence. Noûs 2009; 43: 776-785;C. Brown. Better Never to Have Been Believed: Benatar on the Harm of Existence. Econ Philos 2011; 27: 45-52.). For the purpose of this paper I will assume that this theory, and others which imply that, in general, human lives contain more negative than positive value or that positive value cannot offset negative value, are false.  10 Bostrum, op.cit. note 2. 11 H. Sidgwick.. The methods of ethics. London: Macmillan; 1907. p.487. 12 D. Parfit. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987. pp. 453 -454. 13 Agar, op.cit. note 5.  14 Ibid. 15 J. Harris. Enhancing Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007. pp.15-16.  
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properties that most humans possess, namely self-awareness and rationality.16 Organisms that possess these characterises are referred to as persons.  The intrinsic properties that make us persons may be important if we value total utility over time. Although sentience is often seen as the most fundamentally important organismic property for utilitarians, rationality and self-awareness may also be important as they influence the intensity and quality of experiences. Many believe that persons are able to experience higher quality pleasures than other types of organisms. We have loving relationships, appreciate music and art, and get pleasure from intellectual pursuits. It could be that these higher pleasures are of such greater value than the pleasures experienced by other animals that a world without persons would, in nearly all cases, be worse than a world with persons. As Mill states “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied”.17 This implies that it is likely that a world in which persons exist will have more utility than a world where no persons exist. This is the primary reason why Parfit believes classical utilitarians should value the continued existence of mankind.18   If we care about the continued existence of persons then we may have instrumental reasons to care about the persistence of the species. As discussed above, one way the human biological species can become extinct is if the characteristics of individuals change significantly in the future. Future individuals who lack the characteristics that make us persons (such as rationality) would certainly be very different from us and it is unlikely that these individuals would be seen as potential mates by current members of the species. This indicates that the persistence of the human biological species requires the continued existence of persons – if the biological species exists, persons must also exist.  Similar arguments apply to the persistence of the evolutionary species. The persistence of the evolutionary species will not guarantee the continued existence of persons because it permits the possibility that future individuals could lose the characteristics that make us persons and still be considered as members of the human species. However if we continue to evolve to the point where we are no longer the same biological species, it is unlikely that we will lose the characteristics that make us persons. This is particularly the case if the way we evolve is through the intentional use of enhancement technologies. Hence it is likely that the persistence of the human evolutionary species will be associated with the continued existence of persons.  Therefore the persistence of both the biological and evolutionary species is likely to promote the continued existence of persons. Currently, humans are the only species which are uncontroversially persons.19 This suggests that in the immediate future, the persistence of the species may be an important factor in the continued existence of 
16 P. Singer. Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1995. pp. 205-206.  17 J. Mill. Utilitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1906. p.46.  18 Parfit, op. cit. note 12. 19 It is often claimed that certain non-human animals, such as dolphins and great apes, also meet the criteria for personhood that have been stipulated here – rationality and self-awareness (for example see ). This is controversial and depends on how these properties are defined and what methods are considered to legitimately demonstrate them in other animals. At least some definitions of rationality, for instance, imply that it is a property confined to hominids (see for example K. Sterelny. Folk logic and animal rationality. In: Rational animals? S. Hurley & M. Nudds, eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.pp. 293–312.  
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persons. Therefore if we value the continued existence of persons, we may have instrumental reasons to value the persistence of the species. The above is just a quick sketch of some of the arguments that could be made as to why we should care about species persistence. The purpose of this article is not to provide a thorough investigation of this issue, but rather to show that if we do value species persistence there may be some interesting implications for how we approach the use of GET. I will therefore assume that it is plausible that the persistence of the species is something we should value, and for the remainder of the paper I will focus on the relationship between persistence and GET. I will primarily focus on the use of GET to promote the persistence of the human evolutionary species, but many of the arguments are also relevant to questions of the persistence of the human biological species. While in general GET may be expected to increase persistence, I argue that the use of GET solely to secure benefits for individuals will risk compromising persistence. This presents both an evolutionary and ethical conflict. The probability that such conflicts will be a practical problem for the use of GET, and how we should resolve such conflicts if they are, is beyond the scope of this paper. However these questions should be considered as GET are further developed. 
Individual survival and persistence It may initially be thought that enhancing persistence simply equates to enhancing the survival prospects of individuals that comprise the species. That is, if we make each individual more likely to survive, this would in turn automatically make the species as a whole more likely to survive. But this would be a mistake. In at least some cases, actions which increase the likelihood of each individual surviving can make the species as a whole less likely to survive. An example of this is seen in the frequently-cited case of the peppered moth.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution the peppered moth was predominantly found in a pale form. This colouration allowed the moth to blend in with the light-coloured lichens and tree bark. The less frequently-occurring black moth, on the other hand, was more likely to be eaten by birds. During the industrial revolution in England, the trees became covered with soot. This led to an increase in predation on pale moths as their bodies now dramatically contrasted with the colour of the bark. Conversely, dark-coloured moths became well camouflaged by the blackened trees. During the course of many generations, the allele frequency gradually shifted towards the dark allele, as more and more dark-bodied moths survived to reproduce.20  I mention this example simply to show that improving the long term survival prospects of a population does not always equate to improving the survival prospects of all current individual members of that population. Before the industrial revolution, an intervention which changed all of the dark moths to light moths would have improved each individual’s chances of survival by reducing their risk of predation. However, an intervention which changed all of the dark moths to light moths would have reduced the persistence of the moth population. When conditions changed, the presence of the dark form in the population helped the population adapt. If the dark genotype had been 
20 See G. Dickey Zakaib. The peppered moth's dark genetic past revealed. Nature 2011. DOI: doi:10.1038/news.2011.238. It should be noted that the change in the colouration of the peppered moth is widely considered to be an example of change occurring within a species. It is unlikely to have constituted a speciation event, under either of the species concepts defined above.  
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removed from the gene pool before the industrial revolution, the population would have been at greater risk of extinction.  Similarly, if we were trying to enhance the long term viability of the human species through changes to the human gene pool, this may not simply equate to improving the survival prospects of individual humans. The persistence of populations does not equate to the persistence of individuals. In some cases what promotes the survival of individuals may conflict with what promotes the survival of our population, and our species as a whole.  
Genetic diversity and persistence  Given that enhancing the capacity for persistence in the gene pool does not simply equate to enhancing the survival prospects of individual humans, what does it involve? One aspect of the gene pool that influences the persistence of species is genetic diversity. Many experiments have demonstrated links between low levels of genetic diversity and increased risks of extinction in a variety of species. As Frankham notes – a significant loss of genetic diversity “is expected to increase extinction risk by adversely affecting the ability of populations to evolve to cope with environmental change (evolutionary potential). Environmental change is experienced by essentially all species, whether it be due to global climate change, new or changed diseases, pests and parasites, new predators, climatic cycles, etc”.21 Other studies have found that even moderate losses in genetic diversity “may result in a reduced ability to adapt to environmental change”.22 In at least some cases, losses in diversity can reduce persistence. This is because it can reduce the ability of a population to adapt to environmental challenges.  However, the relationship between genetic diversity and adaptability is complex, especially in humans. This is because selection acts primarily on phenotypes, and only indirectly on genotypes.23 If genetic diversity has no impact, and no potential impact, on phenotypic diversity then it will not affect adaptability. It is not genetic diversity per 
se that is important to adaptability, but rather transmittable phenotypic diversity. If members of a population vary widely in their ability to respond to environmental pressures, and those who respond well can transmit aspects of their phenotype to others in the population, the population as a whole will be able to adapt to a greater range of challenges than a less diverse population.   Genetic inheritance is only one potential source of transmittable phenotypic diversity, with others including epigenetic inheritance, parental effects, ecological inheritance and cultural inheritance.24 But insofar as genetic diversity contributes to transmittable phenotype diversity in humans, it also contributes to persistence.25 Even though the 
21 R. Frankham. Genetics and extinction. Biol Conserv 2005; 126: 131-140. 22 J. Markett, et al. Population genetic diversity and fitness in multiple environments. BMC Evolutionary 
Biology 2010; 10. 
23 R. Brandon. Adaptation and Environment. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1990; R. Powell. The Evolutionary Biological Implications of Human Genetic Engineering. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
2012; 37: 204-225.  
24 E. Danchin, et al. Beyond DNA: integrating inclusive inheritance into an extended theory of evolution. Nat 
Rev Genet 2011; 12: 475-486. 25 Note that the effect of genetic diversity on phenotypic diversity will differ depending on environmental circumstances. A given genotype can produce a range of phenotypes, depending on environmental 
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genetic component of transmittable phenotypic variation may generally be small in humans compared to the cultural component, it should not be viewed as insignificant. For some traits, phenotypic variation is heavily influenced by genetic factors.26 Hence, as diversity in the human gene pool contributes to transmittable phenotypic variation, it is an important element of persistence.  However, enhancing persistence does not merely equate to increasing the capacity to generate phenotypic diversity. In some cases, populations require a distinct lack of phenotypic diversity in order to survive. If only a few specific phenotypes enable survival, then the population’s persistence will depend on its ability to quickly adopt these forms. For example the persistence of human populations may depend on how quickly they can adopt a phenotype that gives protection against a particular disease. In these circumstances enhancing persistence will not involve generating diversity. Instead, it will involve reducing diversity by increasing the frequency of successful phenotypes at the expense of others. Insofar as successful phenotypes are associated with particular genotypes, increasing persistence would involve increasing the frequency of specific genotypes in the gene pool.  
Exploitation and exploration One model that might usefully encapsulate the challenge populations’ face with regard to genetic diversity is based on the concepts of ‘exploitation and exploration’. The use of these terms is borrowed from complexity theory. Many adaptive complex systems (such as ant colonies, the adaptive immune system and cellular metabolism) face challenges in their environments which require them to balance the exploration of new strategies and the exploitation of successful strategies. 27 The gene pool can both explore – by generating novel genes and genotypes that lead to novel phenotypes, and exploit – by increasing the frequency of genes and genotypes that are linked to successful phenotypes. The long term survival of a population is influenced by the way in which its gene pool is able to balance these two factors. Too much exploitation and it begins to lose adaptive genetic diversity and the ability to change in response to future environmental challenges. In the peppered moth example, if the light genotype had been too greatly exploited, the population would have lost the ability to adapt to environmental changes brought on by the industrial revolution. Too much exploration and populations may not adjust to environmental challenges quickly enough. If a particular genotype is associated with a phenotype that allows a population to successfully adapt to an environmental challenge, then persistence may depend on the genotype quickly spreading through the gene pool.  The optimum balance between exploitation and exploration will shift from environment to environment. Certain environments favour the exploitation of known successful phenotypes. For instance, when environmental conditions are likely to remain stable in the near future, it will be optimal to limit exploration and exploit 
conditions–referred to as ‘norms of reaction’. In one environment, the diversity of a gene pool may have a large effect on phenotypic diversity; in another it may only have a small effect. The effect of genetic diversity on persistence can, therefore, be variable depending on environmental conditions.  26 J. Pepper, et al. Genetic influences on human brain structure: A review of brain imaging studies in twins. 
Hum Brain Mapp 2007; 28: 464-473. 27 M. Mitchell. Complexity: A Guided Tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009.  
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genotypes that are known to be successful in the previous environment.28In contrast, if environmental conditions are unstable then exploiting strategies that have previously been successful is no guarantee of success. Instead it is optimal for a population’s gene pool to explore a range of genotypes, as this increases the likelihood of uncovering genotypes which are able to succeed in the new conditions.  Importantly, the optimal balance between exploitation and exploration will also change from trait to trait. In any given environment, it will be optimal for a population to be exploiting successful phenotypes for some specific traits while exploring a range of different phenotypes for others. For example, some genes influence phenotypes that are both very specific and vital for humans to survive. Human populations would not benefit from increased exploration in these regions of the genome. Because of the importance and specificity of the genes involved in cellular respiration, for example, it would be detrimental to produce lots of variance in these genes. We already have a well-developed method of producing energy in our cells, and we need to exploit the genotypes that are associated with this successful strategy. Conversely, because pathogenic threats change from generation to generation, we may benefit from continued exploration in the genes that influence disease resistance. If genes that were good at providing disease protection in the previous generations were heavily exploited, this may make future generations more susceptible to future disease threats.  It appears that these trait-specific differences in selection pressures have already influenced the structure of the human genome. Genes that code for traits which are essential to survival and highly specific, like those involved in DNA transcription, are found in regions of the genome that have low mutation rates. Conversely, genes that benefit from higher rates of change, such as those which control immune responses, are found in regions of the genome that have a higher mutation rate.29 Exactly what is the optimum balance between exploration and exploitation in a given environment, and for a specific trait, will not always be clear. In many cases it will not be apparent as to what extent it would be optimal to exploit a particular genotype, and to what extent others should be explored. However, in some cases it will be clear that the benefits associated with a particular genotype justify its exploitation, even if this results in a reduced ability to adapt to future environmental changes. Similarly, in other cases, it will be clear that genotypes are not providing sufficient benefits, and over-exploiting them may be unnecessarily harmful to a population.  In the future, GET may provide us with the ability to make changes in the gene pool which can improve persistence and make the human species more likely to survive well into the future. However, it is also possible that GET will be used to promote other goals which could have a harmful effect on the viability of the species. In the rest of this article, I will look at the potential of GET both to enhance and compromise persistence.  
28 K. Ishii, et al. Evolutionarily Stable Mutation Rate in a Periodically Changing Environment. Genetics 1989; 121: 163-174. 29 J. Chuang & H. Li. Functional bias and spatial organization of genes in mutational hot and cold regions in the human genome. PLoS Biol 2004; 2 (2). 
51 
 
                                                            
How GET could enhance persistence The intentional modification of genes could potentially have several advantages over modification that occurs as a result of random mutation.30 These advantages might be used to secure benefits for both individuals and populations. Many of these advantages have been detailed in Powell & Buchanan and Powell.31 I will briefly summarise the key potential advantages of GET with respect to increasing persistence. I will divide the potential advantages of GET into two categories based on the exploitation and exploration model above: those that improve exploration, and those that improve exploitation. 
Improving exploration One way GET may be able to improve human persistence is by increasing the range of phenotypes we are able to generate. The physical structure of the human genome, being packaged in chromosomes which are generally inherited together, limits our ability to explore adaptive space under natural conditions. For example, genes which occur close together on a chromosome are nearly always inherited together, and so their effects are always experienced together. The ability of our species to explore the effect of specific genes on phenotype is, therefore, limited.   The nature of natural selection also constrains our ability to explore adaptive space under natural conditions. In its current state the gene pool primarily moves incrementally through adaptive space, by small genotype changes. This means it can become stuck on so called ‘local optimums’ in the adaptive landscape.32 If a particular genotype has a high fitness value (and represents a peak in adaptive space), and all nearby genotypes have low fitness values (and represent valleys), then a population will end up clumped around the peak. It will not be able to move to other peaks in adaptive space, as each incremental move results in individuals who are less fit, and who are therefore selected against. The move to higher peaks in the landscape may require radical rather than incremental changes, which may only be possible through ‘macromutations’, the simultaneous changing of many different genes at once.33 It is often impossible for such large-scale changes to be realised through natural processes alone, as the probability of many specific localised mutations occurring at once is very low. GET could potentially remove the physical and fitness constraints that limit our ability to explore novel phenotypes. This would allow us to explore a greater range of phenotypes than is currently possible. This could increase persistence, as it would increase our capacity to solve design problems that might face our species in the future. For example, it could be that changes to the atmosphere require very specific changes to our respiration in order for us to survive. Such dramatic changes to our phenotype may be impossible through incremental changes to our gene pool. The only way to reach this part of adaptive space may be though macromutations, made possible through GET.   
30 R. Powell & A. Buchanan. Breaking Evolution's Chains: The Prospect of Deliberate Genetic Modification in Humans. J Med Philos 2011; 36: 6-27. 31 Ibid; Powell, op. cit. note 23. 32 The adaptive landscape is a topographic representation of the relationship between genotypes/phenotypes and their fitness value. Peaks in the landscape represent genotypes/phenotypes that have high fitness value, and valleys represent low fitness values.  33 Powell and Buchanan, op. cit. note 27.  
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Further, the fact that humans can non-randomly select mutations, and choose combinations that are likely to contribute to adaptive phenotypes, means that GET will allow us to more effectively explore adaptive space than is currently possible. Whereas mutations that occur under natural conditions are always random with respect to fitness, mutations that occur under GET will benefit from human foresight.34 As people are unlikely to use GET to explore those phenotypes not expected to be adaptive in current conditions, novel phenotypes generated through the use of GET are more likely to be adaptive than novel phenotypes generated through natural processes.  Hence GET could be used to enhance persistence by increasing our capacity to explore adaptive space. It could allow new phenotypes to be generated that may help our species survive in future environments and provide better solutions to adaptive challenges.  
Improving exploitation Aside from increasing our ability to explore novel phenotypes, GET could also be used to improve our ability to exploit clearly beneficial genotypes – to enhance exploitation. As was the case with exploration, a general advantage of GET over random mutations is that genotypes exploited through GET would benefit from human foresight. One way in which GET could enhance exploitation is by enabling the ‘lateral’ transfer of genes.35 This would enable individuals to transmit genetic information to each other without sharing a parent/offspring relationship. As soon as beneficial genes arise in the gene pool, we could ensure they are quickly distributed throughout the population.   Pandemics provide an example of an existential risk that may be diluted as a result of lateral gene transfer. Under present conditions it can take thousands of years for genes that help human populations become resistant to pathogens to become fixed in the genome.36 This result of this can be catastrophic. For example, in Europe between AD 500 and 1700 humans faced a great selection threat from the bubonic plague. Eventually our populations were able to adapt to this threat and resistance genes became widespread in the gene.37 However, this process took hundreds of years and 30 per cent of Europe’s population died over the course of a few years in the mid-14th century.38 This slow rate of adaptation can be seen as reducing the long-term viability of the human species. By increasing the speed at which our populations can respond to pathogens, GET could reduce our susceptibility to this type of existential risk.   Today, naturally occurring disease epidemics may themselves not pose much of an extinction threat to our species. This is partly because humans can effectively deal with epidemics via cultural-behaviour modifications, such as the use of antibiotics, vaccination and sanitation. However, in the future a genetically engineered pathogen, which may have been designed specifically to be resistant to culturally mediated responses, may pose more of a threat to persistence than natural pathogens do today. The ability to quickly fix naturally occurring resistance genes in our population may be an important tool that helps us preserve the persistence of our populations. Further, 
34 Powell, op. cit. note 23. 35 Powell and Buchanan, op. cit. note 27. 36 Ibid. 37 A. Galvani & M. Slatkin. Evaluating plague and smallpox as historical selective pressures for the CCR5-
Δ32 HIV-resistance allele. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2003; 100: 15276-15279. 38 P. Zeigler. The Black Death. London: Penguin; 1969. 
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the lateral transfer of resistance genes may turn out to be a more reliable way of preventing epidemics in the future than other methods, particularly if the effectiveness of antibiotics continues to decline. If GET allows us to deal more efficiently with epidemic threats, then they will also increase persistence – even if disease threats are unlikely to drive us to extinction by themselves. This is because the severity of epidemics can influence our susceptibility to other existential risks. There is evidence from work in macroevolution that reductions in population size can increase extinction risk.39 Similarly in humans, a reduction in population size caused by a severe global epidemic may make us more likely to be driven to extinction by other causes, such as an asteroid or comet collision.  The ability to quickly spread beneficial genes through the gene pool may also reduce our susceptibility to existential risks that result in radical environmental changes. For example, asteroid collisions or runaway global warming could result in rapid changes in our atmosphere. As soon as genes are uncovered that aid survival in these new conditions, GET may be used to ensure they are quickly spread through the gene pool, thereby allowing the species to rapidly adapt to the environmental changes.   Perhaps the types of genotypes whose exploitation is most likely to reduce our susceptibility to existential risks are those that influence our moral motivations. Improvement in our moral motivations, known as moral enhancement,40 could reduce our susceptibility to a range of existential risks41 and increase persistence. Moral enhancement would presumably reduce the risk of malevolent individuals intentionally causing harm through the use powerful technologies such as nanotechnology or genetically engineered biological agents. Further, as moral limitations may contribute to an inability to cooperate effectively at a global level, moral enhancement could also reduce the probability of existential risks resulting from failures of nations to act together – such as global warming or nuclear holocaust.42 Therefore GET has the potential to increase persistence by increasing the speed at which at which genes associated with successful phenotypes spread through the population. Challenges that may be extreme enough to drive our species to extinction under natural conditions may be able to be successfully navigated with the help of GET.  
Ways in which GET could compromise persistence As seen above, GET could be a powerful tool to improve persistence. Ideally GET could be used to improve both the lives of individuals and the persistence of the species. However, whether GET increases human persistence or not will depend on the ways in which they are used. Some approaches to GET could potentially have detrimental effects on the species. This is especially relevant in cases where detrimental effects may arise through attempts to use GET to secure benefits for individuals. As I argued above, sometimes what is good for the persistence of populations can be at odds with what is 
39 For example, ‘Dead Clade Walking’ refers to a phenomenon in which some groups of organisms that suffer population losses in mass extinction do not participate in post-recovery diversifications (D. Jablonski. Survival without recovery after mass extinctions. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2002; 99: 8139-8144). As a result, some species never fully recover from the drop in population and become highly susceptible to extinction.  40 T. Douglas. Moral Enhancement. J Appl Philos 2008; 25: 228-245. 41 I. Persson & J. Savulescu. Unfit for the Future? Human Nature, Scientific Progress, and the Need for Moral Enhancement. In: Enhancing Human Capacities. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell; 2011. pp. 486-500. 42 Ibid 
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good for the survival of individuals living in that population. Similarly, if we use GET purely to benefit individuals this may detrimentally affect the species.    The concerns I discuss only apply to GET regimes that meet two specific conditions. I will be referring purely to germ-line engineering, as it is the most likely form of GET to have a significant effect on the capacity for persistence in the gene pool. I will also assume that GET are widely used within the populations I refer to.  
Loss of adaptive potential One way in which the use of GET to secure benefits for individuals may have a negative effect on the species is by reducing the range of phenotypes that are explored. If GET are used to increase the frequency of specific genotypes that give individuals the best chance to have a good life, this will likely reduce the diversity of the gene pool. In some cases this loss of diversity will result in a loss of adaptive potential and potentially reduce persistence.   One example of a trait where the interests of individuals may conflict with the long term viability of our species is in regard to immune responses. Individuals gain an immediate advantage when they have a phenotype that provides resistance to a disease present in their environment. However, if every individual in a population has this same phenotype this may make the population as a whole more susceptible to future threats.  For instance, certain forms of genes expressed in macrophages give individuals resistance against HIV.43 Macrophages are a type of white blood cell that play an important role in both innate and adaptive immunity. People who have the resistant form of this gene have a slightly different receptor on their macrophages which makes them more resilient to the HIV virus. However it is possible that having the mutant form of the macrophage will make individuals more susceptible to other disease threats. The altered form of the macrophage could be more easily targeted by other viruses that are yet to evolve.   There is a difficulty here, as there is little doubt that for a population where HIV is prevalent it would be beneficial for the resistance gene to be widespread. However in areas where HIV is only a small threat, increasing the frequency of such genes may make a population worse off if it reduces its ability to adapt to future disease threats. This example demonstrates the complexity of the balance between exploration and exploitation. In parts of the world where HIV is prevalent, the benefits gained from heavily exploiting the resistance genotype will outweigh the detrimental effects of reduced exploration. However in areas where HIV is only a minor threat, a population may get only a slight benefit from having the resistance gene widespread in the gene pool. In these cases it may not be worth the cost of making the population less diverse and hence more susceptible to future disease threats.  This problem could be exacerbated if GET allowed individuals to develop phenotypes that provided resistance to multiple diseases at once. It is obviously in an individual’s best interest to be resistant to the most likely disease threats in her environment. Today, that may include diseases such as influenza, TB and HIV. This multiple resistance phenotype would likely include specific forms of the cells of the innate 
43 He, et al. CCR3 and CCR5 are co-receptors for HIV-1 infection of microglia. Nature 1997; 385: 645-649. 
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immune system, such as macrophages. However having an entire population with this specific phenotype could make the population as a whole more susceptible to future disease threats. We might expect a population with individuals who have a variety of different macrophages, phagocytes, neutrophils, and other cells involved in innate immunity, to be resistant to a greater range of disease threats than a less diverse population. Hence if all individuals in a population have similar immune systems, and share immune cells that make them most likely to be resistant to diseases in their current environment, the population as a whole may be made more susceptible to diseases in future environments.  These consequences would not affect persistence if we had the ability to engineer resistance genes as soon as a new disease threats arise. But a difficulty with this approach is that we often cannot know which specific genotypes will give resistance to specific disease threats ahead of time. There are many different complex interactions and it is extremely difficult to determine what genotypes would give optimal resistance to a disease. Therefore until we have the knowledge to accurately predict which genotypes will give resistance against novel disease threats, it would be a better strategy to preserve a certain amount of standing variation in the genes that influence immunity. This could mean limiting the use of GET. As Powell indicates, when using GET we could “significantly reduce the chances of an epidemic by deliberately preserving high levels of polymorphisms in the immunorelevant sections of the genome”.44 However, this may require some restrictions on GET – at least if species persistence is an important priority. We may not be able to allow parents to choose genes that will likely be best for their children – the ones that make their children the most likely to avoid disease. If everyone chose genotypes that provide protection against the most likely threats in their environment this would reduce diversity in immunorelevant sections of the genome. This may in turn reduce the persistence of our populations.  There could be other traits in which a conflict of interest emerges between what is best for individuals and what is best for the population as a whole. If these traits can be influenced by GET, this could also potentially compromise persistence.       For example, it is plausible that our populations benefit from having individuals with a wide range of cognitive traits. Research in social science has shown that cognitive diversity can be more important than individual ability for our collective capacity to solve problems.45 Cognitive diversity improves the ability of groups to make accurate predictions46 and has been linked to increased innovation.47 This indicates that cognitive diversity may be important for our collective capacity to respond to societal challenges, such as those posed by existential risks.   But it is also possible that in a given environment a fairly specific set of cognitive traits gives an individual the best chance of achieving high levels of well-being. So if GET is able to influence cognition, and is used to select genotypes that give each individual this 
44 Powell, op. cit. note 23. 45 S. Page. The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007. 46 J. Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Anchor; 2005. 47 C. Nemeth & B. Nemeth-Brown. Better than Individuals? The potential benefits of dissent and diversity for group creativity. In: Group Creativity. P. Arlington, & A. Bernard, eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. pp. 63-84.  
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set of cognitive traits, this may limit the level of cognitive diversity present in our populations. For example, the cognitive trait ‘extroversion’ has been linked to increased levels of happiness48 and has a genetic component.49 If we were to use GET to increase the frequency of genotypes that were associated with happiness, we may increase the frequency of extroverts in our population and consequently reduce diversity in this trait. However it is plausible that the persistence of our population benefits from having a high level of diversity in this trait, as both introverts and extroverts excel at different tasks.50   That is not to say that there are no ‘all purpose good’ cognitive traits that would benefit both individuals and populations if they were widely possessed. Rather, the claim is merely that it is possible that there are some cognitive traits which benefit individuals, but would not benefit us collectively if they were possessed by each individual. Another example of such a trait could be creativity. Studies have indicated that individuals who perform badly on tests that measure latent inhibition (an ability to block out irrelevant stimuli) do well on tests of creativity, and vice versa.51 It has been hypothesised that these traits may be somewhat mutually exclusive – people are creative precisely because their mind wanders and they cannot block out seemingly irrelevant information. It is also plausible that one of these mutually exclusive traits is more desirable for individuals to possess. For instance, people with good latent inhibition may be more likely to be able to concentrate and do better at school than more creative people, and thus may be more likely to succeed and have happy lives. Further, people who perform well on creativity tasks may be more likely to suffer from mental illness.52  If we were able to use GET to select traits that were best for individuals to have, this may involve selecting individuals likely to have good latent inhibition. But this could be bad for us collectively. All else being equal, our collective ability to solve problems is improved when we have both individuals with good latent inhibition and others with poor latent inhibition but who are creative.  Hence, as well as limiting GET in order to preserve the genetic component of “immunodiversity”, it is possible that we may also need safeguards to preserve the genetic components of ‘cognitive diversity’, to ensure our populations benefit from having people with different types of minds.  To summarise, one way in which GET may compromise persistence is by over-exploiting certain genotypes that benefit individuals but not populations. It is plausible that there are certain phenotypes that are best for individuals to possess, as it makes them more likely to have a good life, but would be bad for populations if they occur in 
48 W. Pavot, et al. Extraversion and happiness. Pers Individ Dif 1990; 11: 1299-1306. 49 D. Rettew, et al. Non-additive and Additive Genetic Effects on Extraversion. Behav Genet 2008; 38: 223-233. 50 J. Stahl & T. Rammsayer. Extroversion-related differences in speed of premotor and motor processing as revealed by lateralised readiness Potentials. J Mot Behav 2008; 30: 143. 51 S. Carson, et al. Decreased Latent Inhibition Is Associated With Increased Creative Achievement in High-Functioning Individuals. J Pers Soc Psychol 2003; 85: 499-506. 52 S. Keri. Genes for Psychosis and Creativity: A Promoter Polymorphism of the Neuregulin 1 Gene is Related to Creativity in People With High Intellectual Achievement. Psychological Scienc 2009; 20: 1070-1073. 
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high frequencies. They may make our populations more liable to future disease threats, or reduce our capacity to respond to societal challenges.  
New local optimums GET could also reduce exploration if it is constrained by non-biological factors. As discussed earlier, one of the disadvantages of the human gene pool in its current state is that it gets stuck on local optimums in the adaptive landscape. In that case the local optimums are determined by fitness constraints. The ability of parts of the gene pool to move around adaptive space is limited because small genotype changes cannot be sustained when they reduce individual fitness. This limits the ability of the gene pool to explore adaptive space and generate novel phenotypes.  While GET may enable the gene pool to break free from local optimums that are determined by fitness constraints, other constraints specific to GET may impose similar limits on our ability to explore adaptive space. These could be conceptual, technological or commercial in nature.   For example, when GET first becomes available only a few specific genotypes may be known to improve well-being. It is possible that other genotypes exist that lead to greater levels of well-being, but these genotypes are not known. In this limited state of knowledge, if we were to use GET to select children who we expected would be most 
likely to experience high levels of well-being, we would need to ensure all of them had one of the few genotypes that we knew were associated with improved well-being. Not using GET and leaving it to chance would likely mean individuals would suffer reduced levels of well-being. However using GET in this way would also limit the population’s exploration of adaptive space and may prevent them from drifting onto more adaptive genotypes. This would be akin to our population becoming stuck on local optimums in the adaptive landscape. However, this time the local optimums are determined by knowledge and perceptual constraints rather than fitness constraints. Because we do not know of other sequences that improve well-being, and because we select each individual with a view to maximising well-being, our populations end up being clumped around a particular point in adaptive space and stop exploring other areas.53  Further, intense selection for specific genotypes which correlate with specific phenotypic traits may adversely affect other traits. This is partly due to the phenomenon of pleiotropy, where one gene may have multiple effects. If we increase the frequency of specific genotypes in the gene pool because they are associated with particular aspects of well-being, this may have unintended consequences on other traits. This has been a lesson with the artificial selection of specific traits in dog breeds. In some breeds, genotypes were selected because they associated with desirable phenotypes but also affected other traits through pleiotropy, which resulted in adverse health effects.54  
53 Similar points can be made about attempting to use GET to increase persistence with imperfect knowledge. If we attempt to maximise persistence early in the development GET when only a few options are available, there is a danger that we will over-exploit certain genotypes. This may ultimately reduce persistence by limiting exploration.    54 E. Karlsson & K. Lindblad-Toh. Leader of the pack: gene mapping in dogs and other model organisms. Nat 
Rev Genet 2008; 9: 713-725. 
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These types of concerns will be highly dependent on the precision of GET and how effectively they are able to achieve complex phenotypes. If we have precise technologies that allow maximum changes in phenotype with only minimal changes in genotype, these concerns may be ill-founded. However if the only way for complex phenotypes to become widespread through our populations is to make individuals share fairly specific genotypes, then these concerns may be relevant when assessing GET.  
Experiments in reproduction and conflict in GET In his article “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings” Savulescu argues that one of the benefits of GET will be that it allows parents to conduct “experiments in reproduction”.  
Reproduction should be about having children who have the best prospects. But to 
discover what are the best prospects, we must give individual couples the freedom 
to act on their own value judgment of what constitutes a life of prospect. 
“Experiments in reproduction” are as important as “experiments in living” as long 
as they don't harm the children who are produced. For this reason, reproductive 
freedom is important.55  Savulescu relates the benefits of reproductive liberty to the benefits that John Staurt Mill saw in the freedom to experiment. Reference to the effect of GET on the gene pool gives us a further reason to believe that the ability of parents to conduct experiments in reproduction may be a desirable consequence of GET. In a constantly changing world, we often do not know which genotypes will be successful in future environments and which will not. For some traits, our populations benefit from conducting multiple trials and exploring different genotypes to see which are beneficial and which are not. GET will benefit our populations by increasing our capacity to explore adaptive space, and then allowing us to exploit clearly beneficial genotypes as soon as they arise. However, GET will only deliver these benefits if they are used in a particular manner – if individuals in a population choose to explore a diversity of traits for their children. As Powell notes, we need not expect people to share a common conception of the ‘good’, and fears that GET will lead to parents selecting highly similar traits for their children, resulting in something similar to a biological monoculture, are ill-founded.56 But, even if we expect people to vary in their conception of ‘the good’, we might expect much less variety in their conceptions of ‘a good immune system’ or ‘a good set of cognitive skills’. For some traits, we may expect very little diversity in what parents choose, as some choices seem more likely to benefit their children than others. While such choices are rational from the perspective of individuals, they may be irrational from the perspective of a population. If we make choices on the basis of what will be optimal for a group, it does not make sense to put all our eggs in one genetic basket.  The above discussion demonstrates some of the potential tensions that should be considered during the development of GET. The use of GET to promote the liberty and interests of individuals may conflict with their use to secure collective goods, such as the persistence of the human species. Whether such conflicts will become a practical 
55 J. Savulescu. Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings. In: The Oxford 
Handbook of Bioethics. B. Steinbock, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. pp. 516-533. 56 Powell, op. cit. note 23. 
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problem for GET, and how we should resolve them if they do, will need to be considered as these technologies are further developed. 
60 
 
Chapter 2: Stocking the genetic supermarket – 
reproductive genetic technologies and collective 
action problems   
Note:  This chapter continues the theme that the use of enhancement technologies to benefit individuals may conflict with their use to secure collective goods. My co-author, Dr Thomas Douglas, and I suggest that such conflicts may in fact be likely to occur for reproductive genetic technologies that target specific sets of genes. We then argue that this provides a plausible pro tanto reason to restrict access to such technologies. This chapter is forthcoming in Bioethics as: C. Gyngell and T. Douglas. Stocking the Genetic Supermarket: Reproductive genetic technologies and collective action problems. 
Bioethics; doi: 10.1111/bioe.12098. Minor adjustments have been made to align the format, spelling and referencing to the rest of this thesis.   
Abstract: 
Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether their future 
children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A popular model that has been 
proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the “genetic supermarket”. In the genetic 
supermarket, parents are free to make decisions about which genes to select for their 
children with little state interference. One possible consequence of the genetic 
supermarket is that collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the 
genetic supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect on 
society as a whole, including future generations. In this paper we argue that RGTs 
targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits could lead to collective 
action problems. We then discuss whether this risk could in principle justify state 
intervention in the genetic supermarket. We argue that there is a plausible prima facie 
case for the view that such state intervention would be justified and respond to a number 
of arguments that might be adduced against that view. 
Introduction Various technologies already exist that enable parents to determine whether their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. Pre-natal testing and selective abortion allow parents to decide whether to continue with a particular pregnancy based on genetic information about the developing embryo or foetus. In 
vitro fertilisation (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) allow parents to acquire genetic information about a range of embryos and then determine which to gestate on the basis of that information. In the future it may become possible for parents employing assisted reproductive technologies to decide which eggs to fertilise with which sperm on the basis of reliable genetic information about the available eggs and sperm.1 Advances in genetic engineering technologies could also allow parents to directly alter the genes of existing sperm, eggs, embryos or foetuses.  
1 This possibility seems likely to occur in the very near future. Personal genomics Company ‘23andMe’ recently received a patent to a technology called ‘Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations’ 
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We use the term “reproductive genetic technologies” or “RGTs” to refer collectively to these technologies and to any other technologies that enable parents or others to (i) determine which of different possible future children to bring into existence based on detailed information about their likely genetic make-up, or (ii) alter the genetic make-up of a given future child whom the parents intend to bring into existence.2  There are at least two important questions that might be asked about RGTs. First, given the availability of specific RGTs, how ought parents to use them? That is – what are the obligations of parents with regard to using the RGTs that are available?3 Second, given the technical feasibility of specific RGTs, which should be made available to prospective parents? That is – how ought governments, or other regulatory bodies, to provide and regulate access to RGTs?   A popular class of responses to the second question come under the banner of ‘liberal eugenics’.4 Liberal eugenic approaches stress the importance of parental autonomy, and support widespread access to RGTs. One of the earliest descriptions of such an approach is found in Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”. Nozick advocates a “genetic supermarket”:5 
Consider … the issue of genetic engineering. Many biologists tend to think the 
problem is one of design, of specifying the best types of persons so that biologists 
can proceed to produce them. Thus they worry over what sort(s) of person there is 
to be and who will control this process. They do not tend to think, perhaps because 
it diminishes the importance of their role, of a system in which they run a "genetic 
supermarket," meeting the individual specifications (within certain moral limits) 
of prospective parents … This supermarket system has the great virtue that it 
involves no centralized decision fixing the future of human type(s).  The core idea of the genetic supermarket, and of liberal eugenics, is that RGTs are freely available to prospective parents, who are ultimately responsible for making selection decisions about the children. This model for regulating access to RGTs can be contrasted with older eugenic practices, which involved coercing people into certain reproductive choices, and current regulations governing access to embryo screening 
(US patent: us 8,543,339). Technologies such as this would allow individuals to choose between sperm or egg donors based on the statistical likelihood of the resulting child having a certain phonotype.   2 We understand ‘child’ to mean ‘post-natal child’. Thus, for us, a child comes into existence at the time of its birth. We suspect that much of what we say would also bear on practices that influence the capacities or genetic material of existing children and adults, but we do not discuss such practices here.  3 Various principles have been offered in response to this first question. See, for example, J. Robertson. 
Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; S. Shiffrin. Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm. Legal 
Theory 1999; 5:117–48; J. Savulescu. Procreative beneficence: Why we should select the best children. 
Bioethics 2001; 15:413–26; E. Harman. Can we harm and benefit in creating? Philosophical Perspectives 2004; 18:89–113; J. Elster. Procreative beneficence—Cui bono? Bioethics 2011; 25:482–88; T. Douglas & K. Devolder. Procreative altruism: Beyond individualism in reproductive selection. J Med Philos 2013; 38:400–409. 4 See, for example, N. Agar. Liberal Eugenics. Public Aff Q 1998; 12: 137–155; A Buchanan et al. From 
Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001; N. Agar. Liberal 
Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; 2004; J. Glover. Choosing 
Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press; 2006; J. Harris. Enhancing 
evolution: the ethical case for making better people. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press; 2007; P. Singer. Parental Choice and Human Improvement. In: Human Enhancement. J. Savulescu, N. Bostrom, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009. pp. 277–289. 5 Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books; p. 315. 
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technologies, which in many jurisdictions restrict the use of RGTs to the prevention of diseases, or a sub-class of diseases.6  Most writers in the liberal eugenic tradition accept there should be some limits placed on parental use of RGTs. The genetic supermarket should not be a true free market. However, they take a true free market to be the default position, with any deviation from it requiring a justification.  There is disagreement about precisely how much deviation from a true free market is justified. Some writers argue that it is only permissible to interfere with parental choice to protect the children who are targets of these technologies.7 Others argue that it may also be permissible to interfere with parental choice to promote social goals like equality, and to protect the public interest.8   One way in which the “public interest” could be harmed as a result of widespread use of RGTs is through the effect of collective action problems. We will take it that a collective action problem exists whenever rational individual agents acting in isolation from one another collectively have a negative effect on wider society.9  Many writers have pointed to the fact that collective action problems could potentially arise for some traits targeted by RGTs, and have claimed that this would potentially justify restricting access to these technologies.10 However, so far this discussion has mainly focussed on only one collective action problem: that posed by RGTs targeting height. The broader significance of collective action problems for the regulation of RGTs has not been investigated. In this paper we assess the likelihood and significance of several collective action problems that could arise in a genetic supermarket. In Part 1, we consider whether and to what extent collective action problems are likely to arise for RGTs targeting height, innate immunity and particular cognitive traits. We argue that collective action problems could arise in all three areas, with different factors affecting their extent and scope. Thus, we suggest, the concern about collective action problems is a serious one. In Part 2, we argue that if the availability of particular RGTs did result in collective action problems, then it would be appropriate for the state to restrict access to them in certain circumstances. We conclude by discussing the implications of our arguments for debates regarding the appropriate framework for regulating RGTs  
Collective action problems The idea that collective action problems could potentially result from widespread access to particular RGTs has been suggested by many authors. For example Singer says that: 
6 Another practice that is often allowed under current regulations is the selection of embryos on the basis of their suitability to act as a tissue donor for a sick sibling. Children who are born through this process are often referred to as ‘savior siblings’. For discussion, see M. Spriggs & J. Savulescu. Saviour siblings. J Med 
Ethics 2002;28(5):289–289. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.  7  R. Bailey. Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution. Amherst: Prometheus Books; 2005. 8 Buchanan et al, op. cit. note 4, pp. 16-17 & 183. Glover, op. cit. note 4 , pp. 77-79 9 We understand ‘wider society’ to include both current and present individuals, and both individuals who contribute to the problem and those who do not. Economic definitions of collective action problems are frequently somewhat narrower than ours, but we believe that our definition captures how the concept has been used in discussions of RGTs. 10 Buchanan et al, op. cit. note 4, pp. 182-187; Singer, op. cit. note 4.  
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being able to select for height….could start the human equivalent of the peacock’s 
tail –an escalating “height race” in which the height that distinguishes “tall” 
people from those who are “normal” increases year by year, to no one’s benefit, at 
considerable environmental cost, and perhaps eventually even at some health cost 
to the children themselves. Genetic enhancement could lead to a collective action 
problem, in which the rational pursuit of individual self-interest makes us all 
worse off. 11   In this section we will examine the significance of the collective action problem presented by RGTs targeting height. We will also discuss two other types of RGTs that could potentially result in collective action problems that have not previously been discussed in the literature – RGTs that target innate immunity and those targeting certain cognitive traits.12 We assume throughout that rational parents faced with decisions about how to use RGTs would be motivated by the wellbeing of their future child.13 That is, if choosing between different possible future children, they would choose to have a child who can be expected to have a life containing more wellbeing over a child who can be expected to have a life containing less wellbeing, and if choosing what dispositions to bring about in a given future child, they would choose to bring about dispositions that can be expected to give the future child more rather than less wellbeing.14 The collective action problems we discuss arise when individual couples or single parents use RGTs in ways that are expectedly best for their children, but where parents as a collective act in a way that is bad for all of their children. No individual couple or single parent could make their future child expectedly better off by acting differently, but if all parents acted differently, all of their children would be expectedly better off.15 
 
Height The idea that RGTs targeting height would lead to a collective action problem builds on empirical research suggesting that tall people perform better on a range of measures thought relevant to wellbeing. Tall people have been found to be more attractive to the opposite sex and more likely to have a long term partner.16 Tall people also make more money, even when factors like level of education are controlled for. Perhaps 
11 Singer, op. cit. note 4, pp. 282-283. 12 Widespread access to sex selection technologies may also result in collective action problems in certain parts of the world. If it is in an individual’s best interest to be a particular sex because of certain social conditions, the widespread availability RGTs targeting sex may make everyone worse off by causing a large imbalance in the sex ratio. We have chosen not to discuss this particular collective action problem in detail because the likelihood that it will arise and its significance if it does arise differ substantially between different societies. For further discussion see Buchanan et al, op. cit. note 4, p. 183-184 and R. Sparrow. Human enhancement and sexual dimorphism. Bioethics 2012; 26: 464-75.  13 In this context we use the term ‘future child’ to refer to the next child the parents will have, even if the parents are using technologies which change the identity of that child, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. 14 We thus effectively assume that rational parents would maximise the wellbeing of their children given the possibilities open to them. However, our subsequent arguments would not be affected if they would instead only aim for a high, but not necessarily maximal, level of wellbeing. 15 Although all the collective action problems we discuss are ones in which parents act in ways that are expectedly best for their children, in some cases parents may use RGTs in ways that actually end up making their children individually worse off because things do not turn out as expected. The collection action problem arising from RGT’s targeting innate immunity, discussed below, takes this form. 16 D. Nettle. Women's height, reproductive success and the evolution of sexual dimorphism in modern humans. Proc Biol Sci 2002; 269: 1919-1923. 
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unsurprisingly, then, height has been found to be correlated with subjective wellbeing.17 If RGTs which target height were available in the genetic supermarket we might expect rational parents to use these RGTs to attempt to have taller children.18  However, if every parent used RGTs to have taller children, this would negate any positive effect of the additional height on wellbeing. This is because everyone’s relative height would stay more-or-less the same, and it is relative height rather than absolute height that is associated with increased career and relationship success and subjective happiness. Further, there are ways in which the widespread provision of height enhancements would make everyone worse off. Buchanan and co-authors note that even if the means of height enhancement had no direct negative health consequences for the enhanced individual, such enhancements would nevertheless have costs, including the economic costs of the intervention itself and the costs of redesigning our buildings, vehicles and environment more generally to accommodate taller individuals.19 There may also be other environmental costs associated with height enhancements. In general tall people need to eat more food, require more fuel to travel, and consume more resources than shorter people. The creation of taller people could increase carbon emissions and increase the risk of dangerous climate change. Indeed, in a recent article, S. Matthew Liao and co-authors argue that, if we wish to use RGTs to protect our populations against climate change, we should already be aiming to make future people shorter than we are.20   Despite these costs, however, rational parents could be expected to use RGTs to have taller children. If other parents use RGTs to target height and you do not, your child will end up enduring a significant height-disadvantage. On the other hand, if other parents do not use RGTs in this way, and you do, your child will enjoy a significant wellbeing advantage. Thus, regardless of what other parents do, if you are motivated by the wellbeing of your own future child, you will attempt to use RGTs to have taller children. The fact that choosing to have a taller child may also contribute to social and environmental costs of the sort mentioned above is unlikely to be a decisive consideration for parents motivated solely by the wellbeing of their future child, since most of those costs will be borne by others. In theory then, the availability of RGTs which target height in the genetic supermarket would create a collective action problem. The rational actions of individuals in the market would make everyone worse off.   However the problem may not be as significant as it is sometimes presented. For one, the relationship between height and subjective wellbeing is strongly affected by sex. Only in males is height independently correlated with increases in wellbeing, once 
17 A. Deaton & R. Arora. Life at the top: The benefits of height. Econ Hum Biol 2009; 7: 133-136. 18 Of course, insofar as parents are limited to selecting between embryos created using existing in vitro fertilisation techniques, they will be severely constrained in the extent to which they can influence the height, or other traits, of their offspring. This is because these techniques allow for the creation of only a small number of embryos. However, it is possible that these constraints will be weakened in the future through the development of genetic modification techniques or stem cell techniques that would enable the creation of eggs and sperm in vitro. For discussion of the latter possibility, see H. Bourne. T. Douglas & J. Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence and in Vitro Gametogenesis. Monash Bioeth Rev 2012; 30: 29–48 and R. Sparrow. Forthcoming. In Vitro Eugenics. J Med Ethics. 19 Buchanan et al, op. cit. note 4, p. 186.  20 S.M. Liao, et al. Human Engineering and Climate Change. Eth Pol Envir 2012; 15: 206-221. 
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economic and health impacts are controlled for. 21 Taller women are happier only because they are, on average, healthier and earn more money. The association between height and wellbeing in women may therefore be better explained by factors which cause both tallness and elevated wellbeing rather than a direct relationship between height and wellbeing. Malnourishment in childhood, for example, may lead to individuals being shorter as adults, and may also prevent them from reaching their full cognitive potential. This could contribute to worse educational outcomes and earnings in adulthood.22 Consequently, we might expect that direct height enhancements would be more popular among parents of male children than female children. Further, at very extreme heights it is doubtful whether further height increases will be associated with increases in wellbeing. Being extremely tall has health and social costs. At extreme heights individuals can find it difficult to attract romantic partners.23 Being very tall can lead to cardiovascular problems, because of the increased load on the heart to supply the body with blood. It can also lead to problems resulting from the increased time it takes the brain to communicate with the extremities. If humans were to get taller and taller, at some point any relative height advantage would surely be outweighed by these costs.   Therefore, while widespread access to height enhancements will potentially lead to a collective action problem, this problem might be somewhat limited in scope (due to the fact that height does not appear to confer a wellbeing advantage on women) and in magnitude (due to the fact that increasing height is likely to cause a net loss of wellbeing at some point).   
Innate immunity  The widespread availability of RGTs capable of targeting innate immunity could also lead to collective action problems. In a genetic supermarket some immune system genes may be more desirable than others, as they provide protection against the likeliest disease threats. However, if many parents pick the same immune system genes for their children, their combined actions may reduce population level immunodiversity, and this could make everyone worse off.   Some genes provide protection against some diseases but increase susceptibility to others. For example, it is known that a variant of the DARC gene – which codes for an antigen found on red blood cells – provides protection against malaria. However this version of the gene also disposes people to be more susceptible to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).24 Genes like this could potentially lead to collective action problems, as it may be best for any given individual to have one variant, but best for the overall wellbeing of the population for there to be a mixture of the two variants in the population. For example, imagine a population in which the average incidence of Malaria is 3% and the incidence of HIV is 5%, and assume that it is at least as bad to have HIV as to have Malaria. If everyone chose the version of the gene that was expectably best for their children, they would pick the version of the gene which provided protection against HIV. However this could make the population as a whole 
21 V. Carrieri & M. De Paola. Height and subjective well-being in Italy. Econ Hum Biol 2012; 10: 289-298.   22 A. Case & C. Paxson. Stature and Status: Height, Ability, and Labor Market Outcomes. J Poliy Econ 2008; 116 (3): 499-532.   23 Nettle, op. cit. note 16. 24 W. He, et al. Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines mediates trans-infection of HIV-1 from red blood cells to target cells and affects HIV-AIDS susceptibility. Cell Host Microbe 2008; 4: 52-62. 
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worse off. If a mixture of genes were present in the population, this might ensure that any epidemics of HIV or Malaria would be only moderately severe. However, if everyone had the gene that protects against HIV and leaves them susceptible to the Malaria virus, the result could be that Malaria epidemics would tend to be very severe. Even if there were a corresponding reduction in the severity of HIV epidemics, this could be a negative outcome overall. Severe epidemics may be particularly undesirable as they result in many people being sick simultaneously which can disrupt the supply of essential goods and services. This can lead to worse outcomes for those directly affected by an illness as well as the broader population. For example, as the supply of health services can get disrupted, sick individuals may have trouble getting properly diagnosed and treated. Similarly, as the supply of other essential goods can be disrupted, severe epidemics can have negative flow-on effects for healthy individuals. Therefore, in cases such as these, it may be preferable for a population to maintain a certain amount of genetic diversity. Diversity would reduce the likelihood that a significant portion of the population would become sick at the one time.   Other immune genes have known benefits but may also have costs that are yet to be discovered. These genes could also pose collective action problems if available in a genetic supermarket. For example, the CCR5 gene codes for a type of receptor found on macrophages (a type of white blood cell), which are targeted by the HIV virus. One form of the CCR5 gene provides resistance to the HIV virus.25 However, given the important role played by macrophage receptors in fighting other infections, it is possible that individuals with this form of the gene will be more susceptible to other infectious agents that are yet to evolve. If this gene were available in a genetic supermarket it seems plausible that many parents would select the form of the gene which provides resistance to HIV. This is likely to be the case even in populations where HIV is only a minor threat. But the combined result of many people selecting this gene for their children may be bad for those populations as a whole, as it may increase their susceptibility to future epidemics.      This problem could be exacerbated if many different immune genes could be targeted by RGTs. If parents make many similar decisions across a range of immune genes, a significant reduction in the general immune-diversity of a population may result. This general reduction in genetic diversity could make these populations prone to being devastated, and even wiped out, by novel disease threats.  Of course, it might be thought that, while in theory RGTs that target immunity will result in collective action problems, the ability of a human population to fight disease in other ways may render these problems insignificant by the time a genetic supermarket opens. Vaccines and antibiotics can already mitigate many infectious disease threats, and in the future other technologies may make innate immunity even less important than it is now. However, it is difficult to be confident that innate immunity will be less important in the future. Antibiotic resistance is becoming a major issue and if it continues we may even find that innate immunity will be more important for the population than it is now. 
25 M. Samson, et al. Resistance to HIV-1 infection in caucasian individuals bearing mutant alleles of the CCR-5 chemokine receptor gene. Nature 1996; 382: 722-725. 
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Cognitive traits RGTs targeting certain cognitive traits could also lead to collective action problems.26 Some cognition-related genes may be very popular in an unregulated genetic supermarket. However, the combined action of many parents choosing these genes for their children may reduce valuable types of cognitive diversity and make everyone worse off.   Recent work in social science has demonstrated that when groups of people are solving complex problems, cognitive diversity can matter more than individual ability.27 Cognitive diversity in this sense refers to differences in how each “individual sees the world, interprets its problems, and makes predictions in it”.28 Groups with low levels of cognitive diversity tend to get stuck on sub-optimal solutions when attempting to solve complex problems together. Because individuals in these groups have similar ways of approaching the problem, they will not be able to see the whole range of potential solutions available. In contrast, when cognitively diverse groups are solving problems together, they can assess more potential solutions, meaning they are more likely to find optimal solutions to problems.29 This model is supported by data showing that cognitively diverse teams outperform less diverse teams on measures of problem solving.30   If this model is accurate, cognitive diversity may influence the collective wellbeing of a society. Cognitive diversity makes groups of people better at solving problems, and populations benefit from this. Reducing cognitive diversity could potentially have very significant long-term effects on future generations, as it could diminish society’s ability to deal with complex global problems like climate change.      In many circumstances we wouldn’t expect all rational parents to pick the same cognition targeted genes for their children, and so cognitive diversity would not be significantly reduced by the availability of RGTs that affect cognition. Generally, rational individuals have many diverse preferences, and so we may expect them to make diverse choices regarding which cognition-affecting genes they pick for their children. However some preferences may be very widely shared by many parents. For instance, it seems plausible that most parents want their children to be happy. Studies indicate that parents generally prefer teachers that make their children happy over ones that 
26 Many cognitive traits are significantly influenced by genetic factors. For example, degree of extroversion and risk of depression have high heritability’s, indicating that a significant amount of the variation observed in these traits can be explained by genetic differences (see T.J. Bouchard & M. McGue. Genetic and environmental influences on human psychological differences. J Neurobiol 2003; 54: 4–45).   This suggests a range of cognitive traits could potentially be targeted by RGTs.   27 L. Hong & S.E. Page. Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2004; 101: 16385-16389; S.E. Page. The Difference: How the Power of 
Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007. 28 H. Landemore. Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of representatives. Synthese 2012; 190: 1209-1231. 29 How much cognitive diversity is beneficial for a particular group will depend on the problem the group is trying to solve. For simple problems only very low levels of cognitive diversity may be needed. For more complex problems groups will benefit from much higher levels of cognitive diversity (although there will still be an upper limit above which extra diversity is no longer beneficial). See Page, op. cit. note 27, pp. 158-159.  30 Page, op. cit. note 27; L.L. Martins, et al. A Contingency View of the Effects of Cognitive Diversity on Team Performance: The Moderating Roles of Team Psychological Safety and Relationship Conflict. Small Gr Res 2012; 44: 96-126. 
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increase their academic performance.31 Therefore, if some genes make it more likely children will be happy we may expect many rational parents to select them for their children. If this has the effect of lowering a valuable type of cognitive diversity, it may make everyone worse off. Consider genes that predispose individuals to depression. Being prone to depression can make someone’s life harder and less enjoyable. This may mean that, in a genetic supermarket, rational individuals would select against genes that predispose to depression. However, these genes may also contribute to valuable cognitive skills. For example, people who are predisposed to depression have been shown to have increased analytic skills.32 Research also suggests that people who are depressed use different heuristics to solve problems than people who are not depressed.33 The existence of individuals on the depressive spectrum, then, could constitute a valuable type of cognitive diversity – one that contributes to collective wellbeing.34  Another example of a cognitive trait that may influence happiness is extroversion. A variety of studies have linked being extroverted to increased levels of subjective wellbeing.35 This means that if RGTs were available which targeted extroversion, we may expect rational parents who value happiness for their children to take steps to increase their chance of having an extroverted child. If many parents did this, it would have the effect of reducing the population level diversity of this trait. But this could also be bad for the population as a whole. Studies indicate that introverts and extroverts have differences in brain structure,36 and respond differently to stimuli.37 It’s plausible that this contributes to distinctive perspectives and heuristics and represents a valuable type of cognitive diversity.  The widespread availability of RGTs targeting extroversion and depression may, therefore, pose a collective action problem. It may be rational for parents who value happiness to use the RGTs to select against genes that predispose individuals to depression and introversion. But this could be detrimental for the population as a whole because it reduces a valuable kind of cognitive diversity. 
Collective action problems and the role of the state In the previous section, we looked at some collective action problems that may arise in a genetic supermarket. We argued that the availability of RGTs that target height, immunity and aspects of cognition could result in collective action problems. At least in the case of immunity and cognitive traits, and possibly also in the case of height, it is 
31 B.A. Jacob & L. Lefgren. What Do Parents Value in Education? An Empirical Investigation of Parents' Revealed Preferences for Teachers. Q J Econ 2007; 122: 1603-1637. 32 P.W. Andrews & J.A. Thomson, Jr. The bright side of being blue: depression as an adaptation for analyzing complex problems. Psychol Rev 2009; 116: 620-654. 33 R. Greifeneder & H. Bless. Depression and reliance on ease-of-retrieval experiences. Eur J Soc Psychol 2008; 38: 213-230. 34 It should be noted that the arguments presented here could also apply to other treatments for depression, such as the use of antidepressants. These could also reduce the types of cognitive diversity discussed here and thus result in collective action problems. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 35 C.R. Gale, et al. Neuroticism and Extraversion in Youth Predict Mental Wellbeing and Life Satisfaction 40 Years Later. J Res Pers 2013; 47:687-697. 36 D.W. Johnson, et al. Cerebral Blood Flow and Personality: A Positron Emission Tomography Study. Am J 
Psychiatry 1999; 156: 252-257. 37 L.D. Smillie, et al. Do extraverts get more bang for the buck? Refining the affective-reactivity hypothesis of extraversion. J Pers Soc Psychol 2012; 103: 306-326. 
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plausible that these problems would have significant effects on society and future generations, though of course any predictions about the likely scope and extent of such problems are necessarily highly uncertain.    In this section we will focus on ethical and political issues rather than empirical ones. If a particular RGT did lead to a collective action problem, should that influence whether the state restricts access to it?   Some would argue that there is a strong case for state interference in a market to prevent collective action problems. The presence of a collective action problem can be seen as a type of market failure, which some take to be a ground for state intervention.38 This suggests that some would think the state could be justified in intervening in a genetic supermarket in order to prevent collective action problems. This view is prima facie quite plausible. It is plausible that moral agents, including the state, have moral reasons to promote and not to set back human wellbeing, and collective action problems of the sort that we have discussed would tend to reduce overall human wellbeing. On this view, then, the state would have moral reasons to prevent those problems from occurring.   However some influential moral views imply that these reasons are illusory or at least are outweighed by other considerations. It may be claimed either that no state involvement at all in the genetic supermarket is appropriate, or that the state should only intervene in the market to prevent direct harm to individuals. We consider these views in turn below.   
A laissez faire approach Perhaps the genetic supermarket should be a true ‘free market’ to which no state restrictions apply. The most promising argument for this view would, we think, appeal to the view that parents have a right to determine the genetic characteristics of their children. This view might (though need not) be advanced within an entitlement-based theory of justice such as that advanced by Robert Nozick.39 If parents enjoy a right of this kind then state intervention in the genetic supermarket would be impermissible, or at least presumptively impermissible, depending on what view one takes regarding the normative strength of rights.   A difficulty with this approach, however, is that it is very doubtful whether parents do enjoy a right of the relevant sort. It is often claimed that people have a right to self-ownership and it might, perhaps, follow from this that they have a right to determine 
their own genetic characteristics, insofar as this is possible. But it is doubtful whether this right extends to one’s children who are not part of one’s own self. Alternatively it might be claimed that parents have rights to determine the genetic characteristics of their offspring because children are the external property of their parents, and parents have a right to shape the characteristics of their external property. But children do not seem to fall under property rights of the sort that cover external possessions; we do not, for example, think that parents are free to sell, rent or destroy their children as we would were children external property of the ordinary sort. It seems doubtful, then, 
38 For example see N. Stern. The Stern Review on the Economic Effects of Climate Change. Popul Dev Rev 2006; 32: 793-798.  39 Nozick, op. cit. note 5. 
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that an appeal to property rights could support a right to determine the genetic characteristics of one’s children.  Rather than that attempting to derive a right to determine the genetic characteristics of one’s children from a more general class of property rights, one might attempt to derive it from a more general right to shape the characteristics of one’s children. It is true that parents are normally permitted to exert considerable influence over the traits of their children by, for example, choosing what sort of parenting style to adopt and choosing what kinds of educational and recreational opportunities to present to their children. It might be argued that we allow parents such great freedom in these areas because we take them to have a right to shape the traits of their child, and this right might be thought to include a right to determine, prior to birth, the child’s genetic characteristics.    However, most people would accept that there should be significant constraints on how parents raise their children. For example, compulsory elementary education is widely accepted, so is the idea that the state may intervene with parental freedom in cases of child neglect or where parents are, for example, encouraging seriously anti-social behaviour in their children. Insofar as widely held views on parenting support a right to determine the characteristics of one’s children, and thus to determine the genetic characteristics of one’s future children, they support only a rather constrained right. It is therefore difficult to see how an appeal to such views could support an unconstrained right of the sort that would be necessary to support an unregulated genetic supermarket approach to RGTs.  
The ‘real and present’ harms requirement  Rather than a true free market, perhaps the genetic supermarket should be one in which the standard for state intervention is set very high, so that it precludes interference to prevent collective action problems, though it may allow state intervention for other reasons. John Harris suggests a view that might have this implication. He states that, for restrictions on access to reproductive technologies to be justified, it must be the case that the use of those technologies would be  
seriously harmful to others or to society and that these harms are real and 
present, not future and speculative, for if they were not, the presumption in favour 
of liberty would be at risk whenever imaginative tyrants could postulate possible, 
but highly unlikely, future harms.40  It might be argued that the sorts of harms caused by creating collective action problems do not satisfy this requirement. However, it is unclear what Harris means by his requirement that harms be ‘real and present, not future and speculative’.41 The requirement may seem to rule out, as grounds for state intervention, all harms that will not occur immediately, or at least in the short-term future. But if so, the requirement 
40 Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 74.  41 We understand the category of harms to include both comparative harms and noncomparative harms (see, for discussion of this distinction, J. McMahan. Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives. J 
Ethics 2012; 17: 5-35). A person suffers a comparative harm when she is made worse off than she was previously, or than she would otherwise have been. A person suffers a noncomparative harm when she exists in a bad state, and irrespective of how well of she was previously, or would have been in counterfactual situations. We return to this distinction later in this section. 
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will be implausible. In general, the fact that a harm will occur some distance into the future does not undermine the case for state intervention. For example, a government could clearly be justified in preventing a parent from feeding a poison to his child, even if that poison would only cause harm to the child years down the line.   This suggests that we should focus not on Harris’s distinction between ‘present’ and ‘future’ harms, but on his distinction between ‘real’ and ‘speculative’ harms. There are different ways in which we might interpret this distinction. On one interpretation, a harm qualifies as ‘real’ if and only if there is some non-negligible probability of it occurring: entirely fantastic harms do not warrant state intervention, but harms could nevertheless be highly unlikely and still warrant government intervention. This view would certainly not rule out collective action problems of the kinds we have described as grounds for state intervention, since the probability that such problems will occur is not negligible. However, it is doubtful that Harris intends to set the threshold for ‘real’ harms so low, for he describes the ‘real and present harm’ condition as a “high standard”.42 He also at times replaces talk of “real and present” harms with talk of “real, present, and highly probable” harms.43   This suggests that Harris rather has in mind that a harm would qualify as ‘real’ only if there is a high probability that the harm will occur. Harris would then be claiming that only harms with a high probability justify state intervention. This might seem to exclude consideration of the sorts of harms that we have discussed. However, on this interpretation, Harris view is implausible. Surely states are permitted to intervene to prevent harms that will occur with low probability if those harms are severe enough. Suppose parents feed their child a poison that only has an effect in 1% of cases, but that effect is to cause death. The state would be permitted to intervene to prevent the administration of this poison.   Perhaps Harris’s ‘real harm’ requirement could be understood in a different and more plausible way. The thought might be that a harm will be sufficient to justify state intervention only if it will occur with a high probability or would have a high severity. On this view, low probability harms may justify state intervention, but only if they have a high degree of severity. This criterion would seem to preserve Harris’ thought that there should be a presumption in favour of liberty. However, it is not clear that this criterion would rule out intervention in the genetic supermarket to prevent collective action problems. After all, it is plausible that, for example, uses of RGTs that significantly reduced diversity of cognitive traits or immunity would with at least some significant probability, cause very severe harms. A reduction in immune system diversity might, for example, result in a serious and lethal epidemic that would kill thousands of people.   Of course, it might be argued that no individual parent’s choice to use an RGT would have made much difference to the risk that such an epidemic would occur. No individual parent would have created a significant risk of a serious harm. However, 
collectively the parents whose choices did in fact make it occur would have contributed to a risk of a very serious harm, and it is difficult to see why collective actions should be immune to the kind of state intervention that might be justified in relation to individual 
42 Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 72. 43 See for example Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 80. 
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actions which risk serious harm. Imagine a case like Parfit’s ‘harmless torturers’, in which each of a 1000 individuals pushes a button and the 1000 button-presses together result in one instance of torture.44 Although no one individual makes a perceptable difference to pain experienced by the victim, it would surely be permissible for a government to intervene to prevent some (or perhaps all) of the 1000 people from pressing the button. More generally, if the actions of groups of individuals only together constitute a significant risk of serious harm, it may still be permissible to restrict the actions of each individual. Many environmental regulations, for example, such as those which prohibit the burning of household waste or the use of inefficient fuels, are intended to prevent (risks of) environmental harms that would only be severe if many people engaged in the actions in question. Yet most would accept that these regulations can be justified.   Are there other grounds, besides those mentioned by Harris, on which one could argue that the harms produced by collective action problems would be insufficient to justify state interference in the genetic supermarket?   One suggestion might be that the harms produced by collective action problems are insufficient because they are noncomparative harms.45 The collective action problems we have discussed may cause significant harms some way into the future, but genetic decisions that produce those harms will also affect what people come into existence in the future. Suppose a large number of people choose to have children with genes that protect against HIV, but this leaves future people susceptible to some new and highly lethal infectious disease 200 years from now. But suppose those genetic selection decisions will also influence what people exist 200 years from now. In that case, arguably no-one would suffer what Jeff McMahan would call a comparative harm—no-one would be made worse off than they would otherwise have been, or than they were previously, by the occurrence of the epidemic, since the people that it afflicts would not have existed had the decisions that caused the epidemic not been made. At most, we could say that those afflicted by the epidemic suffer a noncomparative harm—the sort of harm that exists whenever one experiences suffering, regardless of whether things would have been better for the individual otherwise, or were better previously.    This suggestion seems unpromising however. For one thing, it is not clear that noncomparative harms are insufficient to justify state intervention. Derek Parfit gives the example of a community which must choose between risky policy – which would make inhabitants of the community slightly better for the next century but cause a catastrophe in three centuries; and safe policy – which would avoid the catastrophe but make inhabitants slightly worse off over the next century.46 The choice in policy would also change which people exist in the future, so that none of the individuals who would be affected by the catastrophe in risky policy would exist if the community adopted safe policy. By contrast, some of the individuals who will exist in the next century if safe 
policy is adopted would have existed, and been better off, had that policy not been adopted. Despite the fact that risky policy would only result in noncomparative harms, while safe policy would result in some comparative harms, it is intuitively plausible that that a state would be justified in choosing safe policy. Similarly we may think that 
44 D. Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987. p 79. 45 McMahan, op. cit. note 41.  46 Parfit, op cit. note 44, p. 171.  
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states are justified in implementing measures that mitigate the long term risks of climate change, even if these policies also change which people exist in the future, and therefore only prevent noncomparative harms  Further, it is not clear that all harms produced by the collective action problems we have discussed would be noncomparative. Suppose that current selection decisions regarding immune system or cognitive traits had the effect of causing future epidemics or slowing the rate of future scientific progress. Unless those effects took a very long time to become manifest, some of the people who experience them will be people who already exist. Those people would be made (in one way) worse off by these effects than they would otherwise have been. They would suffer comparative harms.   Another suggestion might be that the harms produced by collective action problems would not justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket because they would not affect currently identifiable individuals. In general people have a tendency to give more weight to the claims of identified individuals than unidentified individuals. For example, people are more likely to voluntarily contribute money to rescue an identified group of trapped miners, than they are to voluntarily contribute money to improve mine safety, which would prevent more miners, whose identities we do not yet know, becoming tapped in the future.47 However whether this general tendency reflects a morally important distinction is disputed.48 In many cases it seems that harms affecting identified and unidentified individuals should be considered as equally important. For example, we think the police should go to the same lengths to catch a criminal who is planning on killing a specific individual as they do in catching one planning on killing a random person.   But even if it were true that states should give harms affecting identified individuals greater weight than harms affecting unidentified individuals, it does not follow that no measures should be taken to prevent collective action problems in a genetic supermarket. This is because it is implausible that harms affecting unidentified individuals should carry no weight at all. If the only way to prevent the deaths of many unidentified individuals in an armed attack was to restrict the freedom of one individual to purchase automated weapons, this would be clearly justified. Similarly if the risk of harm posed by collective action problems to unidentified individuals is sufficiently large, the state would surely be justified in imposing some restrictions on parents accessing the genetic supermarket in order to prevent them.    
Conclusion  In this paper we have investigated the significance of some possible collective action problems that could result from widespread access to RGTs. We claimed that such problems could be expected to arise from the free availability of RGTs targeting height, immune system traits and certain cognitive capacities. We then examined whether the risk of these problems could in principle justify state intervention in a genetic supermarket. First, we noted that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such interventions could be justified, and second, we responded to a number of arguments that might be adduced against that view. We do not claim to have provided 
47 K. Jenni & G. Loewenstein. Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect. J Risk Uncertain 1997; 14: 235-257. 48 N. Daniels. Reasonable Disagreement about Identifed vs. Statistical Victims. Hastings Cent Rep 2012; 42: 35-45. 
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knock-down objections to each of these arguments. However, we hope that our discussion has cast significant doubt on them. It is possible that these doubts could be overcome. However, we believe that, in the meantime, it is reasonable to believe that concerns about collective action problems could in principle justify regulation of the genetic supermarket. We say ‘in principle’ because we may never have strong enough evidence that a particular collective action problem will occur, or will be serious enough, to warrant government intervention. We have noted several areas in which it is plausible that serious collective actions would occur, but that is not to say that we have, or will have, robust and specific evidence of the sort that might be necessary to justify government intervention in relation to particular RGTs.49    As stated in the Introduction, there is disagreement among proponents of liberal eugenics about exactly what conditions justify state interfere in the genetic supermarket. Ronald Bailey argues that “to the extent that new biotechnologies need regulation, agencies should be limited to deciding, as they have traditionally done, only questions about safety and efficacy”.50 Bailey rejects the notion that the state should intervene in the genetic supermarket for reasons beyond the protection of individuals. John Harris accepts that the state could intervene in the genetic supermarket for social reasons, but only to prevent “real and present harms or dangers”; he takes this to be a “high standard”.51   Jonathon Glover is less restrictive in his requirements for state interference in the genetic supermarket. Glover writes   
could leaving people free to choose genes for their children at the genetic 
supermarket have serious social costs? If so, we may need a regulated market, on 
a European model. On this system, there would be no state plan to change people's 
genes or to improve the gene pool, but there might be limitations on genetic 
choices thought to be against the public interest. 52  Allen Buchannan and co-authors endorse a similar position when they say “society has good, if not conclusive, reason to restrict the liberties of individuals if the exercise of those liberties undermines a public good”.53   We believe the arguments presented in this paper support a framework for regulating RGTs that is more in line with those proposed by Buchannan and Glover, rather than those proposed by Harris and Bailey. We have argued that, in principle, it is legitimate for the state to intervene in the genetic supermarket to prevent collective action problems. The types of harms that collective action problems pose may not affect any identifiable individuals and may not occur for several generations, meaning they may not be considered legitimate grounds of state interferences in more restrictive liberal eugenic approaches. None the less, given the total risk of harm that may be posed by collective action problems, we believe they would potentially justify restrictions on 
49 In some cases the best way to determine whether access to a particular RGT will result in a collective action problem may be to make it widely available and monitor its use. If it is observed that a significant number of people are using the RGT in the sorts of ways that give rise to collective action problems, access to it could then be restricted. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.  50 Bailey, op. cit. note 7, p. 235.  51 Harris, op. cit. note 4, pp. 79, 72. 52 Glover, op. cit. note 4, p. 77. 53 Buchanan et al, op. cit. note 4, p. 183. 
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parental choice in the genetic supermarket. The possibility of collective action problems thereby supports less restrictive liberal eugenic approaches to the regulation of RGTs. 
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Chapter 3: Selecting against disability – the 
liberal eugenic challenge and the argument 
from diversity 
Note: This chapter, co-authored with Dr Thomas Douglas, continues the discussion of the negative collective consequences of reproductive technologies, but with a narrower focus. Rather than looking at the broad class of reproductive genetic technologies, we focus specifically on embryo selection technologies and their use to select against disability. We suggest that there is a plausible prima facie case that selection against some disabilities will result in the types of harms that are sufficient to justify state interference within a liberal eugenic framework. This chapter is currently being prepared for publication.  
Abstract: 
Selection against embryos which are predisposed to develop disabilities is one of the least 
controversial uses of embryo selection technologies (ESTs). Many bio-conservatives argue 
that while the use of ESTs to select for non-disease related traits, such as height and eye-
colour, should be banned, their use to avoid disease and disability should be permitted. 
Nevertheless, there remains significant opposition, particularly from the disability rights 
movement, to the use of ESTs to select against disability.  
 
In this paper we discuss the conditions under which the state would be justified in 
restricting the use of ESTs to select against disability. We first outline the challenge posed 
by proponents of “liberal eugenics” who argue that access to ESTs should not be restricted 
without a strong justification. Liberal eugenicists challenge those who defend restrictions 
on the use of ESTs to show why the use of these technologies would create a harm of the 
type and magnitude required to justify social coercion. We argue that most of the 
common criticisms of the use of ESTs to select against disability fail to meet that 
challenge. However, we then show that a developed version of the diversity argument, 
stressing the harmful effect on society of reducing some valuable forms of diversity, could 
meet the liberal eugenic challenge. We suggest that this argument establishes a pro tanto 
case for restricting selection against some specific disabilities, such as dyslexia and 
Asperger’s syndrome. We end by responding to some objections to this view.       
Introduction  Some reproductive technologies, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), allow parents to choose whether or not to gestate an embryo to term based on the presence or absence of particular genes. We refer to such technologies as embryo selection technologies, or ESTs. One of the least controversial uses of ESTs is selecting against embryos that are predisposed to develop disease or disability,1 a practice 
1 Following the World Health Organisation, we understand disability as an umbrella term covering “impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action; while a participation restriction is a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations. Thus, disability is a complex phenomenon, reflecting an interaction between features of a 
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sometimes known as disability screening. Many scholars argue that while the use of ESTs to select against non-disease traits, such as normal short stature or a particular eye-colour, is morally impermissible, their use to avoid disease and disability should be permitted. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that: 
The relevant standard against which to measure proposed interventions is a 
conception of normal human capacities ….This way of thinking about the ethics of 
shaping future persons, then, allows that the distinction between therapy and 
enhancement properly plays a crucial role in thinking about this issue.2  A similar view is expressed by Michael Sandel in his article “The Case Against Perfection”: 
To appreciate children as gifts or blessings is not, of course, to be passive in the 
face of illness or disease. Medical intervention to cure or prevent illness….does not 
desecrate nature but honours it.3 The view that it is acceptable for parents to use ESTs to prevent disability in their future children, but not to select for non-disease traits, might be thought to justify the legal status of PGD in many jurisdictions around the world. In the UK, Australia, and parts and of the USA and Continental Europe, parents are permitted to use PGD to select against disabilities and diseases such as Down syndrome and cystic fibrosis, but not to select against non-disease traits like normal short stature.  In this paper we discuss the conditions under which it is acceptable for the state to limit access to disability screening. In Part 1, we outline what we call the liberal eugenic challenge to opponents of disability screening. According to this challenge, those who think the state should restrict parental access to ESTs need to show how their use creates a harm of the type and magnitude required to justify social coercion. In Part 2 we discuss some common criticisms of disability screening, which focus on harms that the practice may cause to people with disabilities. We argue these attempts fail to the meet the liberal eugenic challenge, as they do not point to harms of the kind and magnitude required to justify social coercion. In Part 3 we discuss an attempt to meet the liberal eugenic challenge which appeals to broader population-level harms “the diversity argument”. We suggest that a variant of this argument establishes a pro tanto case for restricting selection against some specific disabilities. In Part 4, we consider some objections to this view. 
The liberal eugenic challenge Proponents of ‘liberal eugenics’ generally hold that reproductive technologies should be available to prospective parents on a free a market model. Parental choice with regard to using reproductive technologies, including ESTs, is seen as a natural extension of the personal freedoms normally granted to individuals living in a liberal democracy. One of the earliest descriptions of such an approach is found in Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”. Nozick advocates a “genetic supermarket”: 
person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives”. World Health Organisation. Disabilities.  Available at: < www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/ > [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 2 R. Sparrow. Better than Men?: Sex and the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2010; 20: 115-144. 3 M. Sandel. The Case Against Perfection. The Atlantic 2004: 1–11.  
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Consider … the issue of genetic engineering. Many biologists tend to think the 
problem is one of design, of specifying the best types of persons so that biologists 
can proceed to produce them. Thus they worry over what sort(s) of person there is 
to be and who will control this process. They do not tend to think, perhaps because 
it diminishes the importance of their role, of a system in which they run a "genetic 
supermarket," meeting the individual specifications (within certain moral limits) 
of prospective parents … This supermarket system has the great virtue that it 
involves no centralized decision fixing the future of human type.4 Although most writers in the liberal eugenic tradition accept there should be some restrictions placed on access to ESTs, they believe any deviation from a free market model requires a justification. Given that there will be some private companies wanting to provide access to ESTs, and some individuals who are willing to pay for this access, restrictions on parental use of ESTs would involve coercive interference with voluntary transactions between consenting and competent adults.5 According to standard liberal principles, such coercive interference could only be justified if it could be expected to result in harm to third parties. Moreover, this harm would need to be of the appropriate kind and magnitude; many cases of adultery harm third parties, but most liberals would deny that this justifies coercive interference with adulterous actions. Adultery, though morally problematic, seems beyond the proper purview of the liberal state. The challenge posed by liberal eugenics is, therefore, to show why the use of ESTs along the model of the genetic supermarket would cause harm to third parties, and harm of the type and magnitude required to justify social coercion.   One might, of course, seek to resist this challenge by denying that it is entailed by liberal principles, or denying that those principles are correct. In what follows, we will not consider these possibilities. Instead, we direct ourselves to political liberals who would endorse the challenge. Our aim will be to consider whether such a liberal can give an argument for restrictions on disability screening that can meet the challenge. We begin, in the next section, by considering two of the most common criticisms of disability screening, both of which can be construed as appealing to harms that this practice will cause to existing disabled individuals. 
Common criticisms of disability screening 
The expressivist argument  One argument often used in support of the claim that disability screening is wrong is “the expressivist argument”.6 The expressivist argument claims that when parents choose not to implant an embryo because it is predisposed to develop a disability, they 
4 R. Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books; 1974. p. 315. 5 J. Harris. Enhancing evolution: the ethical case for making better people. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press; 2007. p. 73-76. 6 See for example: A. Davis. Women with Disabilities: Abortion and Liberation. Disability, Handicap & 
Society 1987; 2: 275-284.; A. Asch. Reproductive Technology and Disability. In: Reproductive Laws for the 
1990s. S. Cohen and N. Taub, eds. Clifton N.J: Humana Press; 1988. pp. 69-124; A. Lippman. The genetic construction of prenatal testing: choice, consent, or conformity for women? In: Women and Prenatal 
Testing: Facing the Challenges of Genetic Technology. K. Rothenberg and E. Thomson, eds. Columbus: Ohio State Press; 1994. pp. 9-34; S. Wendell. The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability. New York: Routledge; 1996. E. Parens, & A. Asch. The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations. Hastings Cent Rep 1999; 29: 1-22. 
79 
 
                                                            
express an immoral or otherwise objectionable attitude toward existing disabled individuals. Specifically, they express the judgment that the disabled person is worse or in some way less worthy of existence than other persons.  Different variants on the expressivist argument offer different explanations for why expressing these judgments is wrong. On one view, it is objectionable because of the deeper character flaws it manifests. For example, it might be thought that expressing the judgment manifests a willingness to too quickly infer a global evaluation of a person on the basis of a single fact: that the person carries (or will carry) a genetic predisposition for a disability. On another view, expressing the judgment is objectionable because it harms those about whom the negative evaluation is made.7  The first of these variants of the expressivist argument is susceptible to well-known difficulties.8 For one, it assumes a high level of homogeneity in the attitudes underlying people’s decisions to engage in disability screening. However we would expect people’s motivation for selecting against disabilities to be highly varied. While some people’s decisions to select against disability may be based on a negative global assessment of the value or worth of the lives of disabled people, some will be based on more personal reasons. It seems plausible that an individual could have very positive attitudes toward the disabled, but still want to avoid having a child with a disability because they believe that they could not afford the extra financial cost, for example. It seems unlikely then that disability screening expresses a single negative attitude about disability, as the expressivist argument claims. Moreover, even if this variant of the expressivist argument succeeds in showing that engaging in disability screening is wrong, there will be a further question as to whether it should therefore be subject to coercive restrictions. This is where the liberal eugenic challenge enters the scene, and the present variant of the expressivist argument seems inherently unsuited to answering that challenge, for it does not appeal to any harm to third parties. The second variant of the argument seems more promising, since it does appeal to such harm. However, it is nevertheless doubtful whether it can meet the challenge.  There are at least two different ways in which people with disabilities may be harmed by the expression of the judgement that they are worse or less worthy of existence than other persons. First, they may be distressed by the expression of this judgment; they may, that is, suffer a form of mental harm. Second, it might be thought that being the object of such a judgment is objectively harmful, regardless of whether one takes it to heart, or is even aware of it. For example, it might plausibly be thought that being outwardly valued by others is a component in the good life.  However, it is not clear that either type of harm could justify state interference. If distress at the actions of others were sufficient to justify coercive measures, then there would be a case for adopting such measures in relation to, for example, homosexuality 
7 Note that there are other possible explanations for the objectionability of expressing this judgment. For example, it might be objectionable to express the judgment simply because the judgment is false, not grounded on adequate evidence, or because doing so is disrespectful. 
8 See for example: J. Nelson. The meaning of the act: reflections on the expressive force of reproductive decision making and policies. In: Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Parens and Asch, eds. Washington: Georgetown University Press; 2000. pp. 196-213; S. D. Edwards. Disability, identity and the "expressivist objection". J Med Ethics 2004; 30: 418-420.; J. McMahan. Causing disabled people to exist and causing people to be disabled. Ethics 2005; 116: 77-99.; Harris, op. cit. note 5; pp 100-107; T. Shakespeare. 
Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited, New York: Taylor & Francis; 2013.pp. 127-129. 
80 
 
                                                            
and public displays of affection by mixed race couples. These practices cause distress to some, yet few liberals would take such distress as a ground for coercion. It might be objected that this is because the distress, in these cases, is unreasonable, or is grounded on unreasonable moral views. But even reasonable distress is not normally regarded as a sufficient ground for coercive measures. For example, violent films and statements of controversial but reasonable moral views can cause reasonable distress, but liberals would not take this to make them suitable candidates for coercive restrictions.   Similarly, even if expressing the judgment that another person is of low value or worth is objectively harmful to that person, this is not the sort of harm that we would ordinarily take to warrant coercive measures in a liberal state. Statements such as “all immigrants are lazy dole-bludgers” and “homosexuals deserve to catch AIDS” are just as plausibly objectively harmful to those to whom they are directed, yet, though most of us find such statements to be highly objectionable, few would take legal prohibitions on them to be justified in a liberal state, and not merely because such a prohibition would be difficult to enforce.   Hence further argument would be needed to show that, not only are disabled individuals harmed by disability screening, but that this harm justifies social coercion.  
Reduced resources Another way in which disability screening may be harmful to those suffering from a disability is by reducing the total number of disabled people. This reduction in numbers may reduce the incentive for governments or charities to invest in other forms of support for disabilities.  As a hypothetical example, if the number of people in a population who require the use of wheelchairs is significant then there is a motivation for the state to make sure there are ramps and accessible entrances to most public buildings. Wheelchair users may constitute a significant proportion of the electorate, creating a direct political incentive for a democratically elected government to provide the infrastructure. Moreover, since the infrastructure would benefit a significant number of people, many nondisabled people may take there to be a strong moral case for building the infrastructure, and since the economic productivity and thus tax contributions of many would be adversely affected by failing to provide the infrastructure, there might also be a significant economic incentive for the nondisabled to support the infrastructure. However if the number of people who require wheelchair access is very low, then the strategic political case for spending money on this infrastructure in order to court votes from the disabled community diminishes. Similarly, in such circumstances many non-disabled persons are likely to view the moral and economic arguments for building the infrastructure to be weaker. However, the cost of building the infrastructure will presumably remain unchanged. Thus, we might expect that, as the number of wheelchair-users falls, the incentive for society to provide wheelchair access will diminish, and thus the level of access enjoyed by each wheelchair user could also be expected to fall.   More generally, when the costs of providing some facility for persons with a disability are insensitive to the number of people with the disability, we might expect that as the number of people with a disability falls, the quality of facilities provided will tend to fall 
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due to reduced incentives to provide the facility. And this, we might expect, would tend to diminish the wellbeing of those disabled persons who remain.9  Note, however, that there are other factors that may militate in the opposite direction. In the wheelchair access example above, two factors combined to make it plausible that a reduction in the number of wheelchairs would tend to reduce the level of public provision for wheelchair users. First, the economic cost of providing a good (in this case, accessibility) was relatively invariant to the number of wheelchair users. And second, the political, moral and economic incentives to provide the good were highly sensitive to the number of users. In some cases, however, the reverse will obtain. For example, sometimes the amount that the government will be willing to spend on providing for a given group will depend primarily on the amount of pressure they face from benevolently motivated people who do not have the disability, but believe those with the disability should receive state support. There is ample evidence to suggest that such benevolent motivations are often relatively invariant to the numbers of people who will be benefitted.10 Thus, if the political incentive to provide resources is driven largely by such benevolent motivations in the electorate, we might expect the incentive to be relatively invariant to the number of people that suffer from a disability. (If there were fewer people with Down’s syndrome, the public at large might feel just as moved to provide state support for those with the syndrome.) Similarly, there are many cases in which the cost of providing a good to people with a disability is quite sensitive to the number of people to whom the good must be provided. Consider, for example, the costs of providing in-home nursing care. These will vary sharply with the number of people to whom the care must be provided. In cases where the incentive to provide for people with a disability is relatively fixed, and the costs of doing so are highly dependent on numbers, we might expect that decreasing the number of people with a disability will tend to increase the wellbeing of each disabled person. In effect, there will be more people competing for a share of the same pool of resources. As a real-life example of this sort of effect, consider donor screening for thalassemia among Greek Cypriots. This reduced the absolute number of individuals living with thalassemia, however it did not reduce the resources made available to individuals. In fact, because the state kept funding levels the same and there was a smaller pool of patients to share the existing resources, each individual was made better off. 11  These thoughts suggest that the resources argument could cut both ways. Whether decreasing the number of people with a disability will, all things considered, reduce or increase the level of provision to those who remain is an empirical question, and will presumably vary from disability to disability. This suggests that, at most, the resources argument will justify restrictions on some types of disability screening. Moreover, even where disability screening would, through effects on resource allocation, tend to reduce the wellbeing of those who remain with the disability, it is not clear that this will provide a sufficient reason to introduce coercive measures. This is 
9 See, for a statement of this argument, L. Gillam. Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled. J Med Ethics 1999; 25: 163-171. 
10 D.A. Small, et al. Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 2007; 102: 143-153. 11 P. Kitcher. The Lives to Come. New York: Free Press; 1997. pp. 85-86.  
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because there may be alternative, less restrictive means of mitigating the problem. For example, because the harms to the disabled persons are, on the resources argument, economic in cause it seems quite possible that they could be compensated through economic means. Consider a system in which parents are permitted to select against deafness, but if they do so, they must also donate to the deaf community an amount of money intended to offset any negative effect of the selection decision on the level of public provision for the deaf. In principle, it seems quite possible that such a system could negate the resources argument.   
Population-level harms  Aside from appealing to harm to individuals currently living with disabilities, opponents of disability screening may appeal to population-level harms as a way of meeting the liberal eugenic challenge. We will take it that an act causes a population-level harm when it makes a population less well-off when viewed from the perspective of an impartial observer.   There are several different ways in which population-level harms are distinct from individual harms.   First, since populations and individuals have different persistence conditions, a reduction in aggregate wellbeing in a population could harm that population even where it would not harm its members in the same way. Thus, suppose that some existing population could, at some future time, possess a high aggregate level of wellbeing (outcome H) or a low level of aggregate wellbeing (outcome L). If you now bring it about that outcome L will obtain rather than outcome H then you have plausibly harmed this population in a counterfactual comparative sense—you have made it worse off than it would otherwise have been. However, you may not have harmed any of its members in this same sense, since the set of people that will populate the society in outcome L may not overlap with the set that would have populated it in outcome H. In that case, you will have simply replaced better-off individuals with less well-off individuals. Second, the wellbeing of a population may depend on a range of factors beyond the aggregate wellbeing of the individual members of the population.12 For example, the level of inequality in the population, the wellbeing of the worst of members of the population, and level of achievement or knowledge of the population may be independently relevant to the population’s wellbeing. One of the worries about reproductive genetic technologies generally is that they may increase the gap between rich and poor. If the availability of reproductive genetic technologies made the rich better off, but had no effect on the worse off, then they would arguably make the population less well-off in one respect—that of equality—without necessarily having a negative effect on any individual. Similarly suppose that we allow ESTs to be used to select against embryos predisposed to mental illness. If, as a consequence of this decision, humanity produces fewer great works of art, then this act may make the human population worse off in respect of its artistic achievement. This could be true even if no individuals are harmed by the selection decisions.  
12 See for example L. S. Temkin.. Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012. p. 24. 
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Clearly, one of the most serious ways in which a population can be harmed is by going out of existence or being seriously decimated in numerical terms. Provided that the population would otherwise have had positive aggregate wellbeing, this will tend to diminish the aggregate wellbeing in the population. And it will also of course permanently reduce (or, in the case of extinction, extinguish) the ability of the population to make valuable achievements or acquire valuable knowledge.  Population-level harms are sometimes invoked as grounds for coercive measures. For example, the risk that the human population will go out of existence or be seriously decimated is often invoked as a ground for coercive measures designed to prevent catastrophic climate change or nuclear war. In what follows, we will offer a response to the liberal eugenic challenge that also invokes population-level harms to humanity. 
The diversity argument We believe that the most promising argument for coercive restrictions on disability screening appeals to a risk of serious population-level harm. The argument is a variant of an argument that has already played a prominent role in discussions of genetic selection, though it has not, to our knowledge, ever been developed in detail. That argument appeals to the view that use of ESTs could reduce valuable forms of human diversity. Some proponents of this argument treat diversity as an intrinsic good. Parens states that: 
with respect to genetic technology, we can begin by saying that it goes too far 
when—in an attempt to establish paradise on earth —it threatens ….the good 
that is the diversity of human forms. 13 Unfortunately Parens doesn’t elaborate as to why the diversity of human forms is a good. Further he doesn’t elaborate as to which types of human diversity constitute this good. It is not clear that all forms of human diversity are valuable. For instance – we might doubt whether diversity in lifespan among humans is in any way good. Perhaps nothing of value would be lost if everyone lived as long as the currently longest-lived individuals.14 Other forms of the diversity argument stress the instrumental, rather than the intrinsic, value of human diversity. McMahan introduces (though does not endorse), an argument which claims disability is important because it teaches individuals valuable lessons, and may increase the development of positive character traits:  
It is often held that a reduction in the number of disabled people would have an 
adverse effect on human diversity…… the disabled themselves, and indeed their 
mere presence among the rest of us, teach valuable lessons about respect for 
difference, about the nobility of achievement in the face of grave obstacles, and 
even about the value of life and what makes a life worth living.15  
13 E. Parens. The Goodness of Fragility: On the Prospect of Genetic Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of Human Capacities’. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1995; 5: 141-153. 14 R. Powell. The Evolutionary Biological Implications of Human Genetic Engineering. J Med Philos 2012; 37: 204-225. 15 J. McMahan. The morality of screening for disability. Reprod Biomed Online 2005; 10: 129-132. 
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We will not develop this version of the diversity argument any further. Rather we will try to develop a different form of the diversity argument – one that also stresses the instrumental benefits of diversity. We argue that certain kinds of diversity are likely to make future human populations more resilient to extinction or decimation in the face of serious external threats (such as those posed by environmental disasters), and internal threats (such as nuclear war, or other failures of cooperation). Loss of these forms of diversity would leave human populations more susceptible to decimation or extinction and would thus tend to be detrimental to the wellbeing of those populations.   Why think that loses in diversity might be harmful to human populations? The population-wide costs associated with losses of genetic diversity serve as a good illustration of the costs of reducing some types of human diversity. A number of studies with other species indicate that even moderate losses in genetic diversity can reduce the ability of a population of organisms to survive environmental change.16 Reducing genetic diversity makes populations less robust and resilient to a range of possible extinction risks including climate change, pathogenic threats, predator threats, and changes in resource availability. 17 Although genetic diversity is not as important for human populations as it is for other species of animals,18 other types of human diversity may be important for the flourishing of our populations. For example recent work in social science has stressed the group-wide benefits associated with cognitive diversity, that is, diversity in how each “individual sees the world, interprets its problems, and makes predictions in it”.19 Research has shown that cognitively diverse groups are more productive, more innovative and better at solving complex problems than less diverse groups.20 Reducing cognitive diversity could potentially have very significant long-term effects on future generations, as it could diminish society’s ability to deal with complex global problems like climate change and energy security.    If certain forms of human diversity are important to the resilience of human populations in the face of internal and external threats, then an important question regarding disability screening is whether a specific disability contributes to these valuable forms of human diversity. In the following paragraphs we will argue that there is good evidence that at least two conditions which are often classed as disabilities (Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia) plausibly contribute to forms of diversity that are important for population resilience. We believe that this creates a pro tanto case for coercive restrictions on the use of ESTs to select against these disabilities.  Asperger’s syndrome High functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome21 is a form of autism that involves abnormalities in the development of social and communication skills, in the presence of 
16 J. A. Markert, et al. Population genetic diversity and fitness in multiple environments. BMC Evol Biol 2010; 10: 205. 17 R. Frankham. Genetics and extinction. Biol Conserv 2005; 126: 131-140 18 Powell, op.cit. note 14. 19 H. Landemore. Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of representatives. Synthese 2012; 190: 1209-1231. 20 S. E. Page. 2007. The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and 
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 21 Asperger’s syndrome and high functioning autism are sometimes treated as different conditions in the literature. However for the purpose of this section we will treat Asperger’s syndrome and high functioning autism together. This is because there is evidence to suggest that the underlying genetic basis of the conditions is linked, hence they would have to be selected for or against together. See: B. Chakrabarti, et al. 
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marked repetitive behaviour and limited imagination, and in the absence of developmental delay.22 These abnormalities are associated with differences in the brains of children with Asperger’s syndrome when compared to controls. In children with Asperger’s syndrome some regions of the brain, particularly those that deal with language, show weaker connections between neurons when compared to other children,23 while other regions of the brain are much more densely connected than typically developing children.24 These differences in brain wiring may also be linked to some abilities that have been noted in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome.  When solving problems, high function autistic individuals use different heuristics than controls.25 This enables them to perform well on some tests which measure intelligence. Specifically individuals with Asperger’s syndrome tend to perform well on tasks which require close attention to the specific details of a problem such as the Block Design Test, which requires subjects to manipulate a group of blocks to match various two-dimensional patterns and the Embedded Figures test, which involves locating specific shapes or patterns within a larger, more complex design. Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome are also more likely than others to have perfect pitch musically and to be able to pick out ‘disembed’ individual notes from complex chords in a musical score.26 Another unique characteristic of children with Asperger’s syndrome is their tendency to have intense personal interests. In one study of children with Asperger’s syndrome, 90% were seen to have obsessive interests in particular things as diverse as deep-fat fryers, the passenger list of the Titanic, waist measurements, Great Western trains, Rommel’s desert wars, paper bags, light and darkness, globes and maps, elevators, and shoes.27 The combination of unique cognitive abilities combined with intense personal interests can enable individuals with Asperger’s syndrome to make valuable contributions to numerous fields, most notably scientific fields. It has been hypothesised that some of history’s greatest scientists had Asperger’s syndrome. Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein and Henry Cavendish all exhibited an unusually intense interest in their fields coupled with a lack of interest in communicating with others. Simon Baron-Cohen, the psychiatrist who heads the autism research centre at Cambridge, believes all three likely had Asperger’s syndrome.28 Studies of university math and science students at Cambridge University, and of Math-Olympiad winners, have shown that individuals 
Genes related to sex steroids, neural growth, and social-emotional behavior are associated with autistic traits, empathy, and Asperger syndrome. Autism Res 2009; 2: 157-177. 22 S. Baron-Cohen, et al. The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger Syndrome/High-Functioning Autism, Malesand Females, Scientists and Mathematicians. J Autism Dev Disord 2001; 31: 5-17. 23 F. H. Duffy, et al. The relationship of Asperger's syndrome to autism: a preliminary EEG coherence study. 
BMC Medicine 2013; 11: 175. 24 K. Supekar, et al. Brain hyperconnectivity in children with autism and its links to social deficits. Cell Rep 2013; 5: 738-747. 25 K Morsanyi et al. Heuristics and biases in autism: less biased but not more logical. In Proceedings of the 
31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. N. A. Taatgen, H. van Rijneds, eds. Austin Texas: Cognitive Science Society; 2009. pp. 75-80.  26 T. Armstrong. Neurodiversity: Discovering the Extraordinary Gifts of Autism, ADHD, Dyslexia, and Other 
Brain Differences.Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press; 2013. pp 61-62. 27 Ibid, p59. 28 I. James. Singular scientists. J R Soc Med 2003; 9636–39. 
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with Asperger’s syndrome are over represented in these groups and confirms earlier studies suggesting that Asperger’s syndrome is associated with scientific skills.29  Interestingly, the potential of individuals with Asperger’s syndrome to make unique contributions to various fields was noted by Hans Asperger, the physician who first described the condition in 1944:  
A good professional attitude involves single-mindedness as well as a decision to 
give up a large number of other interests. Many people find this a very unpleasant 
decision. Quite a number of young people choose the wrong job because, being 
equally talented in different areas, they cannot muster the dedication to focus on 
a single career. With the autistic individual the matter is entirely different. With 
collected energy and obvious confidence and, yes, with a blinkered attitude 
towards life’s rich rewards, they go their own way, the way in which their talents 
have directed them since childhood.30 In sum, it seems plausible that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome contribute to a valuable form of cognitive diversity. They have a particular way of looking at the world which gives them a unique perspective on problems and encourages them to develop different problem solving heuristics. Such diversity may improve society’s collective ability to solve complex problems and thus to its resilience in the face of external and internal threats.  Of course, the skills associated with Asperger’s syndrome and the technological developments that they enable may not always be put to beneficial uses and may indeed sometimes create threats. For example, some would argue that progress in certain scientific fields, such as nuclear physics and synthetic virology creates more threats than it mitigates. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that greater problem solving abilities generally conduce to population wellbeing, and certainly this is an assumption widely made in relation to education systems which seek in part to develop such problem solving abilities. Dyslexia  Dyslexia is a developmental disorder associated with difficulties in some combination of the following: reading, writing, spelling, handwriting, speaking, listening and memory.31 These difficulties are associated with differences in the brains of dyslexics compared to non-dyslexics.32 Dyslectic brains show different patterns of neural connectivity to the brains of non-dyslexics. In dyslexia there are fewer connections between some regions of the brain, like the auditory and speech centres, however there seem to be more connections between regions of the brain which are far away from each other. Hence, dyslexia is characterised by “local hypoconnectivity and long-range hyperconnectivity”.33  As was the case with Aspergers syndrome, dyslexia also appears to be associated with certain unusual abilities. Dyslexics have been shown to perform better on particular 
29 S. Baron-Cohen et al, op. cit. note 22.  30 James, op. cit. note 28. 31 Armstrong, op. cit. note 26. 32 B. Eide. The Dyslexic Advantage: Unlocking the Hidden Potential of the Dyslexic Brain. New York: Penguin; 2011. p.32-37.  33 E. L. Williams & M. F. Casanova. Autism and dyslexia: a spectrum of cognitive styles as defined by minicolumnar morphometry. Med Hypotheses 2010; 74: 59-62. 
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measures of creativity and disjunctive thought. Some believe that this is a direct result of the way in which the brains of dyslexics are wired, with more diverse regions of the brain being connected and used for different tasks.34 This in turn explains why dyslexics appear to do well in fields which require creative thought. For example, in business, dyslexics are over-represented in entrepreneurs (which likely require a certain level of creative thinking) while underrepresented in corporate managers.35 Dyslexics also tend to be over represented at arts schools.36    Hence, the presence of dyslexic individuals may contribute to a valuable form of human diversity. The way the brains of dyslexics are organised may lead them to develop unique thinking styles, give them unique perspectives and heuristics. Given society benefits from having diverse perspectives and heuristics, this may benefit society as a whole. Their unique way of thinking may also enable dyslexics to make valuable contributions to a range of fields. Hence there is some reason to believe that a human population that contains some individuals with dyslexia will be impersonally better than a population without dyslexic individuals. 
Summary – disability and cognitive diversity The above are just two examples of conditions which would be classed as disabilities, but which may make society better by contributing valuable forms of cognitive diversity. Some other conditions which are classed as cognitive disabilities or mental disorders – such as ADHD and depression – could also be argued to result in significant population wide-benefits because of the unique cognitive style they result in. Similarly it may also be argued that deafness leads individuals to develop a range of unique perspectives and heuristics, in part due to their living in a deaf culture. Hence it is possible that the presence of some deaf individuals in the human population contributes to population flourishing.   In this paper, we take no firm stand on whether any particular disability contributes significantly to human population flourishing. However, we suggest that it is very plausible that Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia do so, and also somewhat plausible that the same is true of other disabilities. We believe an important question when assessing the ethics of screening against a particular disability is whether it contributes to the development of unique and valuable perspectives and heuristics. This is an empirical question, and we believe there is important work to be done in this area. Psychological studies have shown that people suffering from depression and Asperger’s syndrome use different problem solving heuristics than others and as a result do better on specific tasks. However there appears to be little work establishing whether this is also true of other disabilities. We suggest also that, wherever it can be shown that a disability contributes significantly to cognitive diversity that can be expected to enhance population resilience to decimation or extinction, there will be a pro tanto case for coercive restrictions on access to disability screening against that disability. For, as noted above, risks of decimation or extinction are widely and plausibly regarded as capable of justifying coercive measures. 
34 Eide, op. cit. note 36. p.41.  35 J. Logan. Dyslexic entrepreneurs: the incidence; their coping strategies and their business skills. Dyslexia 2009; 15: 328-346. 36 Armstrong, op. cit. note 26. p.81.  
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Further objections  At least three objections that could be made against the claims we have made in this paper: (1) our arguments have implausible implications for the permissibility of treatments for disability; (2) our arguments express an exploitative attitude toward the disabled; and (3) acceptance of our arguments would place an unfair burden on the parents of disabled children. We discuss each of these criticisms in turn.  
Treatments for disability  In the above section we argued that some disabilities plausibly contribute to valuable forms of diversity and suggested that this generates a pro tanto case for restrictions on selection against those disabilities. However it’s conceivable that in the future other treatments will be developed that could lower the frequencies of these disabilities. For example, a dietary supplement may be developed that if taken by women while pregnant stops the resulting child from developing dyslexia. Similarly imagine that an empathy enhancing educational program is developed for toddlers which causes their brains to develop in such a way as to prevent the development of Asperger’s syndrome.  Both of these treatments, if widely used, would reduce the same kinds of cognitive diversity as would screening against embryos predisposed to these conditions. It might therefore be argued that our claims imply that the state may be justified in preventing parents from having their children take the dietary supplement or participate in the empathy enhancing program. This conclusion may be considered unacceptable.  Although we accept the conclusion that the state should block access to these types of treatments is counter-intuitive, we do not believe our arguments do in fact have this implication. There is an important difference between the disability screening technologies we discuss and means of treating disability. If the state were to prevent the pregnant woman from taking the dietary supplements, or the parents of children with Asperger’s syndrome from accessing the educational program, the state would be making these children worse off than they would otherwise have been.37 Dyslexia and Asperger’s syndrome are both disabilities which make life harder for people who suffer from them. Dyslexics perform worse at school than non-dyslexics, which can have long term implications for employment prospects. People suffering from Asperger’s syndrome often have trouble finding full time employment.38 In the above example, if the prenatal child was not given the dietary supplement, or if the toddler was denied access to the educational program, their lives would arguably contain less wellbeing as a result. Therefore if the state were to block access to these treatments, it would be making those children worse off than they otherwise would have been. This is not the case when parents are prevented from accessing disability screening technologies. If parents are prevented from accessing disability screening services, this may result in the parents having a disabled child when they otherwise would have had a child without a disability, but, except if the disability is so severe as to make life not worth 
37 This is debatable in the dietary supplement example. Some people may hold that these supplements are a type of identity-determining inventions. Therefore if a pregnant woman takes the supplement, she doesn’t prevent her specific child from developing a disability, but rather changes which child she ultimately has. If this is true, then the dietary supplement should be considered in the same class as disability screening. However we think the claim that this dietary supplement would be identity altering is not intuitive. Similar prenatal interventions are not normally considered to be identity altering. We normally think that if a woman drinks during pregnancy, for example, she harms that baby, rather than cause a new baby to come into existence. We believe this would also be the case for our hypothetical dietary supplement. 38 J. L. Taylor & M. M. Seltzer. Employment and post-secondary educational activities for young adults with autism spectrum disorders during the transition to adulthood. J Autism Dev Disord 2011; 41: 566-574. 
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living, the disabled child will arguably not have been made worse off than would otherwise have been case, for he or she would not otherwise have existed.39  It seems plausible that this is a relevant consideration for the state when deciding whether it can justifiably prevent individuals from accessing a particular service. For it is plausible to think that reasons not to reduce a given individual’s wellbeing are, other things being equal, stronger than reasons not to have a less well-off child in place of a better-off child.40 Thus, though we believe that the pro tanto case for restricting access to disability treatments in the name of preserving cognitive diversity will be as strong as the case for restricting access to screening services in respect of the same disability, the case against will be stronger in the case of treatments than in the case of screening technologies, and indeed it is plausible that the case against restrictions will always be decisive in the case of treatments. 
Exploiting the disabled A related concern with our argument might be that to restrict disability screening on the basis of the population-level benefits of doing so is to exploit those children who will, as a result of the restriction, be born with disabilities. It uses those children in order to bring about population-level benefits. McMahan suggests this as a criticism for any arguments stressing the impersonal benefits of the disabled. He states: 
I do not know of anyone who has argued that it would be desirable for at least 
some people to cause themselves to have disabled rather than normal children on 
the ground that this would ensure a healthy degree of diversity and enable more 
people to benefit from enlightening contacts with the disabled. For that would 
seem exploitative; it would treat the disabled as a means of benefiting others.41 As stated above, we believe that there is a pro tanto case for the state to prevent parents from selecting against children predisposed to dyslexia or Asperger’s syndrome rather than a normal child. Part of our reason for drawing this conclusion is that these disabilities may benefit society. It may be claimed that by allowing more people with disabilities to come into existence, primarily because of the benefits they provide to society, we would be exploiting them in some way. It is important to note that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia are not themselves not all things considered harmed by policies that restrict disability screening. Everyone, including the disabled, benefit from their existence when they have lives worth living and contribute to valuable forms of diversity. Although causing the existence of someone with Aspeger’s syndrome or dyslexia bestows on them a non-comparative harm associated with living with a disability, their existence also bestows on them a number of non-comparative benefits –the good and enjoyable parts of their lives their existence enables. Given the reasonable assumption that people with Asperger’s Syndrome and dyslexia still have lives that are worth living, the non-comparative benefits associated with their existence will outweigh the non-comparative harms associated with their disabilities. Hence individuals with Asperger’s 
39 The parents may, however, be made worse off. This point will be discussed below. 40 J. McMahan. Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives. J Ethics 2012; 17: 5-35. 41 McMahan, op. cit. note 8. p. 91.  
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syndrome and dyslexia whose existence results from restrictions on disability screening are not all things considered harmed by these polices.   However causing harm to others is not a necessary condition of exploitation, and it remains possible that there is some sense in which causing the existence of people with Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia, in part because of the social benefits associated with these conditions, may be exploitative in some sense. Rather than explore this issue further, we will simply note that the possibility of exploitation is compatible with the claims we have made in this article. Our central argument is only that there is a pro 
tanto case for the prohibition of disability screening. This is consistent with there being countervailing (and perhaps decisive) reasons for allowing disability screening based on exploitation.    Similar points can be made against the claim that in our view the disabled are being used as a means to benefit others. While this may be true, as Parfit makes clear there is nothing intrinsically immoral about using someone as a means. 42 When we get a lift to work with a colleague, we use this person as a means, however there is clearly nothing morally problematic about this. What is often immoral is when we treat individuals 
merely as means. Treating someone merely as a means involves more than just using them to achieve some goal; it involves treating that person as having no value or normative significance besides her value as an instrument or a tool. Clearly we are not advocating regarding the disabled as mere instruments in this way. As a similar example, couples may have a child partly as a means to provide a companion for an existing child. However, provided they still love and care for this child – and do not view them just as a means – it is not clear that there is anything ethically problematic about this.   
Unjust burden for parents The final objection that we will consider holds that prohibiting selecting against certain disabilities will result in an unjust burden for parents. Raising disabled children can be much harder than raising children without disabilities. This is likely even true for mild disabilities like dyslexia and Asperger’s syndrome. Hence there is a sense in which, if the state were to prevent parents from accessing disability screening technologies, they would be made worse off than they would otherwise have been.   We believe this is a relevant consideration, and concerns regarding the burden of parents of disabled children should be considered by the state when designing policies governing access to disability screening technologies. At the very least we believe these considerations would justify a policy where parents who already have a disabled child are permitted, or even helped, by the state to access disability screening services. Whether the burden placed on parents through having a single child with a disability is so high to justify no restrictions on disability screening services is unclear. Indeed we know of no empirical studies showing that the parents of a child with dyslexia, or Asperger’s syndrome are worse off than their peers. Still we concede that if it can be shown that the extra burden on parents and families as a result of having a child with dyslexia or Asperger’s syndrome is significant then this provides a reason to endorse a policy which allows relatively free access to disability screening services. All of this is consistent with our original claim, which was only that there is a defeasible case in favour of prohibiting selection against dyslexia and Asperger’s syndrome. One type of 
42 D. Parfit. On What Matters: Volume One; Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011.pp. 212-228.  
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situation in which we believe that this case is likely to be defeated is where having a child is likely to be especially burdensome for the parents—for example, where they already have a child with the disability.     
Conclusion In this paper we have discussed the conditions under which the state could legitimately restrict parental access to disability screening technologies. The challenge posed by liberal eugenics is for people who think parents’ access to these technologies should be restricted to show how their use would result in harms that would justify social coercion. We have argued that the criticisms most commonly advanced against disability screening fail to meet this challenge as they do not point to harms of the right kind or of sufficient magnitude. We then developed a form of the diversity argument, stressing the instrumental benefits associated with some disabilities. As some disabilities result in unique perspectives and heuristics, they may contribute valuable forms of cognitive diversity. As cognitive diversity is important to our collective ability to solve problems, these disabilities may help to make human populations more resilient to decimation or extinction in the face of major internal and external threats. If this is indeed the case, we suggest that there will be a pro tanto case for restrictions on access to disability screening technologies.  If we are correct we believe our arguments go some way to vindicating widely held intuitions about which disabilities should, and which should not, be subject to state restrictions. Some people have the intuition that it is permissible for parents to screen against serious disabilities, but not against mild disabilities. Indeed a distinction between serious and non-serious conditions is written into the legislation in certain countries.43 However this position is difficult to defend at a theoretical level. While many bio-ethicists draw a theoretical distinction between therapeutic and enhancing uses of reproductive technologies, this does not explain why parents should be allowed to select against serious disabilities, but not others. Preventing any disease or disability is therapeutic even if those conditions are not serious. Hence this view cannot underlie the intuitive position that parents should be allowed to select against serious condition, but not mild disabilities.   In our model, certain disabilities contribute to valuable types of diversity which benefit society in important ways. The core of our argument is that there are some disabilities which make the world impersonally better when they occur in small proportions. This is likely to justify restrictions on selection against some non-serious conditions such as Asperger’s Syndrome and dyslexia, but not restrictions on selection against more serious conditions such Downs Syndrome or Tay Sachs. Therefore we believe that the view presented in this paper may help ground an intuitive distinction between selection against serious and selection against mild-conditions.   
43 Australian-Government. 2007. Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology  in clinical 
practice and research. Available at: < www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/e78.pdf> [Accessed 16 October 2014].  
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Chapter 4: Cognitive diversity and moral 
enhancement 
Note: Effects on human diversity are also important considerations when assessing the moral implications of cognitive enhancement technologies. In this chapter, co-written with Professor Simon Easteal, I consider how cognitive enhancement technologies will influence population-level cognitive diversity; and how this is relevant to well-known debates about moral enhancement. This chapter has been accepted for publication, and will appear in a revised form, subsequent to editorial input by Cambridge University Press, in the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.  
Abstract:  
One debate in contemporary bioethics centres on whether the development of cognitive 
enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this 
article we provide a new argument in favour of pursuing these enhancement technologies 
together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level 
cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their 
cognition, and some won’t enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be 
beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from 
one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and 
coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral 
failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve 
cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help 
society maximise the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to 
cognitive enhancements. 
Introduction One debate in contemporary bioethics centres on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies will hasten the need for moral enhancement. Savulescu and Persson argue that one of the dangers of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) is their capacity to increase the destructive power of malicious individuals.1,2 Armed with greatly enhanced cognitive capacities and powerful technologies whose discovery was made possible by cognitive enhancement, immoral individuals bent on destruction will be able to cause catastrophic levels of harm. In theory, moral enhancement technologies will enable us to prevent individuals from having these destructive desires. Hence, the development of powerful cognitive enhancement technologies will be dangerous unless we also pursue moral enhancement. One problem with motivating the need for moral enhancements in these terms is scope.   Savulescu and Persson state:  
1 I. Persson & J. Savulescu. The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. J Appl Philos 2008; 25: 162-177. 2 I. Persson & J. Savulescu. Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012. 
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Even if only a tiny fraction of humanity is immoral enough to want to cause large-
scale harm by weapons of mass destruction in their possession, there are bound to 
be some such people in a huge human population, as on Earth, unless humanity is 
extensively morally enhanced.3 However, as John Harris points out, in order to protect us from the destructive desires of a “tiny fraction” of humanity we would need to ensure that every single individual is morally enhanced.4 But this may be an unachievable goal. The history of vaccines and other medical interventions has shown that universal implementation of a treatment is nearly impossible to achieve. It is therefore unlikely we will be able to ensure that every single individual is morally enhanced to erase the threat posed by just a small number of malicious individuals.  However, there may be other reasons why cognitive enhancement technologies will drive the need for moral enhancement. According to some theories of human evolution, human populations have evolved to be cognitively diverse. Cognitive enhancement technologies may exacerbate these natural differences among individuals. We may expect different people to use different cognitive enhancements (or none at all) and individuals to respond differentially to particular enhancements. This could increase the level of cognitive diversity in our populations.  If the availability of CETs does increase cognitive diversity, this could be beneficial for society for several reasons. Work in economics, and other social sciences, has shown that diverse groups are potentially more productive and better at solving complex problems than less diverse groups. Similarly, we may expect cognitively diverse populations to reap the benefits associated with the division of cognitive labour and task specialisation.  However, cognitive diversity is only beneficial when group members are able to effectively cooperate with one another. Cooperation in diverse groups can be problematic because of difficulties with communication and coordination. In the future, people with differently enhanced cognitive traits who think in contrasting ways and have diverse values and preferences may have trouble effectively cooperating with one another. These difficulties may arise partly from limitations in our moral psychology. For example, because we evolved in relatively homogeneous groups, individuals can find it difficult to empathise with those who are very different from themselves. This can lead to difficulties with communication and coordination. Enhancements that increase empathy, therefore, could help improve cooperation among diverse individuals. This may provide another reason why research into moral enhancement technologies should be pursued in conjunction with research into cognitive enhancement technologies. Moral enhancements could allow us to improve the expected benefit of cognitive enhancement technologies, and reduce the costs associated with difficulties in group cohesion. In this article, we investigate the relationship among cognitive enhancement technologies, cognitive diversity, and the need for moral enhancement. We first discuss the likely effect the development of CETs will have on population-level cognitive 
3 Persson & Savulescu, op. cit. note 1, p. 174.   4 J. Harris. Moral progress and moral enhancement. Bioethics 2013; 27: 285-290. 
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diversity. We argue that a plausible consequence of the development of CETs is an increase in cognitive diversity. Next, we look at the possible beneficial consequences associated with increasing population-level cognitive diversity. We argue that diverse populations are likely to be more economically productive and better at solving complex problems than less diverse populations. We then look at some of the costs associated with cognitive diversity and argue that moral enhancement technologies could minimise these costs. In our final section we discuss the significance of our claims. We argue that, as moral enhancements can improve cooperation, which improves our collective ability to solve problems, they can be seen as a collective cognitive enhancement. Looked at from a population’s perspective, moral and cognitive enhancements may be desirable for the exact same reason—they improve our collective ability to solve problems. Hence the difference between these two enhancement technologies may be less significant than is often portrayed in the literature. 
How will cognitive enhancement technologies influence cognitive 
diversity? According to some theories of human evolution, human populations have evolved to be naturally cognitively diverse.5 Early groups of humans benefited from having some individuals who were genetically predisposed to be good at working alone, some who were good at communicating with others, some who were good at perceiving fine details, some who were good at dealing with abstract ideas, and so on. This natural diversity allows different individuals to specialise in different tasks, and this makes human groups as a whole better off. However, this also means that few, if any, individuals have all the cognitive capacities they need to live their life in an optimal way. We depend on others in order to survive and thrive. One question that has been largely overlooked in the cognitive enhancement debate is how the development of cognitive enhancement technologies will affect this standing level of cognitive diversity. Although some argue that enhancements in general threaten “the good that is the diversity of human forms”,6 this argument hasn’t been developed for the specific case of cognitive enhancements. One way in which cognitive enhancements may be expected to reduce cognitive diversity is if they are used as part of a coercive state-based program, such as the early eugenics programs of the United States and Germany. These eugenic programs aimed to rid populations of traits the state deemed undesirable. Similarly, if new coercive state-based cognitive enhancement programs are implemented, this might reduce cognitive diversity as cognitive traits that the state labels “undesirable” are eliminated. However eugenics, and the idea of coercive state-based enhancement programs more generally, is now widely considered to be immoral and incompatible with basic human rights.7,8 It is more likely that CETs will be available through a liberal regulatory regime with individuals generally free to make their own decisions about whether or not to use particular enhancements as they are developed. 
5 M. Pagel. Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; 2013. pp. 101-103.  6 E. Parens. The Goodness of Fragility: On the Prospect of Genetic Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of Human Capacities’. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1995; 5: 141-153. 7 M. J. Selgelid. Moderate eugenics and human enhancement. Med Health Care Philos 2014; 17: 3-12. 8 N. Agar. Liberal Eugenics. Public Aff Q 1998; 12: 137-155. 
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If this is the case, the development of CETs may be expected to increase rather than decrease cognitive diversity. We would expect different people to use CETs in different ways, and some not to use any at all. We already see this with traditional forms of cognitive enhancement like education. Some people are drawn to forms of education that enhance their musical ability, whereas others are drawn to forms that enhance their reasoning ability. We can therefore see the availability of different types of education as increasing population level cognitive diversity. Similarly, we may expect the availability of different CETs to further increase cognitive diversity. However, there may be some reasons to believe that CETs will decrease cognitive diversity even in a liberal society. We consider two such reasons now: the differential effects of enhancements on individuals, and the existence of optimal cognitive types. We argue that neither provides a decisive reason to believe that enhancements will decrease rather than increase cognitive diversity at the population level. 
Differential responses to enhancement Many drugs and enhancements have different effects in different individuals. If a specific CET has its greatest effect in those who are at a lower end of the spectrum of the trait it enhances, and has its smallest effects in those at the higher end of the spectrum, it will naturally lower diversity in that trait. For example, individuals with low working memory improve markedly when administered drugs that mimic dopamine, whereas high-performing individuals show much lower effects when given the same medications.9,10 This phenomenon is known as an inverted U-shaped dose-effect curve. Enhancements that demonstrate this type of effect naturally lower the variance in the traits they target. Therefore, if the majority of CETs have inverted U-shaped effects, then a general result of their development could be a lowering of diversity across a range of cognitive traits.  However, it is unlikely that the majority of cognitive enhancements will have inverted U-shaped effects. Some enhancements will have differential effects that will act to increase, rather than decrease, diversity in the traits they target. For example, caffeine is known to be an enhancer of reaction time.11 However, various genes that commonly vary among individuals influence how caffeine is metabolised and how strongly it affects people.12 If we were to measure a set of individuals’ performances in reaction speed tests before and after they had a strong dose of caffeine, we would find that the variance of their performance would increase. This is because some of the best-performing individuals would improve significantly as a result of the caffeine and some of the worst-performing individuals would get little or no boost. Therefore, unless it turns out that most of the cognitive enhancements that are developed have an inverted U-shaped effect curve, the fact that cognitive enhancements are likely to have differential effects does not provide a clear reason to suppose they will lower cognitive diversity. Some will have differential effects that increase, rather than decrease, diversity. 
9 M. A. Mehta, et al. Improved short-term spatial memory but impaired reversal learning following the dopamine D(2) agonist bromocriptine in human volunteers. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 2001; 159: 10-20. 10 C. Housden, et al. Cognitive Enhancing Drugs: Neuroscience and Society. In Enhancing Human Capacities. J. Savulescu, et al., eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 2011. pp. 113-126. 11 A. Nehlig. Is caffeine a cognitive enhancer? J Alzheimers Dis 2010; 20 Suppl 1: S85-94. 12 A. Yang, et al. Genetics of caffeine consumption and responses to caffeine. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 2010; 211: 245-257. 
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Universally desirable cognitive types Another way that the development of CETs might lower cognitive diversity is by allowing individuals to achieve universally desirable cognitive types. For some cognitive traits (e.g., processing speed), it may be optimal to simply have as high a value as possible. Others may be most desirable at intermediate values. If particular cognitive traits have specific values at which they are clearly optimal, then when CETs are developed that target these traits, they may cause our populations to cluster around the optimal values. This would result in a reduction in cognitive diversity.  It is unclear how many cognitive traits have values that are universally desirable. As noted previously, today there is already a wide variance in the cognitive traits that individuals choose to develop through traditional forms of enhancement. Although it is possible that the vast majority of individuals will want enhancements that maximise their memory, for example, this is not certain and would depend on the precise nature of the enhancement. This question would need to be looked at more closely as specific enhancements are developed.  Furthermore, some cognitive traits fit a trade-off model, in which gains in some valuable abilities necessarily lead to losses in others.13 That is, some cognitive traits exist on a spectrum with each end of the spectrum being valuable in some way. We would expect the development of CETs that target these traits to increase cognitive diversity. For example, a trade-off is thought to exist between creativity and attention span. Studies have indicated that individuals who perform badly on tests that measure latent inhibition (an ability to block out irrelevant stimuli) do well on tests of creativity, and vice versa.14 It has been hypothesised that these traits may be somewhat mutually exclusive—people are creative precisely because their mind wanders and they cannot block out seemingly irrelevant information. Hence, enhancements that increase focus and attention span are likely to move individuals further down that end of the spectrum, and in effect to make them less creative. If enhancements targeting these traits are available, we may expect some individuals to enhance their creative ability and others to enhance the ability to concentrate. This will increase, rather than decrease, diversity at a population level.  Therefore, although CETs may reduce some types of cognitive diversity, by allowing individuals to cluster around clearly optimal values, others will increase diversity by allowing individuals to enhance two ends of a spectrum that are both valuable.   Overall, it is an open question whether the development of CETs will increase or decrease population-level cognitive diversity. Much will depend on the exact properties of the particular enhancements that are developed. For the rest of this article we set this issue aside and assume that it is at least a plausible consequence of CETs that they will increase population-level cognitive diversity for the reason that different individuals will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some will not enhance themselves at all. We will now look at some of the potential benefits of increasing cognitive diversity. 
13 T. Hills & R. Hertwig. Why Aren't We Smarter Already: Evolutionary Trade-Offs and Cognitive Enhancements. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 2011; 20: 373-377. 14 S. H. Carson, et al. Decreased latent inhibition is associated with increased creative achievement in high-functioning individuals. J Pers Soc Psychol 2003; 85: 499-506. 
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The benefits of increasing cognitive diversity 
Collective problem solving Recent work in social science has demonstrated that when groups of people are solving complex problems, cognitive diversity can matter more than individual ability. Diverse groups can out-perform less diverse groups that consist of higher ability problem solvers. This is because diverse cognitive types bring diverse perspectives and heuristics to problems that can combine to produce synergistic effects.15,16 This fact can be best understood through reference to the concept of an epistemic landscape, which is modelled on the idea of an adaptive landscape in evolutionary biology. An epistemic landscape is a topographic representation of the relationship between perspectives and heuristics, and their problem-solving utility. Peaks in the landscape represent perspectives and heuristics that have a high problem-solving utility. For many complex problems—such as, “What is the most efficient way to build an electricity network?”—there are often many peaks in the epistemic landscape. Most of these peaks represent local optima: reasonably good solutions to the problem that are not the best solution. The highest peak in the landscape, the best solution, is the global optimum.  When individuals are trying to solve problems by themselves, they are prone to get stuck on local optima in the epistemic landscape. When they find a solution to a problem that is reasonably good, they may mistakenly conclude that the solution is the best one, despite the fact that better solutions exist. This is because their way of approaching the problem prevents them from seeing what is deficient about the solution they have found. Individuals who have similar perspectives and use similar problem-solving heuristics are likely to get stuck on similar local optima in epistemic space. In contrast, individuals with different perspectives and heuristics will likely be drawn to different local optima. Therefore, when groups are formed that consist of individuals with similar perspectives and heuristics, the group as a whole is also likely to get stuck on a local optimum. Because each individual thinks about the problem in a similar way, if one finds a solution that is a local optimum, others in the group will be unlikely to be able to see what is deficient about it, and the group may wrongly conclude that it has found the best solution to the problem. Cognitively diverse groups, on the other hand, are more likely only to agree on solutions that are global optima. As members in the group are individually drawn to different solutions, they are more likely to be able see what is deficient about solutions found by other group members that are local optima. This model is supported by data that show that cognitively diverse teams outperform less diverse teams on measures of problem solving.17 In the future, CETs may enable individuals to access a greater range of perspectives and heuristics than is possible now. This may make our populations as a whole better at solving complex problems. When individuals come together to solve problems, be they in companies, science labs, government committees, and so on, these groups may be more efficient problem solvers because individuals have enhanced different aspects of 
15 S. E. Page. 2007. The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and 
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 16 L. Hong & S. E. Page. Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2004; 101: 16385-16389. 17 Page, op. cit. note 15, p.322-323. 
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their cognition. Therefore, society has an interest in promoting CETs in a way that increases cognitive diversity. 
Economic efficiency Increasing cognitive diversity may also improve economic efficiency. It has long been recognised that nations are more productive when labour is divided and workers specialise in different tasks.18 The division of labour drives populations as a whole to be more productive, as each member gets better at his or her particular tasks. This is part of the reason that larger cities have been shown to be, on average, more productive than smaller cities.19 The division of labour, coupled with specialisation, also drives innovation in groups – as individuals who specialise in particular roles are more likely to be innovators in those roles.20 In modern societies, a key component of the division of labour is the division of cognitive labour. We do not just want people in society to do different things, we also want them to have different cognitive skills; For example, we want our air traffic controllers to have a different set of cognitive skills than our mathematics professors; we want our artists to have different skills than our politicians. This makes society as a whole more productive.  CETs may help drive the cognitive division of labour by increasing the power and range of our cognitive abilities. This is already happening through traditional cognitive enhancements. Specialist schools and training centres encourage individuals to develop role-specific thinking skills. Schools in the creative arts will ask children to undertake thinking exercises that teach them to think creatively, and training programs for pilots will try to improve their ability to make decisions under pressure and so on. In the future pharmaceuticals, or other forms of enhancements, may be used in conjunction with specialised training to help individuals develop role specific cognitive skills. This may improve economic efficiency by allowing individuals to operate more productively.  This would provide one reason for states to promote some specific CETs. Some role-specific CETs are already encouraged by the state. Fighter pilots, for example, are given access to attention-span enhancements like modafinil to help them stay alert.21 In sum, another plausible benefit of cognitive diversity is improved economic efficiency. If CETs increase population-level cognitive diversity, this will drive the division of labour which may help states operate more productively. 
The costs of increased cognitive diversity and moral enhancement In addition to the benefits described previously, increasing population-level cognitive diversity is also likely to have costs. One of the problems that cognitively diverse groups face is difficulties with cooperation and group cohesion. If members of a group think in very different ways, it can be difficult for them to communicate with one another and coordinate their actions. This is reflected in studies of organisational performance which suggest that although cognitive diversity is beneficial under perfect 
18 A. Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nation. London: W. Strahan; 1776 
19 J. M. Quigley. Urban Diversity and Economic Growth. J Econ Perspect 1998; 12: 127-138. 20 K. Sterelny. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2012. p. 18.  21 M. Szalavitz. 2009. Popping Smart Pills: The Case for Cognitive Enhancement. Time Jan 6. Available at http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1869435,00.html (accessed 16 September 2014). 
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conditions, it often leads to problems with group cohesion.22 On a larger scale, difficulties with group cohesion may also explain why some, including UK Prime Minister David Cameron, have labelled state multiculturalism a failure.23 This is in spite of the fact that multiculturalism is widely expected to have benefits for states—benefits that relate to the advantages of cognitive diversity. One reason why it may be difficult for individuals to cooperate effectively with those who are very different from themselves is because of limitations in our moral psychology. Trout talks about an “empathy gap” that is experienced by many individuals living in modern societies.24 Although most individuals find it easy to empathise with those they are close to, such as members of their family, community, and so on, they find it difficult to empathise with those who are very different from them, such as those who come from different cultures and practice different religions. If individuals find it difficult to empathise with those from different cultural backgrounds, then effectively communicating and coordinating actions with them is also likely to be difficult.  In the future, widespread use of cognitive enhancement technologies may lead to similar problems with cooperation. If people use CETs in ways that increase cognitive diversity and in the process begin to acquire diverse values and preferences, it may be difficult for them to cooperate. Moral enhancement technologies may help mitigate these problems by increasing our ability to cooperate effectively with those who are very different from us.   For example, moral enhancements that target empathy may be one way of bridging the empathy gap, and may make it easier for people to empathise with others who have different values and are from different backgrounds. For example, intranasal administration of oxytocin can increase empathy and makes it easier for individuals to infer the mental states of others.25 This helps individuals within groups communicate and coordinate actions with one another. These types of enhancements may be especially useful in the future, if cognitive diversity increases as a result of CETs.   In sum, one potentially negative consequence of increasing cognitive diversity is that it would lead to problems with cooperation and group cohesion. In a future world where we are even more different from one another than we are now, it may be even more difficult for individuals to coordinate their actions. Moral enhancement technologies may make it easier for individuals to cooperate with one another and hence may help mitigate this potential negative consequence of CETs. This provides another reason why research into moral enhancement should be conducted in conjunction with research into cognitive enhancement.  
22 K. Williams, & C. O'Reill. Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research. 
Res Organ Behav 1998; 20:77-140. 23 O.Wright & J. Taylor. 2011. Cameron: My war on multiculturalism. The Independent Feb 5. Available at: 
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-my-war-on-multiculturalism-2205074.html [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 24 J. Trout. The Empathy Gap: Building Bridges to the Good Life and the Good Society. New York: Penguin; 2009. 25 I. Dziobek, et al. Dissociation of cognitive and emotional empathy in adults with Asperger syndrome using the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET). J Autism Dev Disord 2008; 38: 464-473. 
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‘Collective’ cognitive enhancement The preceding discussion suggests that the line between cognitive and moral enhancements may not be as clear as it sometimes appears. Nearly all of the most important problems that society faces today are solved by people working together in groups. Because of this, enhancing our collective ability to solve problems can be seen as more important for society than enhancing our individual cognitive capacities. A group’s collective ability to solve problems is in turn determined by the cognitive ability of its individual members, the diversity of their cognitive styles, and their ability to work together. As moral enhancement technologies may improve cooperation among individuals, they provide one mechanism of increasing our collective ability to solve problems. In this sense they can be described as “collective” cognitive enhancements. This also suggests that if cognitive enhancements are pursued without efforts to enhance cognitive diversity and improve cooperation, they may be collectively self-defeating. For example, imagine a cognitive enhancement that increases IQ in each individual it is given to but in the process causes all such individuals to think about problems in similar ways. If this enhancement were widely used in a population, it could actually make the population worse at solving problems because it lowers cognitive diversity. Similarly, imagine that a population has access to a wide range of cognitive enhancements, which both improve individual cognitive abilities and increase population-level cognitive diversity. If this process makes it more difficult for individuals to cooperate with one another, it could also make the population as a whole worse at solving problems. Both of these cases show the need for a collective approach to cognitive enhancement, which embraces cognitive diversity and moral enhancement technologies. 
Conclusion In this article we have provided a new argument in favour of pursuing cognitive and moral enhancement technologies together. We have shown that a plausible consequence of the development of cognitive enhancement technologies is that they will increase cognitive diversity. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it may make cooperation among individuals more difficult. Moral enhancement technologies may help improve cooperation among individuals and hence provide one way of mitigating the cost of increased cognitive diversity. This suggests that the development of cognitive enhancement technologies will drive the need for moral enhancement.  We further suggested that if cognitive enhancement is pursued in a manner that decreases population-level cognitive diversity, or makes it more difficult for individuals to work together, then it may be collectively self-defeating. It is possible to improve the cognitive abilities of all individuals in a group and make the group as a whole worse at solving problems. This provides further reasons why research into moral enhancement should be pursued in conjunction with research into cognitive enhancement.
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Chapter 5: The ethics of human life extension –
the second argument from evolution 
Note: In this final chapter I show how considerations of human diversity are also relevant to debates regarding human life extension. I argue that radical life extension may influence both genetic and cultural diversity, and explain how this may affect the evolvability of the species as a whole. This chapter has been accepted for publication, and will appear in a revised form, subsequent to editorial input by Oxford University Press, in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.  
Abstract 
One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life 
extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be 
morally undesirable. In this paper I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this 
argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the 
evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural 
mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species 
this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species’ susceptibility to 
extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practises that promote 
wellbeing, and (3) it may impede moral progress. 
Introduction In his paper “The Right and Wrong of Growing Old” Bennett Foddy identifies two arguments that could be made against human life extension that utilise ideas from evolutionary biology.1 The first argument from evolution claims that, as the rate of human ageing has been optimised by evolutionary forces, we should be sceptical about interventions which alter the ageing process. As Foddy demonstrates, this argument is problematic for a number of reasons. First and foremost, most theories regarding the evolution of ageing see it as an epiphenomenal by-product of evolutionary forces and not something that was directly selected. If the rate at which humans age was not selected for by evolution then the claim that the current human lifespan is in some sense optimal loses much of its force.   However there is a second argument against human life extension that draws on evolutionary theory. This argument does not claim that the current human lifespan is in any sense optimal but rather that certain types of life extending interventions may make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable in some way.  Although the second argument from evolution (henceforth SE) is not commonly discussed in the ethics literature, something like it appears to be behind the thinking of many early 20th century scientists and science-fiction writers who wrote about life extension. This is made evident by Adams: 
1 B. Foddy. The Right and Wrong of Growing Old: Assessing the Argument from Evolution. Philos Technol 2012; 25: 547-560. 
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we should note that, remarkably, despite their differences, the diverse works of 
visionaries, critics, and their successors alike share a consensus about one 
important point: there is a tension between the interests of the individual and 
those of the human race as a whole – immortality for the individual may 
undermine the prospects for the human race. For Wells this is because evolution 
works best through selective death, the sorting of variants to preserve the best 
types. Haldane, Huxley and Stapledon grant that we may be able to greatly 
improve and lengthen human life, but this is secondary and subordinate to the far 
more important task of working toward survival and immortality for 
humankind.2  SE consists of two separate claims: one empirical and one evaluative. The empirical claim is that certain forms of life extension will make our species less evolvable. The evaluative claim is that if our species did become less evolvable, this would be morally undesirable in some way. In this paper I explore both the empirical and evaluative claims of SE.  The empirical claims made by SE are unlikely to hold for interventions which make only minor alterations to lifespan, or which make dramatic changes in only a few individuals. This is because these interventions are unlikely to have the population-level consequences that are needed to affect the evolutionary potential of the entire species. However, interventions which dramatically extend life for large segments of the species could, in principle, have a large enough effect to influence the evolvability of the species. Hence the types of life extending interventions for which SE is most likely to apply are those that make radical changes to life expectancy rather than just 
lifespan. 3 Large increases in life expectancy could reduce the evolvability of the species by slowing the rate of generational turnover – the rate at which new individuals are introduced into our populations. That radical life extension could lead to a reduction in generational turnover has been pointed to by many authors, some of whom are proponents of life extension.4 If our populations continue to be limited by resources, and each individual lives for many times longer than they do now, we may need to dramatically reduce the birth rate as our populations reach their carrying capacity. As Larry Temkin says: 
Even if we grant that the earth could comfortably sustain several times its current 
population, slowing the ageing process would, in a very short time, inevitably 
carry with it a commitment to slowing the birth rate. This is not a deep 
philosophical point about the meaning of life or the nature of man. It is a simple 
practical point…Were we to succeed in stopping our biological clocks, at some 
point we would only be able to permit new births to offset those deaths due to 
murders, accident, war and disease. 5,6  
2 M. Adams. The Quest for Immortality: Visions and Presentiments in Science and Literature. In: The 
Fountain of Youth. S. Post & R. Binstock, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004. pp. 38-71. 3 I use the term lifespan to refer to the maximum amount of time that a member of a species has lived, and life expectancy to refer to the average amount of time that a member of a species lives.   
4 J. Harris. Enhancing evolution: the ethical case for making better people. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press; 2007. p 69.  5 L. S. Temkin. Is Living Longer Living Better? J Appl Philos 2008; 25: 193-210. 
103 
 
                                                            
In cases of radical life extension, which I will stipulate as being interventions which increase life expectancy to at least 5000 years and significantly slow generational turnover,7 the empirical claims made by SE look more plausible. It is these forms of life extension that will be my focus in this paper. In Part 2, I look at the science and technologies behind radical life extension. In Part 3, I look at whether radical life extension would make the species less evolvable through an effect on biological evolution. I argue that although radical life extension could reduce one source of genetic variation that is important to biological evolution, this is unlikely to have a significant effect on the evolutionary potential of modern human populations. In Part 4, I discuss whether radical life extension would make our populations less evolvable through cultural mechanisms. I argue that radical life extension could reduce the capacity of human populations to make adaptive cultural changes, and that this effect may be significant for modern populations. In Part 5, I argue for and qualify the evaluative claims of SE: if radical life extension did reduce our evolutionary potential, this could provide a reason why such interventions should be viewed as ethically undesirable. In my conclusion, I argue that both the empirical and evaluative claims made by SE are plausible, and that SE should be a consideration when assessing the moral desirability of interventions which aim at radical life extension.   
The science and technologies behind radical life extension Over the last few decades scientists have developed numerous interventions which seem to slow the ageing process in other species of animals. Increasing resistance to oxidative stress increases lifespan in rodents and some other species by an average of 30%.8 Altering the expression of certain genes can double the lifespan of mice and worms. Pharmacological interventions have also been developed that slow the progression of age related decline in several species.9   Recent scientific and technological advances suggest that we may soon be able to manipulate the ageing process in more radical ways. A recent study demonstrated that increasing the levels of the enzyme nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+) in older mice reversed the age-related decline in their muscles to the point that there were indistinguishable from the muscles of younger mice.10 This suggests it may be possible to actually stop and reverse, rather than just slow, the ageing process. NAD+ is also thought to play an important role in human ageing, and human trials using NAD+ to fight age related decline may begin as early as 2014.11 
6 Aside from these practical considerations, there may also be psychological reasons why radical life extension would result in a lowering of the birth rate – eternal youth may reduce the desire of individuals to have children. See President’s Council on Bioethics. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of 
Happiness. General Books; 2011. 7 I have defined radical life extension as interventions which increase lifespan to over 5000 years purely for illustrative purposes. The arguments in this paper apply to all interventions that significantly extend human lifespan to the point at which it dramatically slows the rate of generational turnover.  8 F. Sierra, et al. Prospects for life span extension. Annu Rev Med 2009; 60: 457-469;M. P. Mattson. Energy intake, meal frequency, and health: a neurobiological perspective. Annu Rev Nutr 2005; 25: 237-260. 9 H. R. Warner. Longevity genes: from primitive organisms to humans. Mech Ageing Dev 2005; 126: 235-242. 10 A. P. Gomes, et al. Declining NAD(+) induces a pseudohypoxic state disrupting nuclear-mitochondrial communication during aging. Cell 2013; 155: 1624-1638. 11 A. Hall. 2013. Australian and US scientists reverse ageing in mice, humans could be next. ABC News 20 December. Available at: www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-20/scientists-develop-anti-ageing-process-in-mice/5168580 [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 
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Studies like this support a view of ageing that see it as a preventable process. Audbrey de Grey, a biomedical gerontologist and long-time advocate of human life extension, describes ageing as “a collection of cumulative changes to the molecular and cellular structure of the adult organism”.12 As soon as we uncover ways of stopping and reversing these changes, we will be able to stop and reverse ageing.  In addition to biological interventions such as NAD+, advanced technologies may also be used to combat age related decline. The futurist Raymond Kurzweil believes that advanced medical nanobots will one day be developed which could completely remedy the effects of ageing.13 These nanobots would be introduced into our cells and fix any age related damage as it occurs. The development of these types of technologies will be driven in part through corporate interest in life extension. In September 2013 Google, one of the world’s largest companies, established a subsidiary with the sole focus of investigating new ways to increase human lifespan.14 Similarly Craig Ventor, whose company Celera Genomics was the first to sequence the human genome, recently established Human Longevity Inc, a new company with a focus on enhancing human lifespan.15 The involvement of companies like this in human life extension may lead to innovative new approaches.  Hence it seems at least feasible that in the future we will have the ability to radically extend human lifespan. Ageing consists of a series of physical changes which, in theory, can be prevented and reversed. Once technologies are available that can stop and reverse ageing, then a world where human life expectancy exceeds 5000 years seems possible. Whether this change would affect the evolvability of the species will be my focus for the rest of this paper. 
Will radical life extension make the species less evolvable through 
biological mechanisms? One way the empirical claims of SE might be true is through an effect on biological evolution. For most species on earth a significant slowing of the rate of generational turnover would significantly reduce their evolutionary potential. Without a constant influx of new individuals a population’s ability to evolve though natural selection would be significantly curtailed. This is because generational turnover is the most important source of heritable variation for most species of animals. Each new generation introduces novel genes, created by mutation, into the population. Some of these new genes will subsequently result in novel phenotypic traits which can then be subject to natural selection. Similarly, every new generation recombines the existing genetic information contained in a population into novel combinations. Both these processes are important to biological evolution, and are required for most populations to undergo adaptive changes.  
12 A. D. de Grey. An Engineer's Approach to the Development of Real Anti-Aging Medicine. Sci Aging 
Knowledge Environ 2003; 2003: 1vp-1. 13 R. Kurzweil. The Singularity Is Near. New York: Penguin; 2005. p. 39.   14 M. Liedtke. 2013. Google tackles immortality with launch of health company Calico. Sydney Morning Herald 19 September. Available at: www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/google-tackles-immortality-with-launch-of-health-company-calico-20130919-2u1fh.html [Accessed 16 October 2014] 15 C. Cookson. 2014. Can we extend healthy life? Financial Times March 14. Available at: www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/566821c0-aa4d-11e3-8497-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wI7LBe12 [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 
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Therefore, we would expect any intervention which significantly altered the rate of generational turnover to change the amount of heritable variation that is available to populations of most species of animals. This would subsequently reduce their evolutionary potential. If a population faces a novel selection pressure, such as changed environmental conditions, a constant supply of new genetic variants can help uncover phenotypes that aid survival in the new conditions. These new variants can then spread through the population, helping the population to adapt to the changed conditions. Hence an intervention which radically extended life expectancy and resulted in individuals being only very rarely replaced could be expected to reduce the evolutionary potential of most populations of animals.16 Humans have the same DNA-based inheritance mechanisms as other species of animals, so the effects discussed above are also relevant to human populations. This is one mechanism through which radical life extension may reduce the evolvability of the species, and through which the empirical claims of SE may hold.    One area where this effect may be particularly relevant for modern human populations is with regard to pathogenic threats. This has been suggested by Nick Agar, who states: 
negligible senescence is, from an evolutionary standpoint, a bit like asexual 
reproduction. It gives no opportunity to change the locks on cellular surfaces… (it) 
may increase our vulnerability to the quadrillions and quadrillions of parasites 
seeking to infect us.17  Agar is right that dramatically extending lifespan may reduce the ability of human populations to evolve through natural selection in response to pathogenic threats. However by the time we have the technology available to undergo radical life extension, genetic engineering technologies may enable us to alter the components of our immune system directly. This would mean that human populations could respond to disease threats biologically, through artificial means. More significantly, the major way human populations respond to pathogenic threats today is through non-biological mechanisms. As Powell says:  
epidemics in human populations can be contained and extinguished in a matter of 
days, months, or years through cultural–behavioural modifications, including 
sanitation, vaccination, and the availability of antibiotics; in contrast, the genetic 
origin and fixation of an immunological adaptation can take hundreds or 
thousands of years, depending on mutation rates, population structure, selection 
pressures, and the type of adaptation in question.18  
16 This idea forms the basis of group-selection or “evolvability” theories of ageing. For example see: V. D. Longo, et al. Programmed and altruistic ageing. Nat Rev Genet 2005; 6: 866-872;T. C. Goldsmith. Aging, evolvability, and the individual benefit requirement; medical implications of aging theory controversies. J 
Theor Biol 2008; 252: 764-768. The claims these theories make regarding the evolutionary origin of ageing are highly controversial, mainly because they appear incompatible with natural selection (A. D. De Grey. Calorie restriction, post-reproductive life span, and programmed aging: a plea for rigor. Ann N Y Acad Sci 2007; 1119: 296-305.) However even if ageing did not specifically evolve as a way to help populations adapt, it could still have this effect. If ageing helps keep the rate of generational turnover high, which in turn introduces novel genetic variants into a population, this will help populations adapt to changing conditions.  17 N. Agar. Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press; 2010. p124. 18 R. Powell. The Future of Human Evolution. Br J Philos Sci 2011; 63: 145-175. 
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This is also true for most other adaptive challenges that modern humans face. The major way our populations respond to threats in their environments is through changes to phenotype mediated by cultural changes. This has been the primary mechanism through which humans have become so well adapted to their environment across Earth.   Therefore, although radical life extension would in principle reduce the capacity of our species to respond to threats through natural selection, this does not mean that the empirical claims of SE hold. Genetic engineering technologies may enable us to biologically evolve through artificial mechanisms, and so radical life extension need not reduce our biological evolvability. More importantly our populations will still be able to undergo cultural evolution, which is a far more significant evolutionary process for modern human populations. Hence it seems unlikely that the effect of radical life extension on biological evolution will reduce the total evolvability of the human species.     
Will radical life extension make the species less evolvable through 
cultural mechanisms? If the empirical claims made by SE are to be plausible this will likely be through an effect on cultural, rather than biological, evolvability. Cultural evolution describes a process through which the distribution of cultural variants19 (such as ideas, beliefs, and skills), change over time.20 This process encompasses how our technologies change over time, as technologies can be viewed as physical manifestations of specific cultural variants. The propensity of human populations to generate novel cultural variants, including technologies, and the propensity for adaptive variants to spread and be maintained within populations, helps explain why our species has been so successful. This is made evident by Henrich: 
our ecological success, technology, and adaptation to diverse environments is not 
due to our intelligence. Alone and stripped of our culture, we are hopeless as a 
species. Cumulative cultural evolution has delivered both our fancy technologies 
as well as the subtle and unconscious ways that humans have adapted their 
behavior and thinking to tackle environmental challenges.21   In this section I want to make some preliminary arguments to show that, in principle, radical life extension could affect cultural evolutionary processes. I will argue that because radical life extension will result in a slowing of the rate of generational turnover, it could influence both a population’s propensity to generate novel cultural variants and the ability of adaptive variants to spread through populations. 
19 In this paper, I will follow Richerson and Boyd and use the term cultural variants to refer to the units of cultural information i.e. “ideas", "beliefs", "values", and "skills” (see P. J. Richerson & R. Boyd. Not By Genes 
Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2008.) However I remain neutral as to the precise mechanisms of cultural evolution. By using their terminology I do not wish to endorse Richerson’s and Boyd’s ‘dual inheritance’ model.  20 Recent examples of cultural evolution can be seen in the spread of novel technologies, and the corresponding changes in skills and ideas they necessitate. The invention of the automobile, for example, is both a product and a driver of cultural evolution. Not only is the car the product of novel ideas, such as those that underlie the internal combustion engine, but its invention has spurned other ideas and skills to spread through our populations. Driving skills are now widely taught and learnt throughout the world, as are ideas about appropriate driving conventions.  21 J. Henrich. 2011. A cultural species: How culture drove human evolution. Psychol Sci Agenda. Available at: www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2011/11/human-evolution.aspx [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 
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Generation of cultural variants  A regular generational turnover ensures that new individuals are constantly being introduced into a population. This could help generate new cultural information as each individual is raised in a unique cultural environment in which particular ideas and technologies are prominent. As radical life extension will reduce the rate of generational turnover, it could reduce the rate novel cultural variants are generated in human populations.   The cultural variants that individuals are first exposed to helps determine how they interpret and respond to information they are subsequently exposed to. This is reflected in the psychological phenomena “belief dependent realism”. Once individuals have a set of beliefs they become invested in them and this limits their ability to acquire other beliefs.22 This means that the order in which we acquire cultural variants is important. When we acquire certain ideas early in development we start to see the world in certain ways. It affects how we search for and interpret information, and influences which cultural variants we will subsequently acquire.   A constant generational turnover ensures that children23 are constantly developing in unique cultural environments and are exposed to different cultural variants early in development. This means that, over time, populations have a large number of different individuals exist in them, each of whom are disposed to develop different cultural variants. Therefore, as radical life extension will slow the rate of generational turnover, it may reduce the variance in ideas and skills that are available to populations over time.  Slowing the rate of generational turnover may also reduce the rate at which cultural variants are transmitted between individuals. This could slow the rate at which novel cultural variants are generated. Some cultural variants only need to be acquired once, after which individuals do not need to re-acquire them. Therefore, in a population where individuals are rarely or never replaced, some cultural variants will not need to be transmitted between individuals often. For example, once everyone in a population who wants to know how to fish, can fish, there is no need for fishing skills to be transmitted between individuals. In contrast in populations with a regular generational turnover children are constantly introduced into the population. This means skills and ideas need to be continually re-transmitted between individuals.  The process is likely to generate novel cultural variants for the simple reason that the transmission of cultural variants from one individual to another is “inherently error-ridden”.24 Individuals have only imperfect access to the cultural information that is stored in the brains of others and have to infer what ideas or beliefs others have. Because we don’t have direct access to the representations of others, the process of 
22 M. Shermer. The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies---How We Construct 
Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths. New York: St. Martin's Griffin; 2012. 23 In this paper I use the term “children” to refer to individuals who have immature bodies and brains, “adults” as individuals with mature bodies and brains, and “adolescents” as individuals in the period of moving between childhood and adulthood. Hence I do not take childhood as necessarily corresponding to a particular age, but rather to a state of mind and body.  24 R. Aunger. Three Roads to Cultural Recurrence. In Evolutionary Psychology and Information Systems 
Research. N. Kock, ed. New York: Springer; 2010. pp 343-355. 
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transmitting cultural variants from one individual to another can be messy – errors arise and this can produce novel cultural variants. 25 The tendency for increased transmission of cultural variants to result in the increased generation of novel variants can be seen in the case of skills. Often individuals will learn skills through a combination of social mechanisms and individual trial and error learning – a process known as “apprentice learning”.26 This process is likely to lead to variations in the skills realised in the learner, due to differences in their characteristics and their learning environment. For example, individuals trying to learn how to perform a tennis serve may end up with a slightly different serve than their teacher. This is because when they practice and engage in trial and error learning; they may find that slight variants of the serve work best for them, due to differences between themselves and their teacher or differences in their learning environment. Therefore the greater number of individuals with unique characteristics coming through a population and re-learning skills in unique learning environments, the more variations in those skills we can expect. These new variants can affect the trajectory of cultural inheritance in the next generation, because successful variants will act as models for subsequent generations.  
Spread of cultural variants  Another aspect of cultural evolution that could be affected by radical life extension is the propensity of cultural variants to spread through a population. A regular generational turnover provides a steady stream of children into a population, and children may be particularly well suited to copying cultural variants from others. One reason why the presence of children in a population may help cultural variants spread is that the brains of children are particularly malleable. As Jablonka and Lamb state “there seems to be a special ‘window of learning’ for some types of behaviour – a window that is wide open early in life and gradually closes as the individual matures”.27 This is reflected in the idea of critical, or sensitive, periods in development. The neural substrates required to perform certain skills do not develop normally if appropriate stimulation is not received during a restricted time period in development. For example – musicians who began practising before the age of seven have been shown to consistently outperform older trained musicians, even when factors like total years trained are controlled for.28 These differences in ability are mirrored by differences in the brains of the these musicians, with those who began practising before the age of seven showing much greater levels of myelination in areas of the brain associated with musical ability. Other critical periods have been postulated for visual perception,29  language acquisition, and auditory processing.30 
25 This process is evident in the children’s game “telephone”. In this game one person whispers a message to another, which is retold through a line of people until the last player announces the message to the entire group. Errors typically accumulate so the statement announced by the last player differs significantly from the one uttered by the first. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this analogy.   26 K. Sterelny. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2012. 27 E. Jablonka & M. Lamb. Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic 
Variation in the History of Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 2006. p166 28 D. Watanabe, et al. The effect of early musical training on adult motor performance: evidence for a sensitive period in motor learning. Exp Brain Res 2007; 176: 332-340. 29 T. L. Lewis & D. Maurer. Multiple sensitive periods in human visual development: evidence from visually deprived children. Dev Psychobiol 2005; 46: 163-183. 30 A. Sharma & J. Campbell. A sensitive period for cochlear implantation in deaf children. J Matern Fetal 
Neonatal Med 2011; 24 Suppl 1: 151-153. 
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Older individuals may therefore have difficulties in learning complex skills they observe in others, because their brains have passed various “critical periods,” and are not as flexible as the brains of children. If an individual develops a complex skill in a population consisting solely of mature individuals it may be unlikely for it to spread as it will be difficult for other members to adopt it.31  Besides being less able to adopt novel cultural variants, older individuals may also be less motivated to adopt them. One reason that adults may be less motivated than children to adopt new ideas and beliefs was touched on above – once individuals acquire certain ideas and beliefs they become invested in them and have trouble giving them up. This is reflected in the idea of “confirmation bias” – a tendency to seek and interpret information in a way that confirms one's beliefs.32 For example, when reading about political issues like gun control and affirmative action, individuals have been shown to prefer sources that affirm their existing attitudes and to interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their existing position.33 Adults are sometimes unmotivated to change their beliefs, because they do not perceive their current beliefs as deficient in any way. As children tend to not have as many fully formed beliefs as adults, they are not as prone to confirmation bias. As a result they may be more likely to acquire novel ideas and beliefs. A steady stream of children may therefore help novel ideas spread through populations.  The above is just a brief overview of some of the ways in which radical life extension could affect cultural evolutionary processes. By reducing the rate of generational turnover, radical life extension will reduce the number of individuals who are introduced into a population. This may reduce variation in the cultural information that is available to a population, as each individual has unique characteristics and a unique cultural background and hence will have their own propensity to develop cultural variants.  Further, reducing the rate of generational turnover also reduces the number of children who live in a population. This may affect the propensity of cultural variants to spread in a population as children have characteristics which make them particularly disposed and able to copy cultural variants. If radical life extension were to reduce the number of cultural variants available to a population, and also reduce the propensity of adaptive cultural variants to spread, then it is likely it would reduce the cultural evolvability of that population. Culture may be less likely to change in these populations, as they will consist nearly solely of mature individuals who are invested in their cultural variants and who are less likely to adopt novel cultural variants. Hence radical life extension could have a stagnating effect on culture. This provides one mechanism through which radical life extension could make populations less evolvable.  Therefore, although the specific cultural evolutionary consequences of radical life extension will be highly dependent on the specific details of the intervention and the 
31 It is possible that by the time radical life extension is technologically feasible, it may also be feasible for individuals to re-engineer their brains so that they can effectively learn new skills in spite of the fact that they have passed critical development periods. Similarly it may also become possible through genetic engineering, or other processes, for our brains to maintain their malleability well into adulthood. If this is the case, then radical life extension may have little effect on a population’s ability to acquire new skills.  32 R. Nickerson. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev Gen Psychol 1998; 2: 175-220. 33 C. S. Taber & M. Lodge. Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. Am J Pol Sci 2006; 50: 755-769. 
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population it occurs in, it is plausible that in certain conditions radical life extension will reduce cultural evolvability. The second argument from evolution, therefore, cannot be dismissed on purely empirical grounds. In cases of radical life extension there are plausible ways in which these interventions could make us less evolvable. Whether this provides any reason to think that radical life extension will be morally undesirable is the focus of the next section.  
Ethical implications In this section I will examine the evaluative claims of SE. If an intervention did make a population less evolvable, would this be morally undesirable? I will look at three reasons why interventions which reduce evolvability could be undesirable. Reduced evolvability could (1) increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) reduce well-being for individuals, and (3) impede moral progress. These factors point to possible costs associated with interventions which would result in radical life extension. 
Increased susceptibility to extinction risks  One reason a reduction in evolvability may be undesirable is that it will increase our susceptibility to extinction risks and make the species less likely to survive well into the future. If radical life extension adversely affects our ability to generate novel ideas and skills, we may be less able to adapt to environmental and societal challenges. This may make the species more likely to become extinct.  If radical life extension did increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, this could be morally undesirable. Some theorists claim that we have either instrumental or intrinsic reasons to value the continued existence of the species. For example Bostrom describes reducing our susceptibility to extinction risks as a “global public good”.34 Sidgwick describes the extinction of mankind as the “greatest conceivable crime”,35 a view with which Parfit sympathises.36 Temkin likewise believes we have reason to promote the continued existence of humanity.37 Agar defends a theory of goods called ‘species relativism’ which implies we have intrinsic reasons to try to prevent species extinction.38 Samuel Scheffler argues that the prospect of humanity's extinction would threaten the ability of individuals now living to lead good and fulfilling lives.39 In this paper I will not provide a thorough investigation of whether we actually have good moral reasons to value the continued existence of the species. I will merely note that some theories do imply that we have such reasons.40 Therefore, if radical life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species, then under these theories of goods, it would provide one reason why it would be undesirable. 
34 N. Bostrom. Existential risks: analyzing human extinction scenarios and related hazards. J Evol Technol 2002; 9: 1-30. 35 H. Sidgwick. The methods of ethics. London: Macmillan; 1907. p. 487. 36 D. Parfit. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987. p. 453.  37 L. S. Temkin. Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012. 38 Agar, op. cit. note 16 
39 S. Scheffler. Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press; 2013. 40 For a more in-depth discussion see: C. Gyngell. Enhancing the Species: Genetic Engineering Technologies and Human Persistence. Philos Technol 2012; 25: 495-512.  
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Effects on well-being Another reason that radical life extension would be undesirable is if it would reduce wellbeing for individuals. Specifically, a reduction in the rate of generational turnover – which can lead to reduced cultural evolvability – may adversely affect various practises and institutions which promote wellbeing. Two broad areas which contribute to wellbeing and may be affected by generational turnover are the Arts and Sciences. It’s plausible that the Arts (music, literature, and so forth) contribute to wellbeing for individuals living in a population. If these disciplines were adversely affected by interventions which reduced generational turnover, this would point to ways in which such interventions may reduce wellbeing.  Intuitively generational turnover seems important to the Arts. Each new generation brings fresh perspectives and new ideas to various artistic disciplines, and this seems to contribute to the diversity in artistic styles and the richness we observe in these disciplines. For example, music in populations with a high rate of generational turnover may be richer than in populations with a slow rate of generational turnover. This is because populations with a high rate of generational turnover will likely, over time, have more musicians than populations with a slow rate of generational turnover. Populations with high generational turnover will have many people cycling through them- and by extension more people who choose to become musicians. Although we may expect a greater proportion of a people to take up music in a world where everyone lives much longer, at very extended lifespans, this may not balance the reduction in musicians caused by a slower generational turnover.41 Similarly a regular generational turnover ensures that individuals who choose to take up music are constantly growing up in a unique cultural environment, which influences the music they ultimately create. These factors would be one reason to expect more variety in music in populations with a high level of generational turnover than in populations that have a very slow rate of generational turnover. Of course, there will be ways in which radical life extension will benefit music. Music may evolve into new and exciting forms in a world where people’s lives are vastly longer. For example operas and symphonies may not be limited by traditional time scales, and many extended for days rather than hours.42 Similarly individual musicians may benefit by having longer careers in music, or from coming to music after long careers in other fields. These benefits would need to be balanced and weighed against 
41 To illustrate this point, imagine a population of one million immortals (population X), versus a populations of one million individuals with a life expectancy of 100 (population Y). The maximum number of different individuals who can become musicians in population X is one million (i.e. if everyone becomes a musician). Assuming that at least some people in populations Y choose to become musicians every generation, the number of different individuals who will become musicians in population Y will keep increasing over time. At some point this number will exceed one million, and the number of musicians who have existed in Y will be greater than X. For example if 5% of the members of population Y choose to become musicians each generation, then in 21 generations (or 2100 years) the number of musicians who would have existed in population Y would be 1,050,000. Similarly even if members of X are not immortal, but still have a much slower generational turnover than members of Y, the number of musicians in population Y will increase at a faster rate than X over time. At some point it is likely the extra musicians in population Y created through a regular generational turnover would exceed the total number of people who have existed in X.     42 I thank an anonymous reviewer suggesting this possibility.  
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the costs associated with a reduced number of musicians in total. It’s possible that at some point, the gains associated with letting specific musicians live longer would not offset the costs of having fewer musicians in total over time.    The same can be said for other artistic disciplines. More artists in total over time, and more artists growing up in unique cultural niches, may benefit many artistic fields. Hence a risk of interventions which result in a reduction in the rate of generational turnover could be that they have an adverse effect on various artistic disciplines. This also has the potential to negatively affect wellbeing, as having a diverse and vibrant Arts culture can be seen as contributing to the wellbeing of individuals.  Another area which may be adversely affected by reduced generational turnover is the sciences. It seems plausible that progress in science is aided by a regular generational turnover which ensures a continual supply of new scientists. New scientists can bring different perspectives to problems and this helps drive science forward. Weisberg and Muldoon suggest that one factor which helps promote scientific progress is a mix of ‘maverick’ strategies, which pursue novel research agendas, and ‘follower’ strategies which pursue tried and proven research agendas.43 A mix of these strategies is the most efficient way to divide cognitive labour when searching through epistemic landscapes.  It’s possible that new and younger scientists may be more likely to align with maverick strategies. Often younger scientists are perceived as the ones more likely to make fundamental leaps in the field, as made clear by Kuhn:  
almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new 
paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm 
they change.44 Generational turnover may help supply scientists who pursue novel research agendas, in part because it supplies scientists who have been raised in unique cultural niches as discussed above. This may make these scientists more likely to stumble upon previously undiscovered peaks in the epistemic landscape and help drive science forward. Similarly, a constant supply of new scientists without preconceived ideas and beliefs about their field may also help scientific progresses by helping good ideas spread and gain prominence. If novel ideas arise which challenge conventional scientific wisdom, they may not spread in a population consisting solely of mature scientists. This is because mature scientists are more likely to suffer from the types of conformational biases discussed above. Having preconceived beliefs about a scientific field may interfere with one’s ability to fairly assess ideas that are contrary to accepted wisdom. This has been indicated by the German physicist Max Planck who once observed: 
a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making 
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.45  
43 M. Weisberg & R. Muldoon. Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philos Sci 2009; 76:225-252. 44 T. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1962. pp. 89-90.  45 H. Wolinsky. Paths to acceptance. The advancement of scientific knowledge is an uphill struggle against 'accepted wisdom'. EMBO Rep 2008; 9: 416-418. 
113 
 
                                                            
As was the case with the Arts, radical life extension may also have beneficial effects on science. Individuals will benefit from having thousands of years of to engage with their fields. Further having a radically extended lifespan may enable scientists to conduct new types of experiments that are not possible to conduct over a single lifetime currently. Again these benefits would need to be weighed against the costs associated with reduced generational turnover. It’s possible that at some extended lifespans, the benefits associated with further lifespan extension would not be offset by the increasing costs associated with reduced generational turnover. One possible consequence, then, of reducing cultural evolvability by slowing generational turnover is the slowing of scientific progress. This could reduce wellbeing for individuals living in a population as scientific discoveries often contribute to wellbeing. Advances in medicine, for example, make people’s lives better by improving health. Such advances may be fewer and further between in populations with slower generational turnover.   In sum, one possible way that interventions which reduce cultural evolvability may be undesirable is by having an adverse effect on institutions and practices that promote wellbeing. Two broad areas which contribute to wellbeing and may be adversely affected by reduced cultural evolvability are the Arts and Sciences. A regular generational turnover, providing novel cultural variants, helps ensure these disciplines flourish.  Of course this does not necessarily mean that, all things considered, wellbeing will be reduced in populations with a reduced generational turnover. When looking at interventions aimed at radical life extension specifically, people may prefer to live in populations with slower scientific progress and less diverse artistic disciplines, if it means they can live for thousands of years. Whether, and to what extent, a radically extended lifespan will improve individual wellbeing has been looked at in detail by others.46 In this section I merely want to note that there are some ways in which being less evolvable could negatively impact on wellbeing, and these costs would need to be weighed against any wellbeing benefits associated with having a radically extended life-span.  
Moral progress A final reason that reduced cultural evolvability may be undesirable is that it may impede moral progress. Moral beliefs are influenced by confirmation bias and once formed they are difficult to change.47 This means that Planks’ quote about progress in science above could also apply to moral progress “new moral ideas do not triumph by convincing their opponents and making them see the light, but rather because their opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with them”.  Peter Singer describes moral progress as “expanding circles of moral concern”.48 While early humans were only concerned with the wellbeing of their immediate kin and group members, society has been slowly evolving so that individuals have begun to care for larger and larger portions of humanity. This was initially limited to concern for individuals in neighbouring groups, then to individuals in larger national and ethnic 
46 See for example B. Williams. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981.; Temkin, op. cit. note 5.  47 J. Haidt. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. 
Psychological Review 2001; 108: 814-834. 48 P. Singer. The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2011. 
114 
 
                                                            
groups, and is in the process of expanding to all of humanity and non-human animals. This type of progress has been epitomised over the last century with the increasing recognition of rights for disadvantaged groups. In the United States, this began with the women’s rights movement and the African-American civil rights movement, and can be seen more recently in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement and the animal rights movement.  Generational change can be seen as playing an important role in the type of rights movements described above. The women’s rights movement is strongly associated with the ‘roaring twenties,’ a period of significant social and moral change that occurred during the 1920’s. Today, younger generations are much more supportive of LGBT rights, and show greater concern for animal welfare, than older generations.49 Presumably this is partly due the fact that once individuals have fully formed beliefs about whether a particular group is deserving of equal rights, it may be difficult for them to change this belief, due to confirmation bias. A regular generational turnover can therefore be seen as important to this conception of moral progress as it provides a continuous supply of individuals without preformed moral beliefs.50    Therefore, if we were to slow the rate of generational turnover, this may reduce the opportunities our populations have for moral reform. Our populations will consist nearly entirely of individuals with fully formed moral beliefs who have difficulty changing these beliefs. In this section I have outlined three ways in which interventions which reduce evolvability may be undesirable. Hence I have tried to show that the evaluative claims made by SE are plausible. If the species as a whole becomes less evolvable then this may be undesirable as it could increase our susceptibility to extinction risks, negatively impact some institutions and practices that improve wellbeing and impede moral progress. However it needs to be stressed that this does not mean that, all things considered, radical life extension, or any intervention which did reduce evolvability, would be morally undesirable. Having a vastly extended lifespan may be highly desirable for a host of other reasons that outweigh concerns related to reduced evolvability. Still, the costs relating to reduced evolvability need to be considered when assessing the moral desirability of interventions which aim at radical life extension. 
Conclusion In his paper ‘Is Living Longer Living Better?’ Larry Temkin asks:   
would an outcome in which society’s members lived forever be ideal? Would it be 
as good as an outcome where society’s members were continually replaced every 
100 years, or perhaps every couple of centuries?51 
49 T. Smith and J. Son. 2013. Trends in Public Attitudes about Sexual Morality. NORC at the University of 
Chicago. Available at: www.norc.org/PDFs/Trend_Report_Sexuality.pdf [Accessed May 30, 2014]; J. Wilke and L. Saad. 2013. Older Americans' Moral Attitudes Changing. Gallup politics Available at: www.gallup.com/poll/162881/older-americans-moral-attitudes-changing.aspx [Accessed 16 October 2014]. 50 Conversely a slow generational turnover may help preserve values through time. This is a potential benefit of radical life extension, as stable values may promote social cohesion. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.  51 Temkin, op. cit. note 5. p. 193.  
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In this paper I have not tried to answer Temkin’s question, but rather attempted to show that a specific argument is applicable to it. The second argument from evolution claims that interventions which radically extend lifespan and slow generational turnover will make our species less evolvable, and that this will be undesirable in some way. I have argued that both of these claims are plausible. A regular generational turnover provides populations with a constant source of genetic and cultural novelty which helps with biological and cultural evolvability. If our populations were to become less evolvable, there are several ways in which this may be undesirable – it may reduce well-being for individuals, impede moral progress and make us more susceptible to extinction risks. Hence the second argument from evolution provides some reason why we would prefer the second alternative in Temkin’s questions – an outcome in which society’s members were continually replaced every 100 years, or every couple of centuries – over one in which society’s members live indefinitely.   
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Conclusions and Future Directions   In the preceding chapters I have sought to contribute to several debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement. In this concluding chapter, I will review some key themes that emerge from this thesis and outline their broader relevance to enhancement ethics, as well as applied and normative ethics.  
Human diversity  In this thesis I argue that when we consider the impact of enhancement technologies we must keep in mind their influence on human diversity. Some types of diversity help human groups flourish. In Chapter 1, I show that genetic diversity helps human populations be resilient and adaptable in the face of environmental and social change, and in Chapter 5 I argue that the same is true of cultural diversity. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I discuss the benefits associated with population-level cognitive diversity, which improves the ability of human groups to solve complex problems.   One risk of technologies that allow people to manipulate their capacities is that they will diminish these valuable forms of diversity. For example in Chapter 2 I argue that widespread access to reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) could result in “collective action problems”. If parents have access to RGTs that target innate immunity, or certain cognitive traits, we may expect them to use these technologies in ways that maximise benefits for their children. However if many parents do this, it may reduce population-level immune diversity and cognitive diversity, which could leave society more susceptible to threats such as those posed by epidemics. Importantly the risk of RGTs to human diversity does not depend on whether the intervention is a therapy or not. In Chapter 3, I argue treatments for particular disabilities, Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia could potentially diminish valuable forms of human diversity. Some disabilities are associated with valuable cognitive styles, and the use of RGTs to select against them could remove valuable forms of diversity from our populations. Life extension technologies may also reduce valuable types of human diversity. In Chapter 5 I argue that technologies which allow individuals to radically extend their own lives could reduce the evolvability of the species as a whole. Radical increases in life expectancy would reduce the rate of generational turnover. Because each new generation brings with it genetic and cultural novelty, slowing the rate of generational turnover could reduce the supply of diversity to our populations, making them less adaptable to environmental and social challenges.   A key risk of enhancement technologies, therefore, is that they may reduce valuable forms of human diversity. This could end up harming our populations, future generations, and the species as a whole. This risk has, to date, been largely unrecognised in the literature on enhancement ethics.  The recognition of the moral importance of promoting and maintaining valuable forms of human diversity could also have implications for other areas of applied ethics.  Education systems, for example, greatly influence population-level cognitive diversity; yet cognitive diversity is rarely discussed in the context of the ethics of schooling and education polices. Similarly, if some types of diversity help populations flourish, this may be relevant when allocating scarce healthcare resources. If healthcare resources 
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are allocated with a view to maintaining valuable forms of diversity, this could have longer lasting benefits for a population. However the concept of population diversity is rarely mentioned in the context of the ethics of resource allocation.   Therefore, the perspectives presented in this thesis on human diversity have broad relevance, not just to debates on the ethics of enhancement technologies, but also to other areas of applied ethics.  
Human persistence  Another key theme that emerges from this thesis is the moral value of human persistence. In Chapters 1, 3 and 5, I discuss the moral reasons why we should care about the persistence of the species. I argue that there are instrumental and intrinsic reasons why we should value human persistence. In Chapter 1, I suggest that utilitarians have instrumental reasons to care about the continued existence of the species, as it is likely to promote total utility through time. Similarly those who believe there is value in the existence of great works of art have reasons to value the continued existence of beings capable of producing great art. As Kantians believe rational beings have inherent value, they too have reasons to value the continued existence of humanity, as it will ensure the continued existence of rational agents. There may also be reasons why proponents of contractarianism should value human persistence. In Chapter 5, I discuss a recent manuscript by Samuel Scheffler, in which he argues that the continued survival of humanity is vital for an individual’s ability to lead a good and fulfilling life.1 If it is true that people’s own abilities to live good lives is dependent on the continued existence of humanity, then under a veil of ignorance, people may prefer states of affairs in which the populations they live in are robust, and likely to continue to exist well into the future. Hence those that follow social contract theories will also likely value provisions that promote human persistence. The value of human persistence is a growing, yet still underdeveloped, area of normative ethics. In future work I hope to further explore these ideas and develop a formal approach to the value of human persistence. 
Contextualised enhancement In the Introduction, I reviewed seven different enhancement conceptions that have been used in the philosophical literature: the functional approach (FA); the constructivist approach (CA); the normal-functioning approach (NFA); the species typical approach (STA); the species maximal approach (SMA); the welfarist conception (WC); and the modified welfarist approach (MWA). I argue that not much is at stake regarding our choice of enhancement concept. If enhancement is understood in an objective sense (as in FA or NFA), then knowing whether something is or is not an enhancement does not provide moral reasons to be in favour of it or against it. While under some normative understanding of enhancement (such as WC and MWA), knowing whether something is an enhancement does provide moral reasons why we should be in favour of it; this merely shifts the debate to one about which particular biotechnologies should be considered as enhancements. In neither case does our choice of enhancement concept play a significant role when assessing the ethical implications of capacity-altering biotechnologies.  
1 S. Scheffler. Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press; 2013. 
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Also in the Introduction I review various arguments for and against human enhancement as a general project. I argued that none of these arguments suggest that altering our traits carries a special normative significance. We should not expect the ethical implications of enhancement technologies to follow a general pattern, such as all being permissible or impermissible.  In light of this I believe the proper role of bioethicists in the enhancement debate is to elucidate the moral reasons for or against using particular technologies in particular contexts. Rather than arguing about how best to understand enhancement, or which biotechnologies are enhancements, theorists should directly discuss the moral reasons for and against particular technologies. Therefore this thesis supports a contextualised approach to the ethics of enhancement technologies, rather than a generalised approach.  
Good enhancement and right enhancement A related theme from this thesis is the need to think about the goals we should be pursuing with enhancement technologies. To date theorists have tended to focus on issues related to the permissibility of using enhancements. This is partly because of the specialised ways in which the term “enhancement” has been understood in the literature. If we understand enhancements as biotechnologies that go beyond the limits of medicine, or take individuals beyond species’ typical levels, it becomes an interesting question whether using them is right or wrong.  However this focus on the permissibility of enhancement technologies has impeded debates regarding the goals we should be pursuing with biotechnologies. What capacities and traits should we be altering and why? What regulatory frameworks will ensure the benefits from enhancement technologies are maximised?  How can we best use enhancement technologies to promote the good? In this context, I believe the importance of enhancing certain collective properties has been largely overlooked in the literature. To date, most of the debates about enhancement technologies have focused on the enhancement of individual traits such as lifespan, intelligence and well-being. However enhancement technologies also have the potential to benefit human groups. In Chapter 1, I show that genetic engineering technologies have the potential to increase the persistence of the human species. Genetic engineering technologies may help us maintain the optimal balance between the exploitation and exploration in the human gene pool. These technologies may therefore help secure the long term future of the human species. Similarly, in Chapter 4 I argue that cognitive and moral enhancement technologies have the potential to increase our collective ability to solve problems. Cognitive enhancement technologies may help us maximise valuable forms of cognitive diversity, and moral enhancements may help leverage this diversity by improving our ability to cooperate. The importance of enhancing these collective properties needs to be part of a wider discussion in enhancement ethics regarding how we can best use enhancement technologies to promote the good – both for individuals and for society as a whole.    
Coordinated enhancement  A final theme of this thesis is the need to think about enhancement in terms of cooperation and coordination. When individuals use enhancements they will likely do so in the context of widespread access to these technologies. The effects of an 
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individual using a particular enhancement technology will depend on the ways in which others are using this technology. For example in Chapter 2 I argue that some uses of reproductive genetic technologies will be expected to increase well-being for individuals if these acts are considered in isolation; however if many people use these technologies in the same way it may reduce valuable forms of diversity and make everyone worse off.   Similarly in Chapter 4 I argue that if we approach cognitive enhancement in a way that focusses on enhancing the cognitive capacities of individuals, the project may end up being collectively self-defeating. Cognitive enhancements could end up making each individual smarter but in the process reduce our collective ability to solve problems.  This is because our collective ability to solve problems depends not only on the cognitive capacities of individuals, but also on the levels of cognitive diversity and the ability of individuals to cooperate with one another.  These considerations show the need to think of human enhancement as a collective enterprise. Often, in order to achieve the best results with enhancement technologies – to achieve the most good – individuals need to coordinate their enhancement decisions.  Going forward there is important work to be done on the question of how we can best coordinate our actions with enhancement technologies. How does knowing how others will likely use enhancement technologies affect how we should use them? What regulatory structures will best enable us to coordinate our enhancement decisions, ensuring the best outcome for all? These are some of the questions I hope to address in future work.      
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